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ABSTRACT
Si:
nce West Germany emerged once more as a sovereign
nation after World War II, it has become known as a " Social
Market Economy " to describe its economic policy making mecha
nism. This system places a strong emphasis on the free interplay
of the market forces of supply and demand, tempered only by the
need to eliminate its excesses by providing social benefits to
the less privileged members of society. Theoretically, therefore,
the " Social Market Economy " occupies the middle ground between
the capitalist and socialist states. The thesis suggests a spe
cific definition of the term as an observable entity.
West Germany's economy has functioned very successfully
during this era, and it is generally believed that the practice
of " Social Market " economic policy has been responsible. Al
though there is some truth in this assertion, the overwhelming
evidence suggests that " Social Market " policy had little di
rect credit for the " Wirtschaftswunder ". The discussion is
related to three criteria of economic performance, the balance
of payments, price and monetary stability, and investment and
capital formation. In these areas Germany's economic activity has
been particularly exemplary according to its records. The analy
sis of the determinants of progress reveal why the actual causal
process was largely independent of subjective factors, i.e. eco
nomic policy decisions and why specifically of " Social Market
Economy " related decisions.
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WEST CffiHMANY:

ECONOMIC POLICY

IN A "SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY"
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the influence of
economic policy on the economic development of Germany in the post-war
period, particularly in the last ten years from 1957 to 1967.

Three

criteria have been chosen from the mass of factors which -underlie the
country's economic evolution, namely the balance of payments, price and
monetary stability, and investment and capital, formation.

The reason

for choosing these particular criteria is that they are generally believed
to be the keys to the economic development of Germany that brought
1

prosperity in the post-war years.

In addition, these criteria are very

broad and allow much scope for policy decisions.
Economic policy will not, however, be analyzed only through its
forward link, that is as a determinant of economic development, but also
through its backward link.
tion of economic policy.

Backward linkage in this sense means motiva
The West German economy is often referred to

as a "Social Market Economy" .

It is understood from such a label that

the economic policy practised by the government followed the guidelines
of a specific economic system.

The more precise intent of the thesis is

■i
The Economist. "The German Lesson", 15-21 October, 1966.

I
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then to show both the evaluation of economic policy on Germany's economic
development in general and the extent to which that policy was motivated
by "Social Market" theory in particular, if "Social Market" theory was a
meaningful reality.
In the analysis of the factors influencing the economic develop
ment of post-war Germany, a very clear step-by-step method must be main
tained.

First the influences that were subject to economic policy

decisions must be separated from those that were not, the objective
influences as they are usually called.
tions must follow.

Secondly, the respective evalua

Were the economic policy decisions and the objective

influences conducive or not conducive to economic progress?

Furthermore,

it must then be determined whether those subjective factors, that is
economic policy decisions, that did influence economic development were
motivated by "Social Market" theory.
or was it harmful to the economy?

Was this relationship beneficial

Finally, a judgment must be made of

what on balance decided the outcome of economic development.

7/ere the

objective or the subjective factors predominant, and if the latter, were
they "Social Market" oriented or not?
Since I do not presume to label West Germany a "Social Market
Economy" a priori, the first chapter explores the meaning of this ex
pression.

The questions of how the idea of a "Social. Market Economy"

originated, how unique it was as an economic system in Germany and else
where and how it was actually incorporated into the system of economic
policy in Germany are elucidated.

Once the degree of the validity of

the hypothesis that Germany does constitute a "Social Market Economy"
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is established, economic policy can be evaluated in the context of the
actual criteria of economic development.
The following three chapters are devoted to that purpose.
The balance of payments is the first criterion.

This criterion has

set the stage for the overall development of the economy through its
radiating effects to the other two criteria and so it precedes the
stability and capital formation questions.

A statistical account on

the balance of payments is presented over the post-war period.

The

factors, structural or otherwise, that are important as the underlying
elements of the balance of payments and the effect of policy on them
complete the chapter.

The other two chapters are similarly organized.

Chapter three, which deals with monetary and price stability, explores
the presence or absence of inflation in Germany during the same time,
the behaviour of the economic agents responsible for the outcome and
the reaction of the government to it.

Chapter four, which deals with

investment and capital formation, analyzes this major phenomenon of
growth in Germany.

The analysis of growth includes a sectoral break

down of the components of the economy's product subject to growth as
well as the causative elements behind evolution and the action of policy
to reinforce or counteract their movement.
The thesis should clarify the intense intellectual struggle
that has prevailed in Germany throughout the sixties on the question of
economic policy.

There is a widespread diversity of opinion among

economists and politicians.

There are those who consider that Germany

constitutes a "Social Market Economy" and that it is this fact that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

accounted for the economic resurgence of the country during the post
war period.

Others agree that Germany is a "Social Market Economy”

"but hold this system responsible for the economic troubles that have
beset the country in the sixties.

Finally others insist that whether

or not the country is or is not a "Social Market Economy” hats had no
connection with the economic policy followed.
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CHAPTER 1
THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY

In this chapter the meaning of the term "Social Market Economy’1
shall he investigated.

The fact that only one country1s economic system

is referred to as such is not an indication by itself that one is dealing
with a system that is different from any other.

Thus, the concept must

be defined and supplemented by a historical analysis of how it evolved to
its present connotation.
Secondly, the extent to which the German economy took on the
features of the "Social Market Economy" concept shall be determined.
A theoretical system implies a certain institutional and legal framework
an well as a certain behaviour on the part of those responsible for the
execution of the system in practice.
answered;

Again then the question must be

how unique has practice, or more specifically, economic policy

made the German economic system?
The meaning of "Social Market Economy" involves a very complex
philosophy of economic behaviour.

The philosophy is based essentially

on the competitive market mechanism,

into which some protection is built

for the less fortunate members of the economic community.

There can be

excesses to competition e.g. when bankruptcy leads to unemployment, which
can lead to temporary hardships.

Reuss, an expert on the German post-war

5
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economy, acutely noted the essence of the "Social Market" principle when
he stated that it was an economic system that worked through incentives
at the top and through paternalism at the bottom, in other words, freedom
of competition among large economic agents and protection of the lower
classes of agents.

2

Its purpose was then, not only to secure the greatest

degree of prosperity possible, but also to eliminate social conflicts, as
those between economically different classes.

It is in this sense that

the system can be termed a philosophy of economic behaviour, rather than
simply an order of economic relationships.

Expressed in still another

way, the essence of a "Social Market Economy is not synonomous with its
goals, for it includes non-economic judgments along with economic judgments
in setting the criteria for specific goals.

Further clarification as to

the idea of "Social Market Economy" will follow from the analysis of its
historical, evolution.
The origins of the ideas on which the "Social Market" concept
relies most heavily can be traced back to classical economic thought.
Both Smith and Ricardo emphasized the supreme importance of the market
principle as the "engine of progress and prosperity".
tute one half of the dual notion "Social Market".

These ideas consti

The attribute "Social"

relates to the second half of the nineteenth century.

During that era,

the free market in Germany became the most concentrated one in Europe.
Smith and Ricardo had pointed out that unless a free market, or perfect
competition as it is now called, existed, resources were not distributed

^Frederick Reuss, Fiscal Policy for Growth Without
Inflation:
The German Experiment (Baltimore; The John Hopkins Press,
1961),p.6l,
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justly and efficiently.
in Germany arose.

Consequently, opposition to the course of events

Religious doctrines on social justice, dated from the

Middle Ages, were revived, and the onus was placed on the government to
correct the injustices.
cated.

"Staatssozialismus" or state socialism was advo-

When the German Empire collapsed in 1918, and the Social Democrats

started the Weimar Republic, social reforms were extended, but the problem
of competition in the market was left untouched.

In fact, the great steel

and chemical cartels in Germany were formed during this period.

Finally,

the era of nazism removed the last remnants of a free market economy.
It was during that reign that the exponents of what later became known as
the "Social Market Economy1' formed their crucial ideas.
In 1945, the autocratic and totalitarian system was swept away
and the "Social Market" supporters had the opportunity to bring their ideas
to fruition.

The continued electoral victories of the CDU party (Christian

Democrats ) were, however, the decisive factor that allowed the "Social
Market" theorists to predominate in the re-shaping of the economy.

If the

Social Democrats had won the election in 1949, they would have instituted
a social welfare state based on the British Labour party's model and would
not have heard the "Social Market" advocates who stood in the ranks of the
Christian Democrats for the most part.
Despite the fact that the "Social Market" protagonists were in
general opposed to the Social Democrats and the welfare state they stood
for, there is by no means complete harmony in their interpretation of
"Social Market" theory.

There are two distinct lines of thought on the

Reinhard Behlke, Per Neoliberalismus und die Gestaltung
der Wirtschaftsverfassung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin; Duncker
und Humblot, 1963), p. 80.
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subject.

Walter Eucken, who until his premature death in 1950, was

Professor at Freiburg University in Germany, is the originator of one
line of thought, the "neoliberal" or "ordoliberal" one.

Alfred

Muller-Armack, Professor at Munster and later advisor to the economics
minister, Ludwig Erhard, constitutes the other.

II

Wilhelm Ropke at

Geneva was another prominant economist, who thought along "Social Market"
lines, but since his main work was directed less to theoretical economics
than to specific problems, he cannot readily be classified as either in
the Eucken or Muller-Armack traditionA

The school of thought that Eucken

formed, the Freiburg School, unfortunately did not develop very much after
Eucken died, although there were several other contributors along the same
lines.

5

i*
Muller-Armack, on the other hand, has tried to elaborate and

clarify his own ideas.

On account of his close association with Erhard,

moreover, his influence must be considered at least equivalent to that of
the Eucken School.
Eucken considered the "Social Market Economy" as the natural
outcome of the requirements for economic and political order.

Progressive

concentration of economic power created "disorder" economically because it
distorted the working of the price mechanism and lead to a maldistribution
of resources.
resulted.

It lead to "disorder" politically because social injustices

(He has fused the implications of classical economics and

"Staatssozialismus").

If all economic processes were highly integrated,

and if the whole economic order was interrelated with the state, law and
society he reasoned, then the entire social order depended on the continued

^
Wilhelm Ropke, Pin Jahrzehnt Sozialer Marktwirtsch^ft in
Deutschland und Seine Lehren (Cologne - Marieriburg: Verlag fur
Politik und Wirtschaft, 1953), p.30 .
^

Franz Bolim and Alexander Rustow et al. ; see bibliography.
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£
existence of the free market mechanism.

"/hat his economic "morphology"

revealed had to he the prime concern of his "Ordnungspolitik", the
search for forms of economic behaviour and institutions to be set up and
the conditions for continued existence.

The forms were those required

for the institutionalization and preservation of the competitive order.
Within this order, households and firms were absolutely free to carry on
their business."^ He used emphatically the word forms of behaviour instead
of processes.

If processes were defined, the result would be a socialist

economy, a "Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft"

8

as he called it.

The

distinction essentially rests with the detail to which behaviour is speci
fied, the implication being that only the broad lines of behaviour had to
be dictated.

This is the crucial distinction.

He wanted a broad frame

work set up as a guide but not to specify its details.

The forms which

Eucken compilated were of two kinds, "constitutive" and "regulative".
The former are those required for the establishment of a perfect competitive
order and the latter, those assuring its continuation.
principles are the following:
1.

The constitutive

9

An operationally meaningful system of prices existing
under perfect competition.

The argument, in this

regard, is the classical one for perfect competition,
maximum output and minimum price.

Behlke, Neoliberalismus. p. 57.
^Walter Eucken, Grundsatze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Berlin;
Duncker und Humblot, 196l), p. 152.
O

°Behlke, Neoliberalismus. p. 45
Q

.

Eucken, Grundsatze, p. 150-7
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2.

Monetary Stability.
Eucken regarded this as the most important constitutive
principle, essential economically to preserve the role
of the price mechanism and politically to prevent social
unrest.

3.

Free access to all markets.
The neoliberals were of course free traders and wanted
tariffs and patent rights etc. restricted in their extent
to assure maximum market freedom.

4.

Private Property.
This was a condition of individual freedom and of a
competitive order based on performance.
however, be used to limit competition.

It should not,
Complete

liability of property in contracts was to be a move in
this direction as well as assuring that profitability
was based on economic performance and not on the legal
position of the entity.
5.

Stability of general economic policy.
TOiat Eucken meant by stability was economic policy that
did not vary too drastically from one period to another.
For if it did, it would act as an exogenous force inter
fering with the market forces and upset the price
mechanism's role as a signalling device.

This leads

to inefficiency and speculation, both of which encourage
concentration.

The threat of a sudden change in economic

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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policy increases the risk of any decision and so firms
concentrate to spread the risk.
The regulative principles, on the other hand, must insure the
preservation of the competitive order and correct its excesses, which
cannot always he avoided.
1.

There are two regulative principles, namely:

Monopoly Restraint.
The preservation of the competitive order by necessity
implies monopoly restraint.

To accomplish this Eucken

envisaged a commission independent of private or govern
ment interference to serve as the regulating agent.
The criterion he suggested to judge the degree of
restraint was the uniformity of the products offered.
2.

"Sozial" and "Vitalpolitik" or Human Welfare Policy.
Since the forms were to be established only as broad
categories, minor infractions of social justice and
income distribution were bound to occur, and so
provisions had to be made to allow for corrective
interferences on the part of the government.
Occasionally perfect competition was necessarily non
existent as in the case of natural monopolies and,
at other times, it would not be just an in housing,
for example.

These negative interferences had to

be likewise complemented and supplemented by positive
corrections or "Vitalpolitik".

"Vitalpolitik"

basically means improving the social status of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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working classes.

The capitalist process, according

to the neoliberals, tended to downgrade the intelligence
of workers, as it demanded only mechanical tasks from
them.

To counteract this tendency, they advocated

worker-manager cooperation and expanded educational
opportunities for the workers.

The neoliberals were

extremely conscious of the social and intellectual
needs of man-kind apart from the material requirements.
The economic relationship between management and workers
in the competitive market could not make allowance for
these needs and so government had to provide for them.
Further elaboration of the ordoliberal system is largely lacking.
Eucken established only basic requirements and two criteria where govern
ment interference in the economic sector would be permitted.

Instead of

specifying further, his followers have restricted themselves to classify
ing any potential interferences as either market conforming or non-market
conforming, according to whether they changed the market-determined supplydemand relationship or not.

For example, a specific subsidy to one

industry would be considered non-conforming, while general subsidization
would be conforming.
Before turning to the Muller-Armack School reference should be
made at this point to Ropke, for although his work was less theoretical,
he spelled out the neoliberal forms in specific reform demands.

For

instance, he strongly supported the liberalization of foreigh trade and
the maintenance of monetary stability after the war.

In this latter
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capacity, he had considerable influence in pressuring for the revaluation
it
Monetary stability was for Ropke the

of the Deutsche Mark in 1961.

ft

essence of a "Social Market Economy".

Erhard aptly voiced Ropke's

thoughts in his own definition of a "Social Market Economy1: An econoniy
that was based on freedom in the realm of goods and discipline in the
realm of money.^

Ropke reasoned accordingly because he believed that

in Germany, as in most other European countries, there existed an inevitable
tendency toward collectivism.

11

The slightest disorder in the economy

encouraged such a tendency and the value of money was the most vulnerable
point.

He believed that only the Swiss had those characteristics which

made them invulnerable to collectivism, the farmer-burgher traits as he
called them.

12

In all other cases, assurances for order had to be more strongly
entrenched.

In addition to the observance of strict monetary stability,

Ropke believed that capital formation on the part of the working classes
was very beneficial.

The workers would only value freedom and order if

they had an interest in the economy, which meant that they should take
part in the investment process.

13

Likewise, it would raise their sense

of identity and status, both of -which again guaranteed economic order
further.

And that was the main object of "Sozialpolitik" .

He did not

10.Ludwig Erhard, Prosperity Through Competition (London: Thames
& Houston 1953), p. 3.
It

11 .Wilhelm Ropke, "Belastungen der Marktwirtschaft: Im A-bweichen
von den Prinzipien Liegt die Gefahr", Die Politische Meinung. (August,1963),
p. 19. Collectivism here implies the leader and followers principle.
12
Ibid.
"^* Ropke, Jahrzehnt

p. 3t«
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emphasize monopoly restraint as much as did the neoliberals, but thought
in terms of workable competition.

He admitted that technical considera

tions of efficiency enlarged the permissible spectrum of competition
beyond that envisaged by the neoliberals.

14

In almost every instance he

was somewhat more pragmatic and less doctrinaire than the Eucken school.
t»

Unfortunately, Ropke's death in i960 set an end to his brilliant comments
on theory and policy.
Muller-Armack remains today the only prominent "Social Market"
economist who continues to expound and elaborate his views.

However,

because he has written on the subject for the last twenty years, his
precise ideas on the "Social Market Economy” have also evolved with time,
and so it is often difficult to determine exactly what he means by it.
When he first coined the term in 1947, he defined a "Social Market
Economy" to be one in which social progress and economic reform were
the ultimate goals and competition the means.

15

In other words, free

competition enabled the achievement of the highest possible income.
Once achieved, some of the income had to be redirected to those members
of society who might have been hurt by the free functioning of the
market mechanism, the unemployed, the sick, the aged, etc.

The excesses

or omissions of perfect competition needed to be curbed to achieve social
progress.

There is a noticeable distinction of emphasis between

Muller-Armack and Eucken among the components that is important.

"^t"* Wilhelm Ropke, "Belastungen..." , p. 27.
AlfredtMuller-Armack, Das G-rundprinzip der Sozialen
Marktwirtschaft (Munster : Author, 1950), p. 1.
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former emphasized the "Social " component, the latter the "Market"
component.

At the same time, the contrast shows the relationship between

the two components.

It is that of creation and preservation.

Eucken

was concerned more with the creation of the competitive order and
t!

Muller-Armack with its preservation.

Hence, their respective emphases

on monopoly restraint and "Sozialpolitik".

There is, however,

no funda

mental disagreement between the two lines of thought.
Muller-Armack's tendency to accentuate the part that
"Sozialpolitik?' played in a "Social Market Economy” became even more
evident in his later enunciations of the theory.
of a second phase after 1962.

He emphatically spoke

From that time on Muller-Armack defined

the "Social Market Economy" as a system of economic behaviour that had
as task the removal of "tensions" between economic growth, personal free
dom and initiative and social equilibrium or the solution of the class
conflict.

The scope has consequently considerably broadened in this

phase, beyond the mere protection of the underprivileged economic units.
The removal of tensions became synonomous with social politics or
"Gesellschaf tspolitik?1.

The task of "Gesellschaftspolitik" was to

secure the increasing maturity of society as well as economic growth.
Immediately after the last war, this was accomplished simply by securing
enough to eat.

But in the mid-sixties, the solution to the problems of

tensions in the economy was much more complex.
mature individuals composing it.

A mature economy required

In other words, whatever problems the

economy faced, creeping inflation or unemployment, the behaviour of the
individual had to be such as to correct the problems.

This is, moreover,
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16
what Muller-Armack meant when he stated that whether or not the"Social
Market Economy" was successful could never "be finally decided "but was
confirmed solely "by the continuing process of solving the internal

16

conflicts of society.

Contrasting this idea once more with the

approach that Eucken used, it becomes obvious that liuller-Armack sees
the "Social Market Economy” more as a dynamic concept, whereas Eucken
envisaged it in comparative static terms.

Both had an orderly economy

and society in mind, where all individuals had high moral standards,
!?
and everyone had identity and status, but Muller-Armack was more interest
ed in the individual steps in getting there.
approach.

This is the dynamic

Eucken was, perhaps, also interested in the road to the

perfect order, but he only elaborated on the imperfect and the perfect
order.

His foims were to do the rest.

In his latest work,
tl

Wirtschaftsordnung und ffirtschaftspolitik. for example, Muller-Armack
strongly advocated regional planning or "Raumpolitik” as a necessaryfurther step toward social progress.
Such evolution of thought has, however, complicated the matter
of trying to translate the "Social Market" concept into practical economic
policy, that must largely be based on everyday economic data.

In his

earlier writings the aims of economic policy were clearly and simply stated.
The "Social Market" principle meant insuring perfect competition, preventing
unemployment and other difficulties to which the less privileged classes
were particularly susceptible.

The recent expositions almost completely

Alfred Muller-Armack, "Wirtschaftsordnung und 7/irtschaftspolitik
(Freiburg, Brsg: Rombach, 1966), p. 300.
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divorce the goals of the "Social Market Economy" from the goals of
economic policy.

As part of the so-called "magic triangle" of tensions

only mflrirmim growth was to he maintained, a fact which would allow even
non-conforming interventions as long as they did not impinge on the
economy1s performance.

Kow Muller-Armack came to this conclusion is

quite difficult to ascertain.

There can be various explanations.

Either he feels that the question of social politics has become too
theoretical to be included in general economic policy, or he is coming
back to his original meaning of "Social Market Economy1' emphasizing
maximum national income, or it is his awareness of the real problems
the German economy is facing in the sixties and which need concrete
economic solutions applied to them which have brought about the altera
tion of thought.

The latter explanation is probably most appropriate.

Muller-Armack has, however, at the same time been ingenious in separat
ing the ethical ideals of the "Social Market Economy" from the economic
ones, allowing him to discuss a switch from one to the other without
contradicting himself or without being inconsistent.

The contrast with

the neoliberal stand, of course, which is still what it was in 1950, is
self-evident.
Fran this historical outline it becomes clear that the "Social
Market" system represents a philosophy of economic behaviour.

The

concern with economic prosperity is principal in the writings of Eucken,
Ropke and Muller-Armack.

But all of them envisage something more than

just the essentials for economic wealth.

II

Social progress for Muller-

Armack and social order for Eucken are integrally related with the economic
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sphere.

Economic goals sire only partially the essence of the "Social

Msirket Economy" .
themselves.

They are behavioural guidelines but not the blueprints

Unfortunately, the problem in such a case remains to proceed

from the guidelines to the ends sought, and both Eucken and Muller-Armack
have been extremely vague on this point.

There are no operationally

meaningful specifications beyong monopoly restraint, monetary stability
and "Sozialpolitik" .

Muller-Armack, moreover, always believed that he

need not really bother, for as he stated it, the "Social Market Economy1'
wsls

one complicated in theory, but simple in practice.
As it is very difficult to shed more light on the essence of

the theory on its own merit, further clarification should result from
the comparison of the theory of the "Social Market Economy" with other
capitalist economic systems such as the social welfare state or the
contemporary American economic system.

The " Social Market Economy"

must be placed between these two approaches and somewhat closer to the
American system.

All three are derivatives of the nineteenth century

confrontation of classical economic thought with socialist thought that
arose as a result of unrestricted capitalism.

Where socialist criticism

was energetic or where capitalism was not strongly entrenched, democratic
socialism emerged.

The modern welfare state came into existence.

The Scandinavian countries, Sweden in particular, and Britain under
Labour Party rale are good examples of democratic welfare states.

The

essence of such states from the economist's point of view is that the
emphasis of economic policy has been shifted from "supply to "demand"
as the means to secure growth, full employment, etc.

This shift was
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strengthened by the experiences during the Depression and by the writings
of Keynes.

The concept of the "Social Market Economy" , on the other

hand, was born of the same confrontation and compromise of classical
economics with nineteenth century socialism.

But the climate in Germany

during the thirties was different than in Scandinavia or in Britain.
The country had a totalitarian welfare state.

Hence, as a reaction to

collectivism and authoritarianism, another welfare state did not emerge
after 'World War H , but one in v/hich the emphasis was once again on
"supply" as the driving force for economic progress.

The entrepreneur

and the capitalist, i.e. supply not the consumer, i.e. demand, were the
forces forging renewed economic progress, however slight the distinction
may have been at times.

The time that the "Social Market" idea wan

propounded was decidedly of more significance, in fact, than the defini
tional novelty.
On the other hand, the distinction between the "Social Market
Economy1' and the American type economic system is more difficult to
establish.

From the point of view of the emphasis on growth, the

entrepreneur is the key in both cases.

But in this case, the difference

occurs at the bottom of the economic and social scale.

"Social Market"

implies a greater degree of paternalism vis-a-vis the less privileged,
a greater degree of collectivism.

American tradition has been too

individualistic at all levels of society to adopt such an outlook as
prevails in Germany.

The "Social Market" system allows, consequently,

a substantial degree of government direction of the economic sphere
which in the United States would be regarded as being strictly under the
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auspices of entrepreneurial or trade union associations.

Paradoxically,

the paternalism incorporated into the theory of the "Social Market Economy"
marks a great achievement for individualism in Germany when compared to
the industrial order during the imperial and nazi eras.

The combination

of free competition and social welfare policies advocated by the "Social
Market" theorists envisaged a very individualistic freedom, a freedom as
implied in the British or American tradition.
this was novel.

In the German context

In nineteenth century Germany and again during the

nazi reign, freedom meant the free, conscious and dutiful submission to
that already existing whole organism molded by history, the state and
the nation^
oneself.

One could only be free in serving the state, not in serving

By opposing this definition, the neoliberals at the same time

destroyed the basis for the concentration of economic power.

For if

freedom was to be attained by submission to the whole, then in the economic
sphere this meant the green light for economic cooperation and concentration.
This had previously always been regarded as something natural and necessary
by the entrepreneurs.

As a result of the different attitude encouraged by

the "Social Market" theorists, even if only in Germany, the idea is again
new and worth noticing.
It has now been shown that the theory of the "Social Market
Economy" is unique as far as the theory is concerned.

It is neither the

same as that underlying the welfare state, nor the same as that character
izing the American economic system.

17

It must be emphasized, however, that

Franz Ottel, Untergang oder Metamorphose der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft
(Stuttgart; G.Fischer, 1963), p. G>0.
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the distinctions are not absolutely clear cut.

Opinions differ

els

to

what comprises a social welfare state, and most certainly do they differ
greatly as to what economic ideology the U.S. economic system is based on.
Hence, in some matters, the "Social Market" concept will resemble the one,
in others, the other.

This is unavoidable.

The conclusion that the

"Social Market" theory is, nevertheless, distinct rests in the difference
in the intent of the roles that the various economic units in society
should play.

The capitsuList1s incentive is definitely more relied on

in the "Social Market Economy" than in the social welfare state, and there
are advantages seen from collectivist action in a "Social. Market Economy",
specifically in the German context, which are alien to American indivi
dualistic spirit.
The next step is necessarily the comparison of theory and
practice.

Theoretically, a case has been made for a unique system of

economic policy.

Whether Germany actually did follow the course set

out requires an analysis of the legal and institutional framework brought
into existence when Germany again became a sovereign state or thereafter.
The legal issue aroused great interest in 1965 when Nipperdey, a prominent
jurist, concluded after an investigation that the constitution of 1949
18
(Grundgesetz) was in fact a "Social Market" constitution.
ant concensus does not go so far as Nipperdey suggested.

The predomin
The constitution

of 1949 was a political compromise between the Christian and Social
Democrats.

No doubt the former had somewhat more influence, but the

H.C.Nipperdey, Soziale Marktwirtschaft und Grundgesetz.
(Cologne; Heymanns, 1965)',"pp. 1-25.
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constitution represents "a synthesis of polar economic ideologies and
19
interests typical of a mixed economy".
economic system was favoured.

In other words, no specific

Free enterprise was to reign in some

sectors, while the government remained in control of others.

Under

the Bonn constitution, Germany has usually Been referred to as a
"Sozialer Rechtstaat", a reference that has little economic meaning
in itself, hut which has been generally interpreted to allow for a
greater degree of government intervention than a pure "Social Market

20
Economy" would allow.

The crucial factor would then he whether the

government refrained from intervening where it had the right or not.
The constitution would definitely allow a de facto "Social Market
Economy" to exist depending on the views of the persons in the govern
ment.
Apart from the "Grundgesetz", the only other hroad piece of
legislation passed in the economic sphere was the Anti-Cartell Law of
1957 ("Gesetzgegen Uettbewerbssbeschrankungen").

This law was to he

the monopoly restraining document that a "Social Market Economy1' could
not do without.
restraints;

It was to control three types of competitive

21
cartells, market dominating firms and price maintenance.

The commission that supervised the economy, however, has not heen able

19

20

^

Behlke, Neoliheralismus. P. 134.
Arndt Teichmann, "Die Wirtschaftsordnung in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland" Deutsche Studien Nr.4 (Bremen; April, 1963), p.28.
Nipperdey, Grundgesetz. p. 25.
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to deal effectively with competitive restraints.

First, it has not

always been able to identify them, and second, the approaching integra
tion of the Common Market has made the consideration of competitive
restraints in a single national market outdated.

What has been done

to prevent concentration in Germany is negligible.

The cartell

commission works with the concept of a zone of toleration as regards
different degrees of competitive restrictions.

In so doing, it is

naturally not following the neoliberal demand of the absolute prohibi
tion of competitive restraints.
Aside from its inadequacy as an anti-monopoly instrument in
the eyes of avowed "Social Market" supporters, the commission and the
law that created it do not represent anything unique internationally.
Most western industrialized nations have similar controls.

Hence,

while there is no doubt that the law was motivated by "Social Market"
supporters, it does not practically distinguish the "Social Market"
system from the welfare state or the American economic system.

In

fact, the practice of monopoly restraint in Germany was never vigor
ously followed and has now turned into encouragement of monopolization,
reminiscent of nineteenth century empire building tactics.
On the other hand, there are innumerable occasions where
fragments of "Social Market" theory could be implemented.
day government business is a case in point.

The day-to-

The presence of Ludwig

Erhard as economics minister in the cabinet and Muller-Armack as his
chief advisor in the ministry would have made this prospect a definite
possibility.

Both are avowed "Social Market" adherents and this bias
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naturally had to exert itself in everyday economic, policy decisions.
Again, however, the practice of their policy did not reveal itself to
he much different from that followed in other western countries.
There were no drastic interventions into economic affairs such as
practices by industry apart from selective price controls in the early
fifties.

The government inherited a mixed economy;

the ratio of the

private to public sector had been set before the war and there was
little to be changed as a result.

Probably the proportions were

weighted slightly in favour of the public sector through the massive
government investments in industry during the thirties, and so the
post-1949 government had some leeway to redress the balance.

The

previous regime had vanished but the remnants of its institutional
framework remained and this framework allowed a much greater degree
of centralization than the social welfare states.
The apparent contradiction between theory and practice of
the "Social Market Economy” must be borne in mind, for it explains many
confusions surrounding the operation of the system.

The economic

policy that was followed by the German government was guided by "Social
Market” concepts not in the sense that certain economic institutions
were created or certain laws established to implement a different
economic system.

The "Social Market" concept manifested itself in the

attitude that those responsible for the execution of economic policy
took toward the economic development of the country.

As stated pre

viously, the "Social Market" approach is a philosophical one.

Endless

attitudes follow from the two main principles, competition andsocial
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betterment that can be shown only in the execution of day-to-day matters.
Various features of the system are not distinguishable from a welfare
state or the American economic system, yet anyone who has observed Erhard
t!
and Muller-Armack at work will realize the different style of trying to
accomplish like tasks.
The problems that the German economy faced in the fifties and
copes with now in the sixties are those experienced by all mature and
growing economies.

And the solutions in each case will also be similar.

Thus it is difficult in any case to talk of basic differences in
approaches to economic policy.

All governments realize that they have a

responsibility for ensuring full employment, growth, price stability and
a fair income distribution even though there need be no legislation to
that effect.

But there are different ways of arriving at the same solu

tions, slight as they might be.
and individualistic in theory;

The "Social Market" system is idealistic
the social welfare state is idealistic and

collectivist, and the American system is pragmatic and individualistic.
Such difference in outlook must inspire economic policy in distinct ways,
part of the time if not all of the time.
How this inspiration made itself evident in German economic
policy since the last war is the subject of the next chapters.

That is

not to say that "Social Market" ideas always influenced the originators of
economic policy.

It will be made clear when it did influence decisions

and when other factors motivated economic policy.

Likewise the results

of economic policy shall be analyzed in this fashion.

was the "Social

Market" spirit beneficial or adverse to the economy's performance when

o prq a n X
w O U U

(
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it was evident;

were other economic policy decisions responsible or was

it the objective structure of the economy which was the primary determinent of its performance?
Three determinants of the performance of the German economy
in the post-war period have been chosen for analysis;

namely, the

balance of payments, monetary stability and capital formation.

In

each case, economic policy will be assessed according to the above
criteria.

The assessment is an evaluation of economic policy in Germany

in general, but with special reference to "Social Market" influence.
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CHAPTER 11

THE BALANCE OR RAIMENTS

The Balance of payments will be the first question to he
discussed with respect to the evaluation of economic policy.

In order

to evaluate policy correctly a careful distinction must he made first
between objective and subjective influences on the German balance of
payments.

Objective influences are defined in this case to be those

independent of government economic policy, while subjective influences
are those arising out of economic policy decisions.
The balance of payments is also interrelated with the other
two determinants of Germany's postrar success, namely price and monetary
stability and capital formation and investment.

for example, an excess

of exports over imports increases aggregate demand, other things being
equal, and helps to use more fully the existing productive capacity.
It absorbs more fully the saving which the economy generates, since it
makes possible an excess of saving over investment (X-M = 3-1).

Since

the utilization of productive capacity is an important criterion for
further investment activity, a positive trade balance is thus a factor
encouraging it.
place.

It does not, however, ensure that investment will take

In fact, an excess of imports over exports increases the volume

27
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of goods and services and makes possible a higher volume of investment.
The positive trade balance stresses the income generating effect
influencing investment while the negative trade balance stresses the
capacity creating effect.

The relationship with stability arises

from the fact that an excess of exports over imports increases the
level of aggregate demand and along with investment and consumption
determine the general price level, depending on their relationship to
aggregate supply.
Before proceeding to the analysis of the balance of payments
in the post1,Tar era, a descriptive picture of the statistical background
should be presented.

For this purpose, the two main components of the

balance of payments, the current and the capital account, will be
separated.

As summarized in Table 1, the current account of the

Federal Republic has been positive from 1952 through to 19£>5.

It

reached the highest surplus position, 6.5 billion EM, in 196l and the
lowest in the first and last years mentioned.
be classified as normal years.

These years could hardly

In 191-8 and 1949, there was no Federal

Republic yet and in the two following years, it was barely getting started.
The highest deficit occurred in 1949 with a total trade value only a third
22
of that three years later.
The volume indexes of exports and imports,
on the other hand, show that the volume of imports has increased progress
ively more than the volume of exports.

Both the per capita and the total

“^United Nations Statistical Yearbook,1966, (New York,1965),
The deficits for 1948 and 1949 were 1,247 and 3,524 billion EM
respectively.
This applied only to Bizone.
Statistics are not
available for the previous post war years.
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indexes "behave in this manner.
Looking at merchandise trade by itself (Table 2, columns 1,
2 and 3 ) it becomes evident that the favourable current account balance
is primarily attributable to the merchandise trade component.

In 19&5,

the current account surplus had almost disappeared, but the merchandise
surplus remained at 5.1 billion Hi.

Since 1965, however, the trade

surplus has once more risen considerably.
new record v/as established.

In 19^7, in particular, a

By August, the merchandise trade surplus

had surpassed 10 billion HI and was expected to reach 15 billion by the
end of the year.

whether this improvement is the result of the 1966

government change which installed a Christian-Democrat-Social-Democrat
coalition for the first time since 194-9 that counteracted inflation
domestically and inspired new confidence after years of growing dis
illusionment in business circles, or whether 1965 was merely an
accidental downward displacement from a rising surplus trend cannot be
determined from the statistics alone.
analysis, which will follow shortly.

This question requires further
Part of the explanation of why

the surplus value is increasing rests with the price indexes of Germany's
foreign trade (Table 3).

The aggregate price index for imports has

remained fairly constant from 1958 to 1965, while the price index for
exports rose 6.7/o during this span of years.

The discrepancy is most

evident in the last two years, Then the volume indexes showed a strong
trend in the opposite direction.
crepancies are interrelated;

To some extent, of course, the dis

price and quantity tend to move in opposite

directions and stabilize total values.
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What the disaggregation of the price indexes shows is
naturally predetermined by the qualitative disaggregation of the exports
and imports themselves according to main product groups and main origins
and destinations. (Tables If and 5).

Looking at the export product mix,

the German predominance as a manufacturing goods exporter stands out
clearly.

The four top export categories comprise more than 5Q;
3 of the

exports, and all manufacturing exports together approach the 9Q.3 mark.
Primary goods such

as iron and iron products are stagnating,increasing

by barely 2Qv in seven years, whereas machines, vehicles, chemical
products and electrical equipment all more than doubled in value.
Imports, on the other hand, do not reveal as precise a picture
as exports.

Germany is a highly developed manufacturing country and so

its import needs are correspondingly diverse.

The country imports food

stuffs and raw materials that either are not found in Germany at all, such
as tropical fruits, or not in sufficient quantities, such as ore, oil and
wheat.

Secondly, it imports secondary manufactured products that do not

necessarily require the latest technology from cheap labour countries.
Textiles are a typical example of this type of import.

Finally, Germany

imports those products which its technology has not yet mastered to
produce, either because of lagging scientific knowhow or because of the
limitations of market size.

Computers are a good example of the knowhow

question and they are imported to keep the country competitive in other
fields.

The market size problem is best exemplified by the machinery and

chemical products categories.

Although German industry is very efficient

in these areas, the possibilities of economies of scale and the limited
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size of the domestic market dictate some international specialization
according to the principle of comparative advantage.

Other highly

industrialized countries would exhibit a similar pattern as regards
their imports.

How balanced Germany's import requirements are is

attested by the fact that all the major groups of imports doubled in
value between 1958 and 1965 (Table 4 ).
The geographic distribution of the best German trade pro
duces a very simple picture.

The primary destinations of German

exports are its European neighbours, particularly those in the Common
Market.

The percentage of exports going to the latter rose from 25/o

in 1958 to virtually 3Q3 in 1965 .

When the Efta countries are added

the result brings the percentage above 5Q3 for Europe.

The only

important non-European market is the United States, but it ranks only
in fourth place.

The United States is much more a source of imports

(about 15$) than a destination of exports for Germany.

Nevertheless,

the European Common Market countries are Germany's principal suppliers
of imports, and their importance is growing.

The percentage of

imports coming from these countries has increased from 22 j to 4QJb from
,

1958 to 1965.

Germany is thus much more dependent on Europe for its

imports than for its exports, indicating perhaps that the country has
reached a more refined state of production than neighbours.

There

are, likewise, indications that the trend to further trade with the
EEC countries will be intensified, both because the countries are by
nature complementary economically and because of the progressive libera
lization of intra-Common Market trade.
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Lastly, the sub-aggregates require some explanation.

If

total values of the individual categories composing the export aggre
gate are compared with the price indexes for the respective categories,
it can be seen that only the machinery and electrical equipment price
indexes move in the same direction as their values.

In the case of

chemical products, the price index fell while total value rose consi
derably,

Vehicles display a stable price index with enormous value

increases.

In both of these last circumstances, the divergent move

ments are an indication of the amount of technological progress and
economies of scale that had an impact on these industries.
The causal determinants of Germany's foreign trade which
have created the preceding statistical picture must now be elucidated.
In a study entitled "Germany's Persistent Balance of Fayments
Disequilibrium" Charles Kindleberger stated that its balance of pay
ments, or more precisely, its surplus was determined by the nine
following factors:

(1) the structure of German trade, (2) the competi

tive situation in German markets, (3 ) the economic situation in Germany's
trade partners, (if) the German propensity to export, (5) the docility of
German labour, (6) German innovation and technical progress, (7) the
German propensity to save and not to consume, (8) the deficiencies of
the German capital market, (9) the beggar- thy-neighbour policies of
the German government, including economic policy in general and the
specific aspect of export promotion.

23

He probably exhausted all the

23

Charles Kindleberger, "Germany's Persistent Balance of
Payments Disequilibrium", Europe and the Dollar ed. B.3.Caves
(Cam.br., Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 44.
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possibilities with this classification.

Any other factor can he incor

porated into one of these and so, a similar pattern will he used to
investigate how important each one has heen in the last decade.

More

over, the classification is suitable because in each case there is
adequate scope for economic policy influence.
be divided into three types;

The causal factors could

first, those where there is no room for

economic policy, i.e. the objective factors, second, those where the
objective and subjective factors overlap, and finally, those where the
subjective policy influence is the overwhelming determinant.
The Structure of Trade
If there is one category in which the scope of government
activity might be expected to be minimal (especially in a "Social Market
Economy") the structure of trade should qualify.

If the country had a

favourable structure of trade then its exports had to be income elastic
and price inelastic and its imports income inelastic and price elastic.
It is important that both exports and imports be considered for the
emphasis could just as well have been on the import deficit as on the
export surplus.

Unfortunately, this aspect is often overlooked.

In

Germany's case, however, the principal determinants can be said to lie
’with exports.

As S.J. Tells put it:

"The secret of German success in

exports lay in its rate of growth, and the success in the rate of growth
pi
lay in exports.
The interrelationship constituted a continuous re
inforcing circle.

The all-important investment that rebuilt Germany

gl

(Cambridge:

S.J. Tells, British Export Performance: A Comparative Study
Cambridge University Press, 19^4), p. 75.
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originated in the foreign export sector and pulled imports with it as
a passive reactant.
Only lately can one speak of an independent import compo
nent, not as an adjunct or input to produce exports.
Let us then begin with the export side.

There is no doubt

that West Germany had and has the right export structure at the right
time.

In a study of the structural changes in the country’s foreign

trade, Hesse derived a correlation coefficient for the value of exports
and world income for the period 1950 to I960 which he found to be .9952 ,
(regression coefficients:

25
.1 = 2L1.82 + 3.40 Y).

The average annual

growth rate of Germany's major manufactured exports was 6.7,3 between
1950 and 1966.

Since world income increased much less rapidly during

this period, Germany was able to increase its share of total world
exports of manufactures from lCfo to 2Cfa.

26

.'/hen world income grew

Germany's exports grew faster.
One of the main reasons is that the nation's short-run com
parative advantage lay in the same direction as its long-run comparative
27
advantage, specifically in contrast to the British position.
(The
British economy lends itself well to comparison with .Test Germany's.
The two countries have approximately the same size, the same population
and similar industrial structures).

~ 25

Helmut Hesse, Strukturwandlungen im Aussenhandel der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Buncker & Kumblot, 19 62), p. 270.
2.S

The Economist, p. iii.

27 Wells, p. 76.
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During the fifties, however, Germany had an advantage in
relatively capital intensive, finished industrial products such as
vehicles and chemical products.

It was for these types of ccanmodi-

ties that the longer run income elasticity of demand was high and
28

price elasticity of demand was low.

Britain's advantage lay in

semi-finished products which were confronted with the opposite posi
tion in world markets.
phenomenon.

Germany's exports in themselves reveal the

Between 1958 and 1966, the exports of the very capital,

intensive products, vehicles and chemicals, rose hy over 100^ and the
exports of semi-finished products, such as iron and iron products
grew ty only 20$.

In addition, domestic production in Germany is

becoming more and more specialized and differentiated in capital
intensive, income elastic goods.

It is a direction typically taken

by rich developed countries, and it is bound to reflect itself in
continued strong exports.

Income elasticity of demand was then a

definite advantage of the German product mix.

But such goods were

necessarily quite capital intensive even in the mid-fifties.

Demand

elasticity had consequently to be complemented by sufficient supply
elasticity so that the demand could be met.
Thus, one should investigate whether the West German case
naturally corroborates the usual assumptions made about factor propor
tions and foreign trade according to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of
comparative advantage.

On the basis of war-time destruction of plant

and machinery and the post-war flow of refugees to the Federal Republic,

28 Wells, p. 76.
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one would expect exports to be relatively labour intensive and imparts
to be relatively capital intensive.

The greater labour supply reduced

wages and the lesser supply of capital increased its rate of return.
The only study of the capital and labour intensities of exports and
imports on West Germany, however, reveals that, as late as 1954, trade
made capital less abundant and labour more abundant, contrary to expec29
tations according to the theoretical Heckscher-Ohlin model.
But it is
possible, as Kindleberger has pointed out, that capital as a whole may
be scarce and labour abundant, yet the marginal product of new invest
ment is highest in familiar lines where it combines with existing
equipment and trained management and labour.^
Certainly, the familiar lines of export of the western part
of Germany, particularly the Ruhr Valley, were of a capital intensive
nature in contrast to the labour intensive, light-industry oriented
eastern part of Germany.

This disparity had been energetically en

hanced by the nazi government's war-time structural intervention in
the economy which sought to give the country a high degree of selfsufficiency.

The intrusion gave East Germany a large part of light

industry, and West Germany received additional capital intensive
heavy industry.

When the country was divided, enough capital had

survived the war in the west to return to its traditional interna
tional markets.

It will be noted likewise, that the heavy influx

29
Karl W. Roskamp, "Factor Proportions and Foreign Trade:
The Case of West Germany^ Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. (19650 p.321.
^Kindleberger, p. 4-6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37

of refugees to the west exemplified not only the presence of more labour,
but also of "human" capital.31

Much of this "human" capital had worked

in armaments production during the war- where it acquired many of the skills
suitable for heavy manufacturing.

Exports were essential because this

capital would not have been employed elsewhere.

There was no armaments

production until 1955 to absorb the former military technicians and
32
engineers in their familiar lines.
On the other hand, the refugees
that qualified in effect strictly as the factor labour were not all
immediately absorbed into the productive sphere.

Traditional lines of

export, concentration of heavy manufacturing in West Germany, human capital
skilled in armaments production, the absence of capital absorbing armament
production, and the non-absorption of refugees labour consequently shaped
the capital intensive production and export structure.

After the basic

heavy manufacturing sector, iron and steel, began to stagnate in the late
fifties, the automobile, chemical, optical instruments, shipbuilding
industries etc. assumed the responsibility for continued rapid growth.
Mostof these rapidly expanding industries were traditionally in the western
part of the country.

In some cases, however, entire industries previously

located in the east, emigrated to the west.

Part of the chemical trust

IG Farben and the huge optical concerns Agfa and Zeiss axe important cases.
On account of this development, capital intensive exports grew consistently
33
as a proportion of total exports from 75/2’ in the fifties to SQSfo in the sixties.

^
70

Roskamp, p. 321.
Anton Zischka, War es ein Wunder? (Hamburg: Mosaik Verlag,

1966), p. 4.54.

^

Kindleberger, p. 4-7.
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The economic policies that other nations followed with regard
to trade and economic development have been a further causal, element in
Germany’s large trade surplus lead by the production goods sector.
International tariff and trade restrictions are much less stringent
where capital goods are concerned in contrast to consumers goods.

Any

country can produce consumption goods if this industry is given tariff
protection, but only advanced countries can furnish technically complex
goods.

All mature countries have this advantage vis-a-vis the under

developed ones.

The advantage was emphasized additionally during the

fifties by both types of countries' efforts to promote investment booms
through economic policy.

The developed countries sought to raise the

standard of living which was threatened by obsolescence (Europe mainly),
whereas the underdeveloped nations desired industrialization and selfsufficiency.

Since there was, at the same time, very little prejudice

in the underdeveloped countries toward Germany because it had not been
a colonial power, German goods enjoyed a particularly widespread reputa
tion there.

Krupp-built factories and Mercedes-Benz cars are among the

most prestigious signs of economic maturity in these countries.

The

strong German export position among the developed countries, on the
other hand, has been secured and extended since 1958 through German
membership in the Common Market.

Prior to its creation, Germany had

already the advantage that its investment goods were subject to fewer
restrictions than consumers goods.34

Most of Germany's partners were

V

6
3

Carstens, Die Aufwertungsdebatte. Kieler Studien, Nr.
(Tubingen: Mohr, 1963), p. 45.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39

less developed in the investment good field.

The Common Market harriers

to trade in consumers goods have likewise drastically receded, a fact from
which Germany is benefiting increasingly.

As a result of the initial

concentration on capital and production goods and the success in thei r
export, the economy achieved a high rate of growth and technical progress.
Adding the benefits that German industry obtained from operating in the
largest single national market in Western Europe, it is obvious that the
country was able to adopt mass production techniques in the production
of consumption goods to a greater degree than its neighbours.

Prices

are lower for a greater variety of products and exports are thus boosted
in this sector.

The automobile industry's success in exports is certain

ly derived particularly from thisadvantage.

Only in the area of primary

and semi-finished products sire German exports being squeezed out.

Often

the German products cannot even hold the domestic market any longer.
Goal production, for instance, has receded for export and domestic use in
the face of rapidly rising costs.

Higher protective barriers in the

lesser developed countries and competition from inexpensive American coal
increasingly imported into Germany are responsible.

35

The iron and steel

industry suffers from very similar problems internationally and domesti
cally.

It is a key industry which every underdeveloped country insists

on having and will go to any lengths to set it up locally.

When steel

must, nevertheless, be imported, Japan produces a high quality product
for much less than it costs Germany, the United States or any other
developed country to produce.

Hesse, p. 276.
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The imports development reveals alone from the statistics a
very different picture and , in many ways, a much more obscure one.
As mentioned above, until recently, imports played a passive role, a
domestic resource-balancing factor to further investment and export.
Usually there were no alternatives since the additional resources were
not available in Germany at all, or their procurement was only possible
at exorbitant costs.
uous.

In addition the imports’ function is discontin

Whenever they result on the basis of realistic competition, the

amounts are absolutely large, but relatively marginal.

If exports

were strongly influenced by world income, imports might be expected to
be influenced by domestic income analogously.

That is not to speak of

the direct influence of exports on imports itself, so much more so
because the income derived from exports plays a strong role in contri
buting to national income.

Hesse’s correlation coefficient in this

case comes to .977^ (regression coefficients: M = -23.88 + .27 Y) and
it is slightly increasing as the demand elasticitj'- is also increasing,
though at a much lower level than that of exports.

In 1961, for example,

the import elasticity was 1.15 while the corresponding export elasticity
was -2.37

The reasons for this discrepancy lie in part with the nature

of the growth of exports, including domestic structural, factors, and
partly with domestic factor behaviour.

In a world of rising incomes

the import intensive industries just happened to be those which produced
goods that were not too much in demand, and the goods that they had to

^ Hesse, p. 250.
^ Carstens, p. 76.
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import previously were replaced by domestic substitutes.

Germany is no

exception in that synthetics, for example, have replaced so many raw
material imports.

It is only the imports of those raw materials for

which no substitutes exist and which are vital to the economy which
continue to rise steeply.

Oil is a key import in thise sense.

The income elasticity of imports is , furthermore, influenced
by the domestic rigidities of supply.

In a complex fully employed

econony such as Germany, income increases beyond those made possible by
productivity gains must spill over into imports.

The more differen

tiated and specialized production becomes the more difficult it becomes
to shift resources when tastes change.

Imports fill the gap.

Hence,

the proportion of finished products imports rises in all likelihood.
In I960, the ratio of raw, semi-finished product imports was already
38

1:1:2.

Since that year, the proportion will have shifted further in

favour of finished products.
employment ceiling;

The economy was consistently at the full

in fact, the situation could be called one of over

full employment where incomes increased to the point where exotic imports
begin to appeal to the average consumer.

In any event the import elas

ticity probably has risen since the last time it had been estimated for
the years 1950 to I960.
Not only does the argument of limited ability to increase
output in a full employed economy support this hypothesis, but there is
also a socio-psychological justification.

3

The individual German was

Hesse, P. 256.
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very restrained in his consuming habits until the early sixties.

In

most respects, such as calorific intake or consumption of imported
luxury products, Germans ranked considerably below their neighbours
during the fifties.

Oneeconomist has stated that if Germany had had

the British consumption pattern in I960, it would have had to import
5 billion EM additionally, a sum that would virtually have wiped out
the export surplus.39 Until the sixties G-ermans still had a recon
struction mentality.

After having lost everything in 1945 the people

were very security minded so that consumption was restricted to a
minimum and saving was encouraged.

The experience of what seemed an

endless boon throughout the fifties and sixties ultimately changed
these frugal attitudes in favour of more demanding consuming habits.
Some of the discrepancy in the consumption patterns of
Germany and Britain owes its existence, however, to the differences
in agricultural protection in the two countries.

Britain gave little

protection and so imported extensively from North America and
Australia, whose products were inexpensive in comparison to European
prices.

In Germany the agricultural sector was subsidized and the

consumers paid the price.

There is, indeed, considerable truth in

this theory, for German food imports are rising as a result of the
Common Market countries agricultural policy,

German prices had to

come down 10 % on the average and the additional demand at the lower
price was to be met from imports.
39

Surplus,"

In one study its author has gone

J. Marlcus, "Some Observations on the West German Trade
Oxford Economic Papers. XV (1965: I), p. 139*
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so far as to insist that in Germany’s case the expansion of imports in
general following lower duties came largely at the expense of domestic
40
production.
This hypothesis is undoubtedly more correct now than it
was during the fifties.

Frugality was the predominant outlook when

purchases were in question at that time.

It is then correct to con

clude that domestic tariff barriers were and still are a hindrance to
German imports, even though the country is one of the lowest tariff
countries in the world.

Nevertheless, one can really speak of hin

drance only in comparison with the ease with which German exports
enter other countries.

In other words, if all international tariff

barriers were removed, imports into Germany would increase relatively
more than its exports to the rest of the world.
Before leaving the topic of the structure of German trade
some remarks concerning the terms of trade must be made.

They are

at least a related aspect in so far as their influence on the balance
of payments is concerned.

They are more or less objective, indepen

dent of direct policy influence.

Beginning with 1950, the terms of

trade were against Germany in view of the rising world prices for raw
materials in connection with the Korean V/’
ar.

At this time, the

adverse terms of trade were of little significance to Germany because
industry was just beginning to get on its feet again.

There were

enough basic materials in Germany to fulfill the requirements.

In

^ J. Wemelsfelder, "The Short-term Effect of the Lowering
of Import Duties in Germany," Economic Journal. (March, i960). p.97.
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fact, they were occasionally exported to the United States.

During the

first three years of the economic boom that started in 1954, the terms
of trade were constant and thus, the trade surpluses were not helped by
favourable terms of trade

The unilateral tariff reductions in 1956

lowered the price of imports by the insignificant amount of 1,8%.
During the next stage of the boom, 1958 to 1963, the terms of trade were
in Germany’s favour;
fell.

export prices remained constant while import prices

The composition of trade basically determined this favourable

development.

Exports tended to display more price inelasticity of demand

than inports.

Thus, when the Common Market came into existence in 1958,

imports had to become less expensive to ccrapete in Germany and exports
could retain the same price level to compete internationally.
In contrast to the role that income plays in determining exports
and inports, that played by price is still negligible in conparison.

The

income and price effects actually worked in opposite directions on occasion.
With falling inport prices, quantities have decreased and with rising export
prices, quantities have increased.

To be more specific, the 5% currency

revaluation in 1961 did not appreciably boost inports immediately there
after, while exports continued to increase at an only slightly lower rate.
It must be emphasized that this situation does not necessarily prevail in
general, but is determined by the composition of trade and consumption habits.
Britain certainly undertook the 1967 devaluation to increase exports and
decrease inports.

The distinction is easily found:

in the case of exports,

Britain exports price inelastic capital goods proportionately less than does

^

Carstens, p. 28.
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Germany, and in the case of imports, Britain has already been a more
international market and so more price sensitive than Germany.

It

means that British exports compete with goods on a price more than on
quality, and imports are likewise determined on a price basis, not
because the domestic market cannot supply them or because there is
something exotic about them.

Finally, since 1963, the German terms

of trade have remained constant, and the trade surplus cannot be ex
plained by prices.
Summarizing preliminarily the evidence of the structural
component of the economy's foreign trade, it must be concluded that
it was very strong in a positive direction.

Germany had in the

fifties and still has in the sixties, the favourable product balance
to find response in foreign trade, and it has it independently of
government economic policy.
tive structuring for imports;

Economic policy played no role in selec
it created a once-and-for-all tariff

wadi of medium importance within which imports were unrestricted and
always overshadowed by the export sector.
The economic situation in Germany's trade partners is
Kindleberger's third determinant of Germany’s trade balance.

iVhat

is really meant in this instance is the impact that other countries*
economic policies have had on their respective economic conditions and
consequently on their trade relationship with Germany.

France and

Italy are the typical cases where the respective domestic conditions
affected the German trade balance significantly.

In contrast to
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Germany, whose government did not actively follow a full employment policy
by the expansion of aggregate demand according to the Keynesian principle,
France and Italy did so regardless of sectoral bottlenecks.

Unequal rates

of inflation move the balance of trade in favour of the country with the
lowest rate.

Thus in both cases, this encouraged exports from price

stable Germany and discouraged imports into that country.
42

was quite acute in the years 1963 ancL 1964,

The problem

and when France and Italy

followed active stabilization policies in 1965, the result reflected itself
immediately in the reduced German balance of payments surplus, both in the
current and the capital accounts with these countries.
Objective - Subjective Trade Influences
The next group of factors to which Kindleberger referred, namely,
the German propensity to export, the docility of German labour, German
innovation and technical progress and the German propensity to save and not
to consume, all constitute that realm of determinants where objective market
influences and economic policy decisions can coincide.

In the three pre

vious explanations, the influence of economic policy on the part of the
German government was totally absent.

If complementarity of objective and

subjective forces in this group of factors existed, the relationship must be
clarified and then policy can be evaluated where it applied.

The task is,

however, somewhat difficult, for qualitative value judgments essentially
identify the determinants.

Quantitative data is not always available.

The four factors can also be lumped together in one category because indi
vidually none of them is important enough to warrant separate attention.

^

Kindleberger, p. 45.
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Propensity to export can denote a variety of meanings.

One

frequently used argument in support of a strong propensity to export
states that since Germany no longer had any political or military power
the on!ly place for vigorous Germans to get anywhere was business.

The

domestic market was at first not big enough because of the low per capita
income after the war, so that there was only the export sector.

Zischka

acutely observed when he wrote that the export push was identical with
Germans1 will to live^ Today remnants of this idea still remain;

only

it is no longer simply the will to live now but the will to be powerful
again economically that underlies the export drive.
meticulous about their exports.

German firms are

They often plan them for ten years

ahead, and send their own contacts abroad instead of relying on the
commercial representatives of the government.

Evidence of the strength

of this export push was really shown by the response to the 196l revalua
tion.

Despite the additional

cost disadvantage to which exporters

were henceforth subjected, exports rose the next year.
have already been given for this phenomenon:

Two explanations

first, German exports are

price inelastic and second, creeping inflation in Prance and Italy count
eracted the price change.

The third explanation is that the response to

hold and increase exports was enormous.

The additional cost burden was

not reflected in export prices on account of a skilful system of price
differentiation in world markets.
Domestic prices were raised in order to keep the export prices
at pre-revaluation levels.
^

The result was exact opposite of what the

Zischka, p. 458.
The Economist, p. xix.
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revaluation was designed to do.

One can then detect a double negative

policy decision on the part of the government.

Price differentiation

was not to be allowed according to "Social Market" theory because it
artificially distorted the market forces of supply and demand.

Secondly,

the action of raising domestic prices while leaving foreign prices at prerevaluation levels was a direct move to counteract the policy decision's
intent.

Since the government stood by without taking any action, its

response must be judged negatively.

It permitted an action that was

contrary to its belief and to its authority.

Public denouncements of

the action did not discourage it frcan being taken.

In fact, Volkswagen

increased its domestic prices exactly the next day after Erhard had de
nounced the policy in front of the auto company's board chairman,
Nordhoff^5

In this instance, export mentality was certainly a reality,

but it would have been neutralized if the government had disallowed the
price differentiation.
A further testimony of the German propensity to export was
the acceptance of lower profit margins by industry when costs rose steep
ly in the early sixties just to keep up exports and investment.

One

student of the situation has concluded that the trade surplus was some
thing to be achieved apart from keeping the rate of investment high and
ig

that it thus arose exclusively at the cost of consumption.

This cost

45
Herbert Ehrenberg, Die Erhard Saga; Analyse einer Wirtschaftspolitik die keine War (Cologne: Seewald, 19o6), p. 125.
46

"

Alois Oberhauser, "Zahlungsbilanzuberschusse und
Einkommensverteilung," ¥e1twirtschaftliches Archiv. (1963s II), p. 296.
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came to nearly 5 billion HI annually.

The welfare of one group was

sacrificed for the benefit of another, but the fact that it continued
so long without resentment by anyone is a sign of how extensive the
export mentality

The innate motivation to export stands out

most emphatically.

Not only were exports promoted, but they were pro

moted by sacrificing consumption.
The market organization reinforces the export mentality
further. It was already noted that cost pressure on exports was met
with price differentiation between the domestic and foreign markets and
that constituted an imperfection of competition.

Aside from the fact

that it violated a principle of perfect competition, the use of price
differentiation suggests a high degree of dependence of the larger West
German firms on the export market.

Indeed, the 100 largest corpora

tions of the Federal Republic account for 50.j of its exports and the
48

largest thousand for over 70%>.

The two giants in particular, Volks

wagen and Daimler-Benz, receive 60% and kO% respectively of their sales
revenue from exports.

Such independence makes these enterprises decid

edly export-conscious and ready to defend exports regardless of what the
rules of competition imply.

Since continued prosperity depends on

increased exports, any government must face the realities of the interna
tional market.

To compete internationally against the huge American

corporations Germans have also expanded to comparable size in some canes.
47 H.H. Lutzke, "Woran krankt unsere Wahrungspolitik?,"
"
Die Aussprache. XV (1965: 2), p. kO.
G. Ollenburg, "Konzentration und Aussenwirtschaft" ,
Die Aussprache. XV (l9o5: 5), p. 144.
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In so doing, they have become oligopolists or monopolists in the smaller
German market.

This has been accomplished either by the acquisition of

numerous small companies by the larger ones as in the chemical industry
or by having publicly known working arrangements for cooperation in
certain fields as in the automobile industry.

The domestic market is

divided by agreement and competition determines success in other countries.
Market organization hence complements the innate export mentality of the
business community.
Both innate export mentality and market organization have pro
vided difficulties for those attempting to follow "Social Market" economic
policy.

The complementarity complicates the decision making beyond resol

ving the questions of the permissibility of price differentiation and the
neutralization of revaluation.

As long as tariff and trade restrictions

exist, price differentiation is a necessity of competition.
to compete in different countries with different prices.
its profits will be low, and in others high.

A firm has
In some cases

For example, Volkswagen

could not sell its cars in the United States at as high a price as in
Canada because the general level of prices for cars is considerably lower
there as yet.

Price differentiation such as this is not dumping either.

Selling a product so that its price in another country is lower than that
charged in the domestic market is considered dumping only if the foreign
price is below the competitive priceprevailing in that market so that
injury results to the producers of that country.
The "Social Market" theory did not provide any guidance for
making economic policy decisions that affect the international corpora-
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tion.
fewer.

In Eucken's lifetime the international giant companies were much
Concern as to their behaviour was not veiy prevalent.

More

importantly, however, the neoliberals saw the large enterprise in a
different light.

They were less worred about the companies' interna

tional competitiveness than their relationship with society.

They feared

that monopolization left society at the mercy of a few large enterprises.
These are problems with which the sociologist is more concerned today than
the economist.

There has been only one attempt to explain the concept

of consumer sovereignty in a monopolistic economic structure, namely,
Galbraith's notion of countervailing powers.

Large producer entities

confront large consumer entities and so provide a check on each others'
power.

The government and the labour unions also provide some check on

the giant corporations' practices today.
In its undeniable capacity of augmenting the export surplus,
the German propensity to export was perhaps too strong for economic policy
to cope with apart from the disagreement with "Social Market" theory.
The export drive was so strong that it could virtually neutralize the reva
luation.

Since the revaluation was, nevertheless, relatively successful

in stabilizing the economy externally and internally, it is difficult to
say whether it was beneficial or harmful.
policy should retain the upper hand.

Certainly, government economic

If the revaluation was designed to

decrease exports, the government's lack of concrete response to the
exporters' evasion of its designs must be considered a failure in a prac
tical sense.

This judgment must be upheld unless it can be proved that

the government anticipated the attempted circumventing of its policy measure
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and. so, adjusted the rate of revaluation higher than -what it intended.
No evidence to this effect can be found, however.
Similar possibilities of conflicting doctrines arise from
the connection of exports and German innovation and technical progress.
The rationalization of production and innovation took place principally
in the larger firms, which were not so susceptible to sudden changes in
demand for their products, so that they could organize their production
most efficiently no matter what investments for new machines, etc, were
required.49

This characteristic is much more important in Germany than

in the United States.

Prom observation European businessmen seem to

invest for longer periods than their American counterparts, and so in
vestments must pay their way much longer.
position to undertake large capital outlays;
and export more.
on this question.

Large firms are in a better
they thus progress faster

The theory of the "Social Market Economy" is silent
Erhard has not interfered with concentration and the

federal cartell office has been reluctant to proceed againstbig industry.
The docility of German labour and the German propensity to
save and not to consume come more into the direct sphere of economic
policy influence.

Until the sixties, German unions were very sensitive

when exports were being threatened, the cause of which relates to the
immediate postwar era of codetermination.

If the government had any say

in regard to this matter, its influence was restricted to moral suasion.
The 1949 constitution guaranteed autonomous collective bargaining
"Tarifautonomie" to the contract partners, industry and the unions.

49

Kindleberger, p. 57

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The

53

government never mediated disputes.
this issue more extensively.

The next chapter will elaborate on

It will suffice here to say that the res

traint practised by the unions throughout the fifties with respect to
wage demands undoubtedly aided in the creation of a surplus for the pro
ducer, but if the producers would not have adjusted to lower profit mar
gins their influence would have resulted in exactly the opposite in the
sixties, for the wage increases granted in Germany since 19 60 are the
highest in Europe,

Thus today one must regard this trait as an obstruc

tion to the export surplus.
The propensity to save and not to consume, likewise is a main
subject in a later chapter, and so its mention here in connection with
exports shall be brief.

Savings were the prerequisite without which the

massive exports could not have been possible.

The average propensity

to save is high, especially among private households.

These economic

units contributed 37,o of the total savings in 1963, based on an average
rate of lQo of disposable income.

The marginal propensity to save is

also high, although in the mid-sixties it is probably declining.

The

cause has already been referred to as the desire for security, precaution
and lately the quest for identity.
Savings occupy an important part in the determination of exports
in the long run as well as in the short run context.

In the long run, if

savings constitute a high proportion of income, investment can be high both
in the domestic and export sectors.

Hence, exports will grow, raise income

and set the same chain of events into action once again.

liVhile the long

run significance is applicable at all stages of employment, the short run
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connection between savings and exports takes on importance particularly
at the full employment level at which Germany has been for the greater
part of the postwar era.

According to the theory of national income

accounting, exports can increase at the full employment level without
inflation only if there is (a) a corresponding decline in investment,
(b) an increase in imports or (c) an increase in savings. (X = (S -±) +M).
During the late fifties, investment was too profitable to be reduced and
imports were stable.

Thus, marginal savings were the flexible element

that allowed exports to increase.

In the sixties, the long run connec

tion retains its former importance but the short run savings have declined
in favour of an increase in imports.

They are, nevertheless, still quite

important and preferable to increased imports because any short run savings
contribute to the long run export prospects.
Economic policy was an important factor affecting savings.
Together with the psychological motives that were responsible for frugality
they explain the high average and marginal propensities.

Economic policy

provided many financial incentives for saving above the already extensive
precautionary amounts set aside by the public.
present a thorough analysis of the details.

The last chapter will
The promotion of exports was

not the only reason for which incentives were created.

Exports were part

of the general effort of reconstruction for which savings were required.
The Role of Economic Policy
The last part of this chapter will deal with those issues which
exclusively or nearly exclusively involved the influence of government
economic policy.

Kindleberger has suggested that they were the deficiencies
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of the German capital market and the beggar-thy-neighbour policies of
the government.

Since this last phase is a priori negative value

judgment its connotation must be changed.

The manner of presentation

will also be based on two broad causal elements, direct government
export promotion and the management of the capital account.

The latter

aspect will complement and complete the analysis that has up to now
dealt only with the current account or even more specifically the mer
chandise trade balance.

Export promotion has been consciously follow

ed since the beginning of the Federal Republic in 1948.

At various

times this export promotion has taken the form of taxation privileges,
special bank discount rates, export insurance schemes, and miscellan
eous expenditures to foster better communication and information inter
nationally.
On the whole,
since its initiation.
portant era.

Jest German export promotion has receded ever

The early fifties until 1955 were the most im

Portions of the income from exports to the dollar area

were income tax tree, and the bills of exchange financing the exports
were free of the bill tax.

50

This privilege ended in 1955 with the

GATT convention, where it was agreed that no industrialized country
was to grant tax privileges for exports.

All that remains today in

the German tax system is the rebate of the turnover tax, which has been
arbitrarily set at 3 .5/i irrespective of the actual burden of the tax.

51

^ 7/irtschaftsdienst "Soil und kann der Staat den Export fordem?" ,
Interviews des Tfirtschaftsdienstes, (October, 1966), p. 527.

51

*■
n
R. Adouard, "Kehren die alten Handelsbilanz uberschusse wieder?",
Wirtschaftsdienst. (October, 1966), p. 71.
Since this thesis was origin
ally written, Germany has switched to the value added form of taxation
thus removing the ambiguity of this rebate.
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As its counterpart, there is also an import equalization tax to equalize
the burden domestically, that has, however, been differentially adjusted
to reflect the actual burden more adequately.

52

Again, this is not really

a tax privilege but a competitive measure to prevent the cummnlative tax
from pricing the commodities out of the international market.

In France

/ 53
such rebates come to 8-9,3.
The reduction of discount privileges of exports by the banks
began somewhat later when the surpluses were getting too large.

Ninety

day bills of exchange in the export business had been rediscounted by
the German banks without the acceptance of the central bank and at rates
in the pairticular countries concerned if they were below the rates pre
vailing in the Federal Republic.

The costs were borne by the so-called

"Plafonds B" of the central bank, containing 300 million Dtvl and created
by the treasury specifically for that purpose.

54

That remains of this

credit system since 1957 is carried on by the "Kreditanstalt fur
iederaufbau" (credit institute for reconstruction) and the
"Ausfuhrkreditanstalt" (export credit agency).

The former has at its

disposal a fund of 300 million IM out of the former SEP programme with
which to aid in the financing of long term investments in underdeveloped
countries.

The second institution is a private bankers consortium en

gaged in the aid of medium-term projects, 6 to 48 months.

The funds

52

Heinz I.Iesenberg, "Schwerpunkte der Steuergesetzgebung" ,
1961-65", Steuer und Y/irtschaft. Nr.42 (December, 1965) p. 882.
53
54

Adouard, p. 71.
Carstens, p. 39.
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came from the original "Flafonds B" of the central bank.

55

In contrast

to the earlier period these agencies no longer are permitted to provide
for continuous refinancing.
As export credit is, nevertheless, a fairly strong allocative
support which is internationally frowned upon in debtor countries, the
main efforts of German export promotion have shifted to export insurance
in recent years.
shift also.

Other factors have, of course, contributed to this

Export insurance is as close as one can get without dis

torting the competitive ideal of the "Social Market Economy11.
does not distort trade;
doubt on this issue.

Insurance

it only reduces the risk, although there is some
In addition, only the government can handle so

vast a programme as international insurance.

Finally, the development

of the trade pattern in recent years has done much to bring insurance to
the forefront of export promotion.

Export insurance began in 1950 and

has contributed very much to the success of the winning back of export
markets after the war.

The two agencies primarily engaged in this

activity are the "Hermes AG" and the "Deutsche Revisions - und Treuhand AG",
both credit insurance agencies having a public guarantee fund at their
disposal.

56

-

It contained 120 million EM in 1950, and by 19o5 it had grown

to 17 billion EM, of which 16 billion DM was in active use.
The main function of export insurance in recent years has been
to bridge the risk and the credit conditions in underdeveloped and communist

56

K. Hamann, and U.H. Habicht, "Zur Geschichte der deutschen
Exportkreditversicherung," Neue Perspektiven aus lirtschaft und Recht.
(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 196(5), p. 20.
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countries.

In absolute terms, therefore, export insurance does not

play a major role.

ffith the advent of Common Market integration,

the relative importance of the underdeveloped and communist markets
has receded.

Communist countries demand very long credit terms of

seven to eight years, and if the political risks are added, private
insurance companies would not enter this field.

In comparison with

other countries, the German government insurance is small.

For

example, French and English exporters are covered to 90 - 95^ for
political risk and 85 - 9Qo for economic risk as compared with the
meagre German rates of 15,j and

respectively.

57

The success of

German firms in still getting orders and completing them can then
either be attributed to their love of risk, or to the good reliabi
lity of the debtor when dealing with German enterprises because he
values their goods.
latter.

Something should definitely be said for the

The problem in underdeveloped countries, on the other hand,

is somewhat different.

Here it is very difficult to draw the line

between direct aid and export promotion, and because competition for
exports is very intensive, there is every indication that a good deal
of business is a donation to the exporter by~ the government.
this phenomenon is not restricted to Germany alone.

58

But

The American

Export-Import Bank financed 12,6 of all U.S. exports through the
foreign aid programme also.

More precise information on this topic

F. Berg., "Interviews", iffirtschaftsdienst. (October,1966) , p.36 ,

rO
Rudolf Munemann^ "Probleme der Kooperation bei der
Exoortfinanzierung", Vortrage des 17. Betriebswirtschafter Tages,
[Munich : Duncker & Humblot, Deutschen 19^-), p. 181.
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is difficult to obtain, and quantitative data legally obtained are
virtually unavailable.
Finally, a word should be said about informational export
promotion.

Apart from 12 million DM allotted for fairs and exhibi

tions by the government, there has been very little activity.

Private

industry itself invests only 1 .5/0 of its earnings in research of for
eign sales opportunities.

Not until recently has the new government

proclaimed that the economics ministry hopes to receive ideas from
private industry as to what sort of research should be financed by the
government.59

Erhard had remained unconcerned about this matter even

in a year of meagre surplus such as 1965.
The quantitative effect of the export promotion aspect of
the German trade surplus cannot be calculated.

The impression that

one obtains is that export promotion was helpful in the early years
after 1949, but that in the last decade, it has affected trade only
marginally.

Moreover, the German system hardly had the scope of the

British or French promotion, whereas German exports have grown much
faster.

7/hether a greater effort would have improved the results

further is unimportant.

Germany did not need greater exports.

The government's laisser faire attitude with the addition of a small
dose of moral suasion was sufficient.

Direct export promotion by a

rich country vri.ll always remain marginal in the quest for internation
al markets.
The management of the capital account is the most contro-

59 '

Adouard, p. 73.
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varsial feature of the government’s economic policy on the issue of
the balance of payments.

If Germany is ever referred to as having

followed a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, the management of the capital
account is generally the first argument put forth.
the judgment would seem to be supported.

Statistically,

Not only has the current

account been in Germany's favour, but the capital account has also
been consistently positive.
tive only in 1962.

As summarized in Table 6 , it was nega

Bor the period 1958 to 1965 the answer to whether

Germany really followed a beggar-thy-neighbour policy can only be
determined from an analysis of the causes of the capital account surplus.
The underlying theme of the capital surplus is the dilemma
resulting from an irrevocable conflict of domestic and foreign economic
policy that Germany faced since 1954.

Domestic price stability was

given priority in economic policy decisions, and its price was paid in
terms of ever increasing trade surpluses and capital inflows.

Some

observers see the origin of the problem in the undervaluation of the
exchange rate which gave Germany a natural 5-IQ-j advantage over its
competitors.

60

But the situation became drastic when Germany reached

full employment in the mid-fifties, and bottlenecks put pressure on
prices.

’.Thereas other countries fostered domestic expansion in com

parable situations, Germany suppressed it and piled up surpluses to be
used in creating even more exports, which in turn once again strained
domestic stability.

Concomitantly, the deficiencies of the German

capital market added flames to the fire, as the central bank was unable
to neutralize the surplus required to maintain permanently the domestic
1’■■

1 '■

The Economist, p. xi.
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stability.

The insufficiency found expression in rising interest rates

which drew large capital inflows with them.
dilemma was accidentally remedied.

for a short time, the

Reaching a high point in 1956, a

portion of the surpluses accumulated and was neutralized in the
"Juliustuzm" to an extent of 7.7 billion DM.

^2

These were originally

planned expenditures for foreign troops stationed in Germany which were
either not spent or not spent on schedule.

After 1957, however, they

were reduced and the surplus ceased to be neutralized.

In addition,

the surplus funds which the government was able to reach through the
influence of the central bank on the commercial banks wan only a seg
ment of the total.

The non-bank sector could not be reached at all by

way of open market purchases and rediscount policy, used an it wan to
self-financing, and thus still more capital streamed in from abroad.
Remedying the balance of payments crisis by means of re
export of money capital, gold and foreign exchange, was considered for
some time at this point.

The notion had been brought up by German

economists for several reasons:

(a), it would put the German accumula

tions of gold and foreign exchange to work in underdeveloped countries,
(b)} it would help to alleviate the international liquidity crisis for
which Germany was receiving a large part of the blame, and (c), it
would neutralize the inflationary impact of the balance of payments
surpluses^

Carstens, p. 62.
/To

Ibid.. p.37.
^
Patrick Boarman, Germany*s Economic Dilemma: Inflation
and the Balance of Payments (.London: Yale University Press, 19«f),p.2V7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62

In view of the structures and the economic policies followed
by the underdeveloped countries in contrast to Germany, credit extension
would, however, return to Germany like a boomerang.

As Boarman states:

"Extension by surplus countries of credits to deficit
countries which followed inflationary policies con
tained an economic booby trap.
The soft currency
countries frequently used the monetary "elbow room"
provided to increase the general condition of over
expansion with its import-increasing exportdecreasing consequences.
As a result, the export
credits made the deficits still bigger.
The export
of German credit abroad was nullified to the extent
that the recipient countries returned the gold and
g,
exchange to Germany for the purchase of German goods."
The goods that Germany produced were especially in demand in developing
countries.

What were permanently exported were thus German goods for

which no equivalent goods were received in exchange.

The fact that

Germany usually insisted on loans tied to German products virtually
assured this reaction.

Moreover, the process of reexport of foreign

exchange in Germany itself forced real capital exports.

What was re

duced by the reexport of inflowing gold and currencies was not primarily
income but bank liquidity.

Thus a surplus in the balance of payments

may be turned into a deficit, which did occur in 1959 but without thereby
cancelling the original impact of the current account surpluses.
As already mentioned, even if the "boomerang effect" would not
have been operative, the high interest rates prevailing in Germany in the
late fifties would have reversed the flow of exchange again.
rates were phenonomenally high during this time.

The German

The average 1956-1961

long term interest rates were 6.55/° as compared to 3.66^ for the United

^

Ibid..

248.
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States and 3*18,0 for Switzerland.
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Despite the impressive growth in investment in Germany through
out this period, there was still a great scarcity of capital.

About

ktfa of all funds were directed to solving the housing problem, and further

amounts were needed first to re-equip labour with new tools and later to
overcome the scarcity of labour.

Capital costs simply skyrocketed.

Only if the recipient countries used the credits to settle debts
with other countries or international financial institutions, or if they
neutralized them in their treasuries would the reverse flow of funds not
have been inevitable.

These policies did not begin to

makeheadwayin

most countries until well into the sixties.
The boomerang effect, on the other hand, would not operate in
the same way with regard to money inflows in the short or intermediate
period.

The outflows

of credit were bound to turn

into

goods outflows

while the inflows were

not followed by real capital

inflows. Credit

inflows were mostly in the form of direct investments by foreign com
panies establishing subsidiaries to serve the European Common Market.
These investments were constantly nourished by fresh inflows of capital,
but they grew principally through reinvestment of retained earnings.
Direct goods imports did not follow from this investment process imme
diately.

Eventually, the additional investment contributed to a

rising level of national income and so to more imports as determined by
the marginal propensity to import.

Similarly, the increased investment

had this time undoubtedly strained some resources, raised prices,

^

Ibid.. p. 25h r .
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discouraged exports and encouraged imports.

The connection remains,

nevertheless, indirect, -whereas Germany's capital exports were subject
to both the direct and indirect effects.
The basic dilemma continued until 19 6l.
had increased every year;

The trade surplus

gold and foreign exchange were at an all

time high and price stability was weakening.
a point of fundamental disequilibrium.

The economy had reached

If prices were to be kept

absolutely stable, the trade surplus would have had to reach a size that
the other countries no longer could accept without retaliation.

Conse

quently, the only way out if Germany was unwilling to inflate the price
level and if the other nations were unwilling to apply restraint was to
revalue, and this Germany undertook in 1961,

Once more, it must be

emphasized that the German case would hold in general in industrial coun
tries practising restraint.

There are notable exceptions;

the United

States and Switzerland are good examples that show that long run capital
exports are possible.

But it is primarily possible because most of the

capital exports are reinvested profits accruing from their substantial
foreign direct investments.
In his analysis of the 1961 revaluation, Carstens has shown
that given the export and import elasticities of Germany, the normal
reduction in the size of the balance of payments should have resulted
and it did in 1962.

66

(Table 2, column 6 shows this).

The current

as well as the capital account (Table 6) contributed to the reduction.
Exports rose only 3.9,j (19o1, 6.3/b) while imports increased by 11.6;o
(1961, 3.8/2).

The next year, however, the same problems began to

Carstens, p. 73.
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reappear as in the late fifties.
exports rose rapidly.

Inflation abroad was strong and German

At the same time, one revaluation established

hopes for another one to follow.

Exporters were eager to export before

a second revaluation gave them an additional price disadvantage abroad,
while importers held off pure liases in the hope of acquiring them at lower
prices following revaluations.

2.5 billion DM of liquid capital also

/•
67
entered the country in 1963 in expectation of speculative gains, or one
half of the German net exports of goods and services.

But in contrast

to five years earlier, revaluation was no longer needed.

Some pressure

was reflected in increasing domestic prices and a great deal in foreign
leakages.

Tourists accounted for 2 to 3 billion EM, foreign workers

for another 1-g billion EM in remittances, 1 to 2 billion EM went to
underdeveloped countries, and 2 billion EM went abroad as net dividend

68
remittances by 1965.

In addition, the foreign demand for German bonds

received a halting blow with the 25 % coupon tax imposed in March, I96A.
Previously, this demand was infinitely elastic whenever their price
dropped below the foreign bond prices.

So by 1965, the total balance

of payments turned negative, (Table 2, column 6) and the problems all
seemed to have solved themselves.
Before commenting on this aspect of government economic
policy, one interesting point might be made.

Carstens once again has

pointed out that one half of the surplus on current account could be

Hans J. Brems, "West German Problems, Price Discipline and
Economic Integration", Quarterly Review of Economics and Business,
(Winter, 19&0, p. 55.

68

The Economist, p. 28.
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explained by a non-economic phenomenon, receipts from foreign troops.
(Table 2A).

69

Ke insisted that because of their political nature, the

troop receipts were not a permanent feature of the German economy.
If they were omitted in calculating the balance of payments surplus,
no appreciable surplus remained.

But there is adequate reason to

regard them as just as permanent a category as some nations regard
shipping receipts.
Despite the dilemma,there is undoubtedly no country that
would not gladly have changed place with Germany.

Moreover, one

cannot attribute the problem to the beggar-thy-neighbour policy de
liberately pursued by the government.
primarily with surpluses in mind.

It did not follow its course

After several historical exper

iences with domestic inflation, which deeply affected the "Social
Order" theorists of the "Social Market Economy", a rigid course with
regard to price stability had obviously to be the predominant concern.
When the other countries do not share those opinions, they must be
aware of the consequences.

Not only did they encourage the German

trade surplus accumulation by their stimulation of aggregate demand,
but they put Germany in a position where it could do little to remedy
the situation.

For while a policy to expand exports by holding down

prices and curbing domestic spending works well, a policy to increase
imports and to improve the functioning of the capital market, both
of which were expected of Germany, is usually unsuccessful!^
69

Carstens, p. 36 .
^Kindleberger, p. 58.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Hence,

67

responsibility lay with the debtor not the creditor.

The validity of

this conclusion is poignantly shown by France and Italy since 1965 .
The theory of Sucken and Ropke was followed to the letter by
the government policy makers, and in their eyes the surplus must be
viewed a triumph.

One can support that position, calling it a "Social

Market Econony" triumph, but of the short, not the long run.
a one directional course can be successful for some time.

Steering
The "Social

Market Economy" theorists and practicians responsible for economic
policy in Germany in the mid-fifties were probably too optimistic in
believing that the "others" would revert to the German practice.

Ulti

mately these hopes were dashed at a time when the domestic-foreign policy
disequilibrium strained the economy to the limit.

A decade of huge

surpluses and their effects were beginning to disrupt the domestic social
order.

Here the Erhard administration was no longer master of the situa

tion as the economy was sliding into greater difficulties than the tradi
tional problem countries, France and Italy.

Under such a reversal of

the situation, even the best export structure, which Germany still has,
is of little value.

Little more needs to be said about that question,

for it is the topic of the next section.
Conclusion
In this chapter, the attempt has been made to evaluate the
influence of economic policy on the German balance of payments in the
postwar era and to relate that economic policy to the ideas which under
lie the "Social Market Economy" .

The balance of payments position has

almost consistently been in Germany's favour.

Of all factors analyzed,
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the composition of trade stands out as the major explanation of success
in foreign trade.

The keys as to why Germany had the correct composi

tion are its economic structure and its capacity for innovation and
technical progress.
cal occurrences.

Both in turn can he attributed to unique histori
The separation of Bast from '.Test Germany gave to the

West an economic structure whose comparative advantage was in capital
goods production.

These were in great demand in the postwar years.

The war itself was the other historical incident that gave Germany an
advantage.

The technical experience gathered in such a vast military

effort was of great value to German engineers and technicians in con
tinuing technical progress after the war.
actively affect the structure of trade.

Economic policy did not
If it can be said to have

played a role, it was one of passive acceptance of the new postwar en
vironment, which in fact, meant the encouragement of trade based on
comparative advantage instead of renewed self-sufficiency.

Such

acceptance meant trade liberalization and proved successful.
The same criteria apply to the influences that other coun
tries* economic policies had on German trade.

The creation of the

Common Market benefited Germany primarily because it was in the best
position to adopt mass production techniques.

In the less developed

nations, German exports had none of the stigmas attached to them as
those from the ex-colonial powers, France and Britain, or those from
the neo"colonialist" Americans and Russians.

Nevertheless, the

general lines of economic policy were again an underlying theme.

The

German government was Europe oriented, a fact which contributed to the
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establishment of the Common Market, while in the eyes of the third world
it was a welcome change from one-country nationalism.

Much of this new

outlook was inspired by "Social Market" ideas in addition to the changed
role that Germany could play after the war.
are really connected.
phasized.

In a vague sense, the two

Competition and comparative advantage were em

Neither social welfare states like Britain nor the U.S.

supported trade liberalization to the degree that Germany did.

Classi

cal economic theory triumphed when Germany exported successfully.

One

can, of course, say that economic policy was involved in all these issues,
but the point is that the effect was purely secondary.

Without the struc

tural advantages to begin with, the export surpluses would not have resulted
in all probability.
In addition, the propensity to export and the propensity to save
were seen to play a role in the success of foreign trade.

Economic sur

vival as a mature nation meant exports and savings for the German economy
after the war, a thought which still pervades the thinking of businessmen
and workers today.

The feelings were seen to be so strong that they even

persisted against the economic policy of revaluation in 1961.

That action

paradoxically represents both the success and failure of "Social Market"
doctrine.

Competitiveness had been so strongly emphasized by "Social

Market " theorists that German producers created a monopoly in the domes
tic market to remain competitive internationally.

This was clearly not

intended by Eucken or by Muller-Amnack.
Direct export promotion was hardly a factor beyond the imme
diate postwar years.

It takes only the form of export insurance now,
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and in comparison to Britain, the U.S. and Prance, the German effort is
far more limited.

There is no significant economic policy decision nor

"Social Market " doctrine in question when it comes to insurance.
Finally, the positive capital account was shown to be directly
related to a fundamental requirement of a
tic price level stability.

"Social Market Economy", domes

The export surpluses resulting were important

but incidental outcomes of such policy.

Throughout the entire period

that Erhard was economics minister and later when he was chancellor, price
level stability remained his prime concern.

One cannot, however, go so

far as to consider the positive capital account an unmixed blessing nor
can it be indefinitely prolonged without incurring bad feelings in other
countries.

Domestic stability was achieved at the price of cumulative

export surpluses which had a cumulative inflationary effect that was pro
gressively more difficult to neutralize.

Eventually revaluation was the

only solution.
In conclusion, the impression is that it wan the objective
economic factors that were on balance responsible for the strong balance
of payments position.

If economic policydid not leave a significant

mark, it wan primarily because the success wan much more dependent on an
economic philosophy than on precise policy.

The economic philosophy wan

liberal and did not prevent the objective factors from playing their role.
The emphasis on trade liberalization, competition and comparative advantage
which inspire the "Social Market " theory were evidenced only in a passive
way.

Whatever economic policy was applied, it did not have any specific

"Social Market" traits except in connection with monetary stability.
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conclusion is, moreover, unavoidable that no positive economic policy
could have accomplished much more during the first twenty postwar years.
But it does not imply that a new approach should not be warranted in
1968 to keep the favourable trade balance either from the point of view
of economic philosophy or economic policy.

All objective and subjec

tive criteria are subject to change.
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CHAPTER 111
PRICE AND MOHETARY STABILITY
The objective of this chapter will be the evaluation of
economic policy with respect to the second criterion of success in
German's postwar development, domestic monetary and price stability.
There are three types of possible inflations, demand pull, cost push
and structural inflation."^

The chapter is an analysis of the fac

tors that are responsible for these three types of inflation and what
role they played in Germany.

Government economic policy is an inte

gral. part of such as analysis by virtue of the role government plays
in contributing to inflation and in responding to its existence.
The degree to which Germany's postwar economic development
has displayed a certain price or monetary stability can be judged rela
tively or absolutely from statistics.
case the absence of inflation.

Price stability means in any

The Gennan inflation of 1923 acutely

demonstrated the adverse economic, social and even political results
of inflation.

Consequently, the preservation of price stability is

generally recognized now to be one of the major objectives of govern
ment economic policy.

Certain^ the government has the direct

71
The three-fold division of inflation classification is
emphasized according to the more modern approach, primarily because
it allows economic policy response.
72
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influence through its control of the issuing of money.
In Germany, price and monetary stability were to be especially
encouraged by economic policy.

Both those who had lived through the

1923 inflation and the "Social Market " economists were ardent supporters
of stability.

The economics minister Srhard, as mentioned earlier, even

interpreted the "Social Market Economy" to mean "freedom in the realm of
goods, discipline in the realm of money" .

Price stability had to be the

major policy consideration of any German government and particularly in
a "Social Market Economy".

There is no doubt, therefore, that the re

placement of the Erhard administration by the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition
in 1967 was partly motivated by the belief that Srhard and his "Social
Market" economists were failing to solve the problem of creeping infla
tion.

The apparent success of the fifties was not being duplicated in

the sixties.
Price and wage Movements
A brief statistical synopsis will outline how stable the
price level has actually been.

Tables 7 and 8 summarize the develop

ments of the general wholesale and consumers price indexes and give a
disaggregated picture of the major wholesale price index component as
well as an international comparison.

Both general indexes show sub

stantial. price increases after i960 essentially concentrated into the
years 1964 to 1966.

During that span of years, the wholesale price

index rose 36 annually, and the consumers’ price index rose by 4$
annually.

The discrepancy with the average price increases during

the fifties, which never passed beyond 2,1, is noticeable.
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increases are virtually the upper limit if the inflation is to be called
creeping.

A look at the disaggregated wholesale price index shows that

consumption goods and building materials have generated the most signi
ficant price increases.

Producers' goods price and basic raw materials

and textiles,on the other hand, show less than average increases.
Labour costs axe also signposts of price level stability, for
if the Cobb-Douglas production function is acceptable in the German case,
labour is the major input in a product.

A look at Table 12 reveals that

contractual wages increased at an even faster pace, 31.5/a alone since

1962 or almost 10,j annually since 19^3 •

Jeekly gross pay for workers

and monthly salaries for white collar workers show similar tendencies at
levels only slightly below the hourly pay increases (Tables 9 and 10).
Furthermore, it can be seen from Table 11 that the increases which, of
course, affect the cost of produced goods put Germany into one of the
worst positions internationally, together with the British and the
Japanese economies.

It is interesting to note that both Britain and

Japan are having the same problems as Germany.
a growing economy while Japan is.

Britain is not, however,

V/ages and price increases can occur

in either growing or stagnating economies.

The first year of the new

government has been, on the other hand, very stable.

Expected increas

es were only about 1-gu until the end of the year 1967.
Inflation, as noted above, can be of demand pull, cost push
or structural type and the remedies lie with monetary and fiscal policy,
"Konjuhkturpolitik" as it is known to Germany.

Of the three demand-

pull is most sensitive to monetary and fiscal policy measures;

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the other

75

two are less sensitive to them, and their correction often requires going
outside of conventional policy.
In contrast to the decade of the fifties, the sixties show a
definite decline in internal price stability, a decline that, nevertheless,
compared favourably with the developments in other major countries.

The

instability suggests that the government either could not diagnose the
causes of the creeping inflation, or could diagnose correctly but was un
able to find the correct remedy, or it was aware of both the illness and
the cure but was unwilling to do anything about them for political or
other reasons.
Demand Pull Inflation
Let ’
us begin with the traditional demand pull inflation, deter
mine the extent to which Germany has been affected by it and examine the
government's policy response.

The Keynesian model of income determina

tion identifies three components of aggregate demand, consumption, invest
ment and government expenditures.

Exports have been deliberately omitted

in this model because their role has already been noted.

One must be

aware, however, of the possible connections of demand and supply.

Changes

in the supply of labour, for instance, cause changes in the level of aggre
gate demand.

Consequently, Germany probably does not suffer from only one

type of inflation but all three.

The identification of the demand pull

element is thus a problem in itself.
Although virtual full employment had been reached in 1956,
noticeable demand pull inflation did not result until the beginning of the
sixties.

Until that decade, the economy had realized "the most favourable
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development of its potential with a high micro-economic flexibility and
72
a macro-economic full capacity.

Inflationary pressure was there,

provided by the huge capital inflows and the trade surplus, but the
central bank and the government kept it under control an noted previous
ly.

After I960, demand pull inflation could no longer be suppressed.

While revaluation in 1961 temporarily slowed down the imported inflation,
the domestic one was accelerated.^
The origins of the demand pull inflation were found in the
order of government expenditures followed by investment demand and con
sumption.

Table 13 verifies this order of precedence.

As a proportion

of total domestic demand, government expenditures have increased from a
low of 12.9/2 in 1956 to 15.6'o in 1965.
ed for since 1959.

Much of this increment was account

Investment has moderately increased its share of de

mand while consumption has displayed a persistent relative decline.

The

decline is, however, relative for column A shows that it has been increas
ing in absolute terms.
An examination of sector aggregates reveals also that prices
have risen most where government expenditures were important.

The con

struction sector above all has been influenced by government spending and
its price index movement is correspondingly strong.

The curtailment of

the consumption share is particularly evident in the years i960 and 1961,
*72

Karl Schiller, Preisstabilitat durch globale Steuerung der
Marktwirtschaft (Tubingen; Mohr 1966), p. 10.
*77

Karl Hauser, "Das Inflationselement in den deutschen
Exportuberschussen", ~,7e1twirtschaftliches Archiv, (1959: II), pp.243-67 .
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during which the investment share rose noticeably.

Thus on the whole,

consumer expenditures could not have contributed in any great measure
to the demand-pull inflation at this time.

The slight increases in

their proportion in the following years were always overshadowed either
by those of government or investment.

.'/hat pressure there was, origina

ted in specific sectors such as consumer durables and consumer services.
Increasing differentiation of demand provide the basic explanation in
this case.

As for the investment demand component, which increased its

share strongly in 1959 and I960, the foremost initiating forces were a
building boom and an inventory expansion, both encouraged by low interest
rates, along with the general vibrant investment demand in the other sec
tors

The weakening of the investment demand following from bad pros

pects in heavy industry, temporarily cooled the demand in 1962, only to
begin anew in 1964 until the end of that year in -which the building boom
also reached a new height.

Since the statistics for that year show a

declining share for consumption, the conclusion is that investment always
increased its share at the expense of consumption.

If the correlation

statistically is not too exact, it is because of the growing but fluctuat
ing foreign workers remittances.

These substantially stabilized domestic

consumption expenditures.
On the other hand, the case of the government sector is differ
ent,

In every year since the mid-fifties its share has expanded, absolut

ely and relatively, irrespective of the other two components.
72,

it

Slight

Heinz Linsenmeier, Moglichkeiten und Grenzen der
Kon.junkturbeeinflussung durch aktive Bankpolitik, dargestellt am
Kon.junkturverlauf in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Dissertation,
(Stuttgart: Seewald, 1964).
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correlation exists only with investment}for as might tie expected for
through direct and indirect subsidies this component was encouraged to
expand.

For example, the building boom primarily achieved its enor

mous dimensions because of government subsidies.
dies alone reached 16 billion EM.

75

In 19$2 these subsi-

And from that sector, effects

radiated to all others by virtue of the nature of the building industry.
In 1965, total subsidies reached 28.5 billion EM, almost 5Q j of the
budget of the central government.

Its own private investment demands

naturally grew in step and added 4.5 billion DM of demand in 19&4.
The federal government's demand in the investment sector was overshadow
ed by the other two levels of government, the "Lander” and the "Gemeinden"
(local governments).

Construction came more within the jurisdiction of

the lower levels of government.
their purses were smaller.

Their projects were more extensive but

In 1964 the "Lander" added 8 million EM or

almost one-third of the total public investment demand of 28 billion EM.
And the "Gemeinden" added another 16 million EM.

The means of finance

of the "Lander” was the central bank, through its so-called "Juliusturm II",
and debt creation in the capital market.

As Table 14 shows, the local

governments increased their debt constantly, from 3.5 billion EM in 1964
to 4.6 billion in 1965 , while the "Lander" followed with 1 billion DM in
1964 and 3 billion DM in 1965 .

The federal government remained relatively

Linsenmeier, p. 134.
Karl Hettlage, "Grundsatzfragen antizyklischer Finanzpolitik” ,
Geldwert und offentliche Finanzen (Ludwigsburg: Aktionsgemeinschaft
Soziale Marktwirtschaft, 1965), p. 63
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modest with only 1 billion DM of additonal debts during the latter year.
The capital market in effect was being excessively strained.

The public

demand for capital has risen from a total of 31 billion EM to 37 billion DM
in 1965.

Total savings had also increased by 6 billion DM .

Since the

increased public expenditures meant an increase of 11.j over the previous
year and revenue rose by

private savings had to be tapped and drawn

77
away from the private sector.'

Hence the inflationary gap arose, and

the government demand component bore the responsibility.
While the private sector has in the last few years not been
the principal villain in unleashing the inflationary forces, it has never
theless had to bear the consequences.

The creeping inflation lias foster

ed the "disintegration of the society", hinted at earlier.
in income and more so of wealth were accentuated.

Differences

This social disequili

brium was as inadmissible as inflation in a "Social Market Economy" .
Statistically the statement is partially correct.
regard to the formation of wealth.

It is accurate with

Already between 1950 and 1959, 17,’0

of all household united received three-quarters of the total accrued net
wealth;

the average capitalist accumulated at that time twenty-three

73
times as much wealth as the average worker.
have not been substantially changed.

Since then the results

Germany has thus achieved a more

unequal wealth distribution than the United States though not comparable
with that of under-developed countries.
77

t*
ti
Heinrich Troiger, "Die Finanzreform, Grundzuge und
Leitgedanken", Offene Welt (November, 1966), p. 284.
Hhrenberg, p. 44.
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Government attempts to counteract the trend have not been
very effective.

In 1961, for example, the government put into effect

the "law for the promotion of wealth formation", which was extended in
1963 and supplemented in 1965 .

The original law and its extension

offer premiums for savings for limited amounts (minimum 24012.1, maximum
480 Hi) at rates between 221a and 23 /a depending on family size and
length of deposit.

The supplement, also known as the 312 HI law, is

a more direct stimulus for wealth formation through which the worker
is offered 312 HI annually by the employer, the determination of the
type of asset being left to the employee.

79

In both cases a negli

gible percentage of those qualifying have taken advantage of the offer.
The same disinterest was manifested with regard to the "Volksaktien"
issues (peoples' stock).

Vforkers were quick to purchase them at their

below market prices but almost immediately resold them for a quick pro
fit.

The workers simply had no experience with the ownership of capi

tal.

For the "Social Market" supporters the rejection by the workers

of capital ownership must be considered a blow, for they hoped that
capital ownership would make them feel that they had a stake in the
economy's future.

If the social equilibrium lost its balance it was

because labour did not take the initiative to overcome its inabilities.
Labour could even be accused of augmenting the inflationary pressure by
its actions and thus hurting itself.

If woz'kers had kept their

"Volksaktien" instead of selling them and spending the proceeds, excess
demand would have been reduced and real wages would not as easily have
suffered.

The argument is true only so long, however, as excess demand

*7Q
Mesenberg, p. 673.
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is the cause of inflation and there is excess aemnd in those sectors
where the proceeds are spent.

The concentration of wealth in Germany

has increased and was facilitated to do so by creeping inflation.
The distribution of current income, however, does not show
a bias against labour.

Table 15, column 3 shows that since I960 the

proportion of income going to non-self-employed labour has risen
steadily.

Conversely capital income is shrinking, despite the fact

that investment has been increasing.
fiable.

The reasons are readily identi

The capital-output ratio has remained fairly consistent and

profits have decreased.

There is no logic in the argument that

because national income in Germany had doubled from 1957 to 1967 that
the share of labours' income should rise.

Nor did the distribution

in favour of labour have an adverse effect on price level stability.
Government and investment were the sources of inflation more so than
consumption.

Nhat matters is not the income distribution or the

wealth distribution per se but how they affect the supply and demand
relationship in any particular sector.

Capital income affects pri

marily the investment component and labour income the consumption
sector*.

Savings originate in both, but labour does not actively

dispose of savings destined for investment.

A forced redistribution

of income could disrupt the regular market forces and lead to price
instability.

80

80

II
Wolfram Langer, Sicherung der Geldwertstabilitat: Sine
Aufgabe der Konjunktur -, Struktur - und Airtschafts-politik
Kieler Vorthage Nr.44, 1966 (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 19^6), p.15.
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In conclusion, the case of demand-pull inflation is quite
clear cut.

In the last six years the economy has been facing excessive

pressures leading to demand-pull inflation, at first slightly on account
of private investment demand and subsequently replaced by a stronger
government demand.

Moreover, in both cases the demand surplus wan the

original cause and not induced by preceeding cost increases on the supply
side.

Finally, the strength of the inflation can be calculated from the

observation that in the case of the local governments the discrepancy bet
ween the sources of revenue and the demand for expenditures exceeded 25;a
most of the time.

Cost Push Inflation
On the supply side of the economy it is cost induced or struc
tural inflation which occur.

Both originate on the supply side;

the

difference exists in the sense that in the case of the former the purely
macro-economic supply inelasticities are the cause, while in the latter
the inelasticities are micro-economic.

Demand pull could be the initiat

ing force in regard to structural inflation, but usually the consequent
price increases are supply originated.

Cost push emphasizes the total

excess of demand for factors of supply, real or artificially created,
'while structural inflation emphasizes the differentiation of supply.
The word excess demand always remains, but it is distinguished from the
real demand pull inflation by virtue of the theoretical difference between
the theory of derived demand for factors and the marginal productivity
theory of factor demands.

Inflation can arise in a specific sector with

out the existence of an excess demand for its products.
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A brief statistical summary will once more introduce the
analysis.

Just as in the case of the demand side of the economy,

from which data can be obtained on aggregate demand and its relation
to supply in the realm of goods can be estimated, so on the supply
side data can be obtained on the aggregate supply of factors and an
estimate can be made of its relation to the demand.

Supply is cal

culated from the size of the labour force and its productivity.
Table 12, column 2 demonstrates that the active labour force hats been
growing but at a diminishing rate since I960.

The increase of 1.6

million employed can be attributed almost completely to imported la
bour.

The actual supply, quantity employed multiplied by hours

worked, has in effect slightly decreased despite the arrival of these
foreign workers.

The index of hours worked with origin 1950 = 100

has declined to 195 by i960, and reached 88 in 1965.

The native

labour force in Germany itself is stagnating and will soon start de
clining (by 1970 = -300,000).

The manpower market throughout the

seventies will be marked by the absence of the war and postwar genera
tions.

The postwar baby boom was retarded until the mid-fifties.

The situation is still one of full employment.

The rgistered un-

employment rates were 0.63 in 1965 and 0.7,3 in 1966.

82

Productivity

increases, on the other hand, have been substantial, 5.5-3 since 1958,
on the average (Table 16), 8,3 annually during the sixties, but de
creasing to

81

(preliminary estimated statistic) in 1966.

T
o
Langer, p. d.

82
Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland. 1967.
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static labour force and comparing the productivity gains with the
increases in remuneration (Table 9, 10 and Table 12, column l) reveals
an unmistakable cost inflation.

The wage index (Table 12) shows a 65,u

increase for the same period and even salary increases have followed
closely with gains of 58,6.
The discrepancy is in effect greater since contractual earn
ings increases fall consistently below actual increases by approximately
2,.o annually (Table 17) .

Combining this differential factor with the

annual IQw contractual wage - productivity discrepancy yields an average
cost increase of 3,j annually.

This follows from the additional require

ment of constant capacity utilization.

The manufacturing industry capa

city utilization index still stood at 89 (Table 12, column 6), which may
be taken to be the lowest point on the average cost function, at a point
lCfj below absolute maximum production.

It ’would mean that for 1966 the

cost increases must have been greater, for the index fell to 84, and that
result corresponds approximately to the results in Table 11 .

Here is a

clear evidence of cost push, for demand has actually receded as shown by
the lov/er capacity index.

It can be said that aside from some excep

tional years in which demand fell the supply side has been increasingly
pressured by the rising scarcity of the factors labour and land during
the last decade, leading to excess demand and higher costs.

The effect

has been heightened by the asymmetric response of these costs, the rat
chet effect, particularly labour to demand changes.

Rapid capital stock

accumulation counteracts the trend to some extent, but it is not perfectly
substitutable for the other factors.

Limited possibilities of substitu

tion apply foremost to land, and so the construction industry has become
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the leading cost push sector.
The exact relationship between factor prices, factor costs
and product prices is difficult to calculate in the German case.

The

83
only attempt for the sixties has been undertaken by Adolf Franke.
For example, he has estimatedthat the 10.4, j increase in actual wages
from I960 to 1961 led to cost increase of 4.5, ^ which in turn resulted
at that time in price increases of less than 2,3, the difference reflected in lower profits.

84

host of the increased prices originated in the

consumption goods sector as a direct by-product where demand pull was
relatively absent.
ginal cause).

(in the investment sector the latter was the ori

After 1963 the rates were reversed.

Cost push infla

tion increasingly pervaded the investment goods sector and demand pull
took hold of the consumption goods sector.

The total effect has lately

been more determined by cost push than by demand pull.
The statistical data seem, moreover, to suggest that labour
has been the primary culprit of cost push inflation.

That argument

must be substantiated 8y analyzing whether there have been direct attempts
to curtail the supply, a question which immediately brings union policy
to mind.

In order to understand union activity in Germany, one must

Adolf Francke, "Die Preis - und Lohnentwicklung in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit i960,” Aeltwirtschaftliches Archiv,
(1965: I), p. 126.
84

iieinz Scherf, "Bur Frage der Beziehungen zwischen Lohnen
■and Preisen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1951-61," 7/eltwirtschaftliches Archiv. (1964: i)
The point is made in this article that
the wages have their primary impact on the prices constituting the cost
of living index, more so than on the retail price index.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86

first of all comprehend their institutional structure.
are strictly industrial unions;

German unions

there axe sixteen broad and indivi

dually independent groupings united together to form the German Federa
tion of Unions (D G B;.
union policy.

This structure has had a profound impact on

The unions are strongest at the center.

Collective

management of the sixteen engages in collective bargaining to set the
contractural wage rates ("Tariflohne").
the plant level.

The unions are weakest at

It was not intended to be that way originally but

was the consequence of the principle of co-determination with manage
ment.

In all directorates of the large enterprises, one director is

a labour union representative, but as director the bond with labour is
weakened and the affinity with management is augmented.

The benefit

is, of course, that the rationale behind strikes has been undermined.
The principle of co-determination and strikes are inconsistent.

In

effect, the number of days lost due to strikes drastically fell from
1580 to 40 during the period from 1955 to 1961, and today the frequency
85
of strikes in Germany is still the lowest in Turope.

A further weak

ness at the plant level steins from the independent attitudes and outlook
of the works councils who represent the unions at this level.

The im

portance of this institutional feature, as far as this discussion is
concerned, is that after 1954 it has created the tendency for actual
plant wages to divert from the contractually settled wages, the so-

86
called "'wage-drift" .

<7age-drift occurs whenever the labour market is

gc
Haris Lilge, Deutschland von 1955 bis 1963 (Hanover: Verlag
fur Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 196>5), p. 124.
^

Scherf, p. 65.
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very tight and the union structure weak.

To attract new labour or to

retainalready acquired supplies, management will create new positions
at higher pay that union contracts do not classify or it vd.ll pay bonus
es for certain types of work.

Thus the contractually settled wage tends

to be below the actual rate of remuneration.

Tor certain skilled jobs

there is always a wage -drift.
It remains to be seen whether the discrepancy in pay rates
has had any bearing on the problem of inflation,

Henry T/allich came to

the conclusion in his study of the first postwar decade of German expan
sion that upward wage pressure ’which has been such a powerful force for
technological progress in the United States has been largely lacking in
Germany.

87

Undoubtedly the fact that the contractual wages were not

those in force restricted the union influence in this direction.

The

flexibility introduced into the system by the wage-drift no doubt aided
the employer.

Studies have, however, shown ’wage drift occurred only

in those sectors where the technological and organizational conditions
allowed large productivity gains, and where the cyclical influence could
virtually force it to exist, given the institutional framework of the
union.

38

The reason for the absence of iallich’s force has been the

more cooperative atmosphere of union - management relations and the
tight labour market situation, which makes it desirable for both sides
to progress technologically;
- - II I

for labour, to reduce the hours worked;

T T

Henry Uallich, Die Triebkrafte des deutschen 7/iederaufbaus
(Tubingen: Mohr, 1958), p. 215.
88

Scherf, p. 75.
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for management to fulfill the required demand of the market.
process additional wage increases vrere granted to labour.

In the
The profit

margin decreased but total profits increased.
It seems to be the general opinion among German observers
of union wage policy, that its role has been more of substantiating
Q9
than initiating significance,
and that v/age pressure has been consi
derably alleviated by the strong increase in savings of the public.
The wage increases which rise above productivity gains, a difficult
hypothesis to prove in any case, have a greater chance of being rea
lized, the higher is the marginal rate of savings of the wage increases.
The excess increases are simply reabsorbed without demand creating leakages with growth detracting implications.

90

If any conclusion can be

drawn from the preceding discussion it is that neither industry nor
labour alone were the initiators of cost push inflation.

All produc

tive factors, but particularly land and labour, became progressively
scarce while the demands for their services expanded enormously.
case wan a mixture of demand pull and cost push;
both at the product and factor levels.
and cost increases 7/ere inevitable.

The

demand was excessive

Once this was realized price
Unions were not overly active in

pushing for wage increases but the wage drift compensated for their
restraint.

Costs rose and prices were subsequently adjusted upward

also.
89

G, Zeitel, "Bestimraungsfaktoren der Preis-und
Produktivitatsstruktur", Strukturwandlungen in der deutschen Yfirtschaft
e&F. Neumark, (Berlin: Duncker &, Humblot, 1963), p. 680.
90

Linsenmeier

p. 135*
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Structural Inflation
Finally, the problem of structural inflation must be clarified.
Structural inflation is really demand pull seen microeconomically, but
it also has important macroeconomic implications.

Inflation is possible

not only if there is a macroeconomic excess demand over supply at the full
employment and capacity level of national income, but it is possible even
when aggregate supply and demand are inequilibrium.

The essence of infla

tionary tendencies is that they are attributable to the fact that money
wages and prices in a modern economy are flexible upwards but rigid downwards.91 When demand rises, prices will rise, whereas in a sector where
demand declines prices will not fall;
rise.

in fact they will probably even

Monetary and fiscal policy can do nothing to solve the problem

short of a reorganization of those sectors which have experienced de
clines to permit them to operate profitably at lower prices, and policy
should counteract the increases where they have occurred by encouraging
economies of scale.

The committee of experts in the economics ministiy

formulated this requirement vezy simply in its 1965-66 annual report:
"A stable price level necessitates growth, and growth necessitates struc92
tural change".
The contrast of declining and growing industries has quite
obviously contributed to the phenomenon of structural inflation in
Germany as in most other modern countries.

The construction industry

91

W.C. Peterson, Income. Employment and Economic Growth
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 411.
92
R.Jochimsen, "Wechselwirkungen zwischen Stabilitat und Wandel
der Gesellschaft als sozialokonomische Bildungsaufgabe," Qffene Welt.
(October, 1966), p. 182.
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and the services sector are good examples 'where demand increases have
led to direct price increases, and the iron and steel industries are
good examples where demand decreases have led to price increases.
Both demand pull and cost push combined in the construction industry.
Germany set a phenomenal pace in building an average 600,000 housing
units a year in the last decade, (for comparison, Prance built 6000,000
in total since 1955), but the housing deficiency is still 2C$ (Table 18)
and it is an industry in which there is little room for productivity
gains.

The general cost push condition holds, moreover, that the lead

ing productive sectors set the pace for wage increases with the result
that all others suffer cost and thus price increases equivalent to the
difference in productivity between them and the most productive firm.
In this particular industry, moreover, the costs are directly shifted
to the consumer, so that the rent increases consistently account for
Q-Z

about 25$ of the increase in the cost of living.

The whole field of

services ranks next to the construction industry in respect to price
increases.

For example, in 1954- the average German spent 21$ of his

income on services, whereas in 1965 this percentage had risen to 35$,
the increase being partly occasioned by the change in demand but primarily by cost increases.

94

On the other hand, the German iron and

93

W.Knauer and H.G.Hermann, "Die Wohnungsmiete"
Wirtschafts-und Sozialpoldtik ed.F. Dorge (Hamburg: Akaaemie f\ar
Wirtschaft und Politik, 19^4), p. 149.

Harald Jurgensen, "Preisstabilit'at im wirtschaftlichen
Wachstum" , Volkswirtschaftliche Korrespondenz der Adolf - Weber Stiftung (Frankfurt, 196^), p. 3.
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steel industry, on which the recovery during the fifties was based,
represents the case where the declining demand has not lowered price.
Prices have in fact been raised.
Of major concern in discussing the problem of structural,
inflation is the question whether there actually are any compensating
price changes that counteract the "permanent" inflationary pressure.
The answer unfortunately is not easily found because qualitative
changes are always incorporated and their extent is not statistically
identifiable.

The chemical industry is the only major sector where

prices have actually fallen while quality has improved.

In the

German oil refining industry prices have fallen very slightly for im
proved products.

In the automobile industry as in most other consumer

durables industries prices have remained constant but quality has vastly
improved.

Economies of scale provide the explanation.

provements are indirect reductions in price.

Quality im

In most countries,moreover,

productivity changes are not passed on to the consumer in the form of
lower prices tut to labour and management in the form of higher incomes.
Unions prefer this approach because it enhances their power.

Conse

quently structural inflation is a phenomenon that one has to live with.
Aside from encouraging increased productivity in the hope that some of
it will be reflected in lower prices, there is little even government
policy can do.
Inflation and Policy Response
The German economy has been affected by all three types of
inflations during the first half of the sixties as the preceding
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analysis has demonstrated.

One must not, however, exaggerate the

degree of this inflation.

Compared with other countries the German

economy cannot he called inflationary (Table 7 compares the German
performance favourably with those of her competitors).

France, Italy

and the Scandinavian countries all faired more poorly than Germany.
The comparisons of the last years only, 130+ to 1966, put Germany on
a level with France and Italy but certainly not in a worse position.
The reason for the concern about inflation in Germany seems therefore
to be unwarranted.

Nevertheless, Germans are very sensitive about

price increases on account of their historical experience with infla
tion, and thus their concern is understandable.

Secondly, France and

Italy are considered as traditional problem countries as far as inflation
is concerned and hence no proper comparison.

It is the United States

performance that the German one is compared to because the United States
is Germany's biggest competitor in world markets. If German prices
rise, not only are domestic buyers dissatisfied, but the one-fourth of
national product that goes abroad faces stiffer competition.
Finally, it is not being facetious to say that great concern
is directly related to the government's practice of monetary and fiscal
policy to restrain inflation.

The apprehension surrounding this aspect

of economic policy is astounding.
been very harsh.

Critique of the government has often

Ehrehberg, Erhard's sharpest critic, went so far as

to accuse him of having no ideas or concepts whatsoever in dealing
with inflation.95 Government forecasts predicted price increases,
95

Ehrehberg, Saga, p. 440.
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while at the same time they stated that no economic policy decisions
were to be taken to prevent the increases.

The market had only to

ii
96
be free of "competitive interferences" (Wettbewerbsstorungen).

After Erhard had such success during the fifties in holding prices,
it is remarkable that he should have been accused of failure ten
years later.
Even the experts in the government ministries, however,
were at a loss as to what to do about the inflationary pressures
after 1960 in the way of both monetary and fiscal policy.

They were,

indeed, aware of the fact that the econony faced a demand pull infla
tion, which meant that monetary and fiscal tools had to be applied,
but there their work stopped.

Since monetary policy had been reason

ably successful in cooling the strained econony in 1956, it wan natural
ly the first weapon chosen to control price and cost increases.

Prom

1956 to 1959 monetary policy had been geared to expansion, these being
stable years.

The Bundesbank reorganized the capital market, lowered

the interest rate, and gave selective credit injections to the steel
industry and coal mining, a course which it suddenly had to reverse in
I960 when the building boom was in full swing.

The discount rate was

raised from 2-3/^ to 3i% and the 10fo bank reserve ratio was raised to
20$.97

When the impact was found to be negligible, the bank raised

the discount rate to
(Table 19).

the highest since the 1956 credit squeeze

At the end of I960, Blessing, the President of the

Bundesbank, had to ease the restrictions in view of the international.
qg

-

Ibid« P. 162.
97

Linsenmeier, p. 120.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

94

situation which caused capital to flow into the country.
rate was lowered to jfo once more.

The discount

But even the virtual doubling of

the discount rate and the high reserve ratio were not sufficient to
curb the boom.

Investments in housing still increased by 2 billion EM

in 1961, considerable compared to 3.8 billion EM the previous year.
The surprising fact about the situation is that Muller-Armack, the most
notable "Social Market Econony" theorist in the government, was actually
opposed to the restrictive policy in the first place.

He seemingly

contradicted himself, when he demanded that no expansion controls should
98

be put on the investment sector.

In general, of course, inflation can

be controlled by reducing any one of the three components of demand,
consumption, investment or government.

Since in this instance it was

obvious that government and private investment were creating the infla
tion they had to be limited.

The cost of limitinginvestment is reduc

ed growth in the future, and hence most governmentsare reluctant to
start with investment controls.
After the revaluation the econony cooledoff once more until
early in 1964.

This time the Bundesbank did not applythe brakes until

a year later (Table 19),

Blessing argued that the more restrictive

monetary policy was, the more inflation was encouraged.

The cost effect

of the higher interest rates predominated.
(This justification was,
however, provided by Schiller.)99 The discount rate, raised to 2$,
QO
Alfred Muller-Armack, Die kon.jukturelle Lage. das
Stabilit'atsgesetz und die nachsten wirtschaftspolitischen
(Mftnster: By the author, 19^6), p. 2,

^

K. Schiller, Preisstabilitat. p. 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Aufgaben

95

took effect "by mid-1966, one-and-a-half years later.

It was the length

of time it took to stop the price increase that demonstrated the weakness
of the monetary policy this time.

The inability of the central bank to force the econony to
contract through monetary controls is not peculiar to Germany, but is the
phenomenon present in most countries with a strong commercial banking
system.

In the first place interest rates on short term loans have lost

their significance with regard to investments because of the excess liquid
ity of the banks, and second, once the capital market functioned again the
Bundesbank could no longer directly influence the interest rates there
What remained was only its influence on long term rates, and in that case
the large business had become less dependent on the market rates of
interest.

Not even open market operations were successful in view of

rapidly increasing liquidity, nor the chancellor's "soul massages"
"Seelenmassage" , or moral extortations for restraint
Monetary policy had its place but alone it was only of limited
effectiveness.

When inflationary pressures were very slight a small

dosage controlled the situation, but in the face of real booms monetary
policy was a failure.

The increased costs of investment arising from

higher interest rates were compensated by the rising expectation of
returns.

To impinge on the degree of spending the rate would have to

be increased by a significant amount, which is an undesirable solution
because it deters certain long range investments from taking place.
100

Linsenmeier, p. 177.
Ehrehberg, p. 71.
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Schiller Haa also noted that the substitution of labour for capital
could thus be encouraged in the long run and make a tight labour market
102
even tighter.
(The lower governments would, nevertheless, have
been insensitive even to substantial interest rate increase).

As an

instrument to foster expansion, on the other hand, monetary policy
never has had to prove itself.
If monetary policy alone is not effective as an anti
inflation policy it must be supplemented by fiscal policy.

Unfortun

ately, in Germany what monetary policy sometimes accomplished was often
undone by fiscal policy.

Without any bias whatsoever it can be stated

that fiscal policy represents one of the darkest chapters in German
economic policy.

Until the "Stabilization Law " was implemented in

1967, anti-cyclical fiscal policy was a chance occurrence in Germany.
Keynes’ teachings on the subject reached the German universities in
the mid-fifties and the government approximately a decade later.
For most of the postwar period a fiscal policy to promote
full employment and price level stability by anti-cyclical spending
was not consciously followed.

Fiscal policy was usually cycle-

enforcing and determined by political o b j e c t i v e s E r h a r d thought
himself to be, in effect, not an economist as such but an economic
psychologist, and this led him to be very sensitive to the demands of
interest groups, especially as chancellor, at election time.

The

farmers were annually rewarded to the sum total of 11 billion IM, and

102 Schiller, p. 8.
Linsenmeier, p. 178.
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the voters received a substantial tax reduction for the 1965 election,
regardless of the inflationary pressure persisting from the 196k invest
ment boom.

What the central bank did to maintain stability, the govern

ment usually managed to undo again.
habits were remarkable.

Its cycle-pronouncing spending

Beginning in 1948, a year of inflationary

pressure, the federal budget showed a slight surplus that increased in
1949, a year of recession.
deficitary.

During the Korean boom, the budget was

Three years of surpluses followed, correctly anti-cyclical,

but after 1957 deficits dominated until the sixties despite the boom.
It was not until 1961 that the government's financial report
demanded the legal institution of anti-cyclical fiscal policy.

In the

1964 version it came to discussion and finally reached legal status as
the "Stabilization Law" on August 5th, 1966, at which time most of the
104
harm had already been accomplished.
And it was only the introduction
of the annual economic reports and their pessimistic predictions which
led the government to undertake this step.

The reports were themselves

already a great step forward, if one considers that for Erhard every
quantitative prediction of economic development resulting from an econo105
mic policy was a step in the direction of a planned econony.
Fiscal
policy was interpreted predominately to mean changes on the expenditure
side, not on the tax side.

The allies had imposed very high taxes

after the war so that any tax changes were always one way.

But exten

sive tax changes were rare. Taxes were mainly changed for specific
Jorg Beyfuss, Das Stabilitatsgesetz: Wende in d.er
Kon.junkturpolitik (Cologne: Deutscher Industrieverlag, 1966), p.10.
Ehrehberg, p. 140.
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goals such els capital, formation and privileges for certain industries
not for broad fiscal policy ends, such as budgeting.
Fiscal policy might actually have fared better if it had
been based on the principle of the balanced budget as the 1948 consti
tution in fact demanded.

Along with the boom, Parliament and Govern

ment became accustomed to the high revenues of the high growth period,
and whenever this growth levelled off they simply resorted to stop gap
measures, short term budgets, tax privileges, easier credit conditions
of all sorts, etc. to re-establish the condition of high revenues.
In the event that this policy was unsuccessful, they resorted to price
increases, and the process analogous to a vicious circle was set in
motion.

Although the government preached restricting the budget to

keep prices stable, in the end it let prices rise so that revenues
would rise and the government could hold the line on the budget.
After one cycle was over restraint was once again preached.

If the

vicious circle got out of control economic policy simply stopped the
market mechanism from working altogether.

For example, during the

1962 building boom the government ordered an absolute construction
stoppage on all public and private building where more than one-third
of the space was used for offices and on all luxury home building.
The problem at hand was admittedly really much more complex
than the situation seems to suggest.

The building boom got under way

not primarily with federal government investment projects, but with

106

"

ti

J. Eick, Uberbeschaftigung urn jecten Preis?

(Cologne: Deutscher Industrieverlag, 19^5, p. 3«
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those of the lower levels.

Likewise, the deficits were incurred as

mentioned previously, mainly by the local echelous.

The reason that

the federal government cannot be considered the sole culprit, despite
its often perverse cyclical spending policy, is that constitutional
rigidities prevent one fiscal policy for all three levels of govern
ment.

The two lower levels, moreover, guard their privileges zealously

to prevent a concentration of power in the hands of the federal govern
ment reminiscent of the years 1933 to 194-5.

Given the unquestionable

predominance, moreover, of the government spending factor as the source
of demand pull inflation, the conflict must be given ample consideration.
According to the Bonn Grundgesetz, financial matters are
constitutionally instituted.

Of interest in this particular matter are

two principles of the constitution.

One grants that the "Lander" have

10
complete autonomy in their budgeting, a provision that cannot be changed.

‘

The other defines the tax split among the different levels.

In Germany

there are both separate and joint taxes, i.e. all taxes except the income
and corporation tax have been given to the individual levels and this
jqQ

one is divided on a quota basis.

But although the quota is supposedly

flexible, changing it is virtually synonomous with changing the constitu
tion, since the representatives of the "lander" constitute the "Bundesrat"
(Upperhouse in Parliament).

Both provisions have consequently had the

result that the revenue has progressively accrued in favour of the federal
government, while the expenditure requirements have risen more for the

Hettlage, p. 65.

108 Heinz Haller, "Brauchen wir eine Finanzreform?" ,
Stabilitat und Aufstieg (Hannover: Dietz Nachf, 1963), P.93.
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lower levels.

These governments then had to create deficits to finance

the expenditures fostering inflationary pressure, about which the central
bank could do nothing.

It could only attempt to counteract the rampant

credit expansion on the part of the "lender" and "Gemeinden" by curtailing
the credit in the private sector.

Such measures more than any others

ultimately brought about the 1966 recession from which the new government
is finding it so hard to emerge.

The "Stabilization Law" of that year

solved this problem, and henceforth cooperation in budgeting is the rule.
The cooperation was accomplished because the provision on budgeting
autonomy contained a clause whereby the lower levels of government could
be forced to accept and engage in a long term planning of their budgets
and to reach a decision on the division of the tax revenues every two
years (Article 106, Par, 4-66)
The "Stabilization Law" put an end to the limited and direc
tionless fiscal policy.

The problem of wage policy, on the other hand,

remains to be solved, and until that time cost push inflation cannot be
attacked at its roots.

Nor could it ever be entirely solved in a "Social

Market Economy" that recognizes autonomous collective bargaining as a
basic requirement for social and economic progress,

Certainly the idea

of wage pressure as a tool of technological progress finds its place here.
But if cost push inflation becomes serious, and reduces the competitiveness
of industry, the obstacles to technological progress might become insurmount
able so that the intended wage-technology relationship can never take effect.

RolfDahlgrVm, "Die Problemstik der haushaltswirtschaftlichen
Unabhangigkeit von Bund und I&ndern" , Finanzwissenschaft und
Finanzpolitik ed, F. Sch'afer (Tubingen; Mohr, 19^), p. 27.
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It cannot be claimed that the credit restriction policy of
the sixties has had a negative impact on capital investments.

When

planning investment expenditures one has to look at Keynes but not
forget about Harrod-Domar.

Whereas in most developed countries the

problem of overcapacity predominates, Germany still suffers from under
capacity, and tight money policy worsens the condition.

The causal

chain of reactions that is known as the purchasing power argument, did
not live up to its expectations as the automatic remedy for growth.
This argument was based on the logic of a cycle of occurrences.

The

economy was to be forced to grow by increasing wages, thus raising
purchasing power and ultimately production.

But because of monetary

restriction, production was not expanded while wage incomes still in
creased;

the results are inflation and undercapacity.

This was the

practice in Germany in 1966.
It was impossible for the government to restrict wage expan
sion to productivity gains.

It is extremely difficult to calculate an

objective and correct productivity index, and Erhard was not interested
in pursuing the matter.

He considered the establishment of guidelines

as in the United States too much of an intrusion of the private sector.
Moreover, and this point has been made already, wage contracts cannot
differentiate among all firms according to their productivity gains.
Arbitrariness of calculations and inflexibility of the bargains made
have contributed immensely to policy difficulties.

Finally, the

JoachimGrunau, "Lohnpolitik, Produktivitat und Preisniveau" ,
Qrdo Jahrbuch f&r die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1965),p.ll8.
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failure of Erhard's psychological approach accentuated the dilemma.
His favourite words were that the goal of economic stability could only
be reached if all participating persons and institutions in the economy
behaved accordingly.^^
fined.

What he meant by "accordingly" was never de

Occasionally he added the word moderation, but that term was,

likewise, obscure.

The only consolation for him is that the problem

has not been solved concretely by the new government either.

But

taking over in a recession it has not yet really been confronted with
the price problem.

The new government has the advantage, however, that

since it is a coalition in which the Social Democrats participate, labour
listens more attentively when the government tries to use moral suasion.
Coming to the third aspect of inflation again, policy aimed
at structuring the economy has not had price stability as its prime ob
jective but growth, and that is the concern of the next section.

It

will suffice here to say that since the government directly influences
or controls 5Qf?o of the capital in the economy its influence can be ex112

tended to each economic sector as required.

Unfortunately, through

out the sixties the government has not bee able to maintain moderation,
and hence stability.

It has not been certain of which sectors to in

fluence and those that it has influenced have usually suffered a greater
degree of inflation than those left to private initiative.
comes to mind as the greatest failure in this regard.

Coal mining

This industry

has received billions of marks of subsidies to modernize and rationalize

111
112

Ehrehberg, p. 122.
Linsenmeier, p. 12*j0.
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its production tut costs and prices are still rising.

The government

seems unwilling to face the fact that the industry can never he inter
nationally competitive again because of the high mining and labour costs
and that as a result most spending is in vain.
tion industry is more difficult to evaluate.

The case of the construc
The private sector infla

tionary pressure still remains, as Table 10 demonstrates.

The reduction

in the restriction on rents that began in i960 and the resulting increas
ed rents in the so-called "white counties" (deficiency of housing less
than j$) have only slightly alleviated the excess demand until now.
Opinions on the conditions in the public sector are divided.
On the one hand, most government experts attack the inflationary pressure
arising from government investment and demand moderation in spending*
Public building expenditures have to be reduced.

The opinion is, of

course, by necessity shared by the entire finance ministry, for when
Erhard left the government there were no funds left in the treasury.
The 1966 weapons agreement with the United States had taken care of that.
There was not even enough money left for his community project
(Gemeinschaftswerk") of 3 billion DM.

On the other hand, there are those

113 Prom
who emphasize that there is a deficiency of public investments.
the point of view of the demands of a "Social Market Economy" the govern
ment has to be actively engaged in"Sozialpolitik".

It has obligations

of helping provide housing and educational facilities.
require public investment.

These duties

Historical comparison shows, however, that

Harald jlirgensen, Stabilit'iitspolitik und Offentliche
Investitionen (Cologne: Deutscher Industrieverlag, 19^6), p. 3 .
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the Federal Republic is investing a lower percentage of GNP than either
the Weimar Republic or the Empire.
Republic's effort excelled.

Only in housing has the Federal

In the remainder of the country's infras

tructure, investments have been lower than in other comparable countries
such as the United

States and France in the postwar era.

114

There has

been an obvious bias in favour of directly productive investment in
Germany.

Social capital investments have been neglected.

Requirements

have been estimated to come to 260 billion DM until 1975, an average of
.50 billion EM or 3% of GKP annually.

If one considers that during the

seventies the labour force will decline and the private sector continues
to grow, price pressure would result if the social capital requirements
were fulfilled.

The only answer is that resources must be drawn away

from the private sector by taxation.
cular drawbacks again;

Such a solution has its own parti

the price is in terms of a lower rate of growth.

In the next ten years much of private capital will have to undergo reju
venation so that any diversion from this sector will have adverse conse
quences on the competitiveness of German industry.
Conclusion
The overall evaluation of economic policy as a counter infla
tion policy is negative.

Before such harsh criticism is dispensed,

however, the problem must be seen in perspective.

Economies similar to

the "Social Market" system are generally plagued with instability.
is a phenomenon inherent in the competitive mechanism.

It

Market forces

tend to fluctuate between surplus and scarcity, inflation and deflation

i:Uf r a a .. P. 3.
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unless prevented from doing so by anti-cyclical policy.

The "Social.

Market" concept of anti-cyclical policy, "discipline in the realm of
money1', was cleanly insufficient.

The demand pull and structural

inflations persisted in spite of monetary restriction.

The rising

expectations of return always neutralized the additional restraint.
The persistence of cost push inflation, on the other hand, was faci
litated by monetary restriction.
the basic costs of production.

The increased costs were added to
It seems paradoxical that monetary

restriction should encourage cost push inflation.

The paradox is

e.ttributable to a confusion of demand pull and cost push inflation.
The government was aware that monetary restriction was not applicable
to cost push inflation but did not realize when the demand pull infla
tion of the early sixties turned into a cost push inflation in 196^.
Hence it was trying to solve a cost push inflation ty demand deflation
snd enhanced the cost push element.
Fiscal policy encountered even greater difficulties and as
such it must be considered as having been detrimental to price stability.
The origin of the problem is two-fold.

First, there is the matter of

the constitutionally defined financial autonomy of the three levels of
government.

This privilege has been so jealously guarded that a co

operative effort was virtually non-existent.
government behaved in a cycle-enforcing manner.

The lower levels of
This characteristic,

it will be noted,was not peculiar to Germany, but most federal countries
face this problem.
it.

When the lower governments have money they spend

They do not believe that they are responsible for the maintenance
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of price stability, and the fields relegated to lower levels of govern
ment are such that if money is spent the government achieves a political
advantage.

Houses, roads, parks, etc., are such political investments

which cities and provinces indulge in when they have money.

In Germany

prestige investments were very popular, and the governments did not mind
borrowing vast amounts to achieve their goals.
was not about to cut its spending either.
to make also.

The federal government

It had political investments

Agriculture and mining always received their subsidies

and the American Defence Department consistently convinced the German
government to invest more in armaments either in Germany or in the United
States.
The second origin of the problem of fiscal policy relates to
the -unwillingness of the German government to accept the responsibility
for anti-cyclical policy.

Apart from the 1954 to 1957 period the budgets

were always cycle-enforcing.

To what extent the unwillingness is related

to the principles of the "Social Market Economy" and to what extent it is
related to Erhard’s own ways of looking at government economic policy is
not clear.

The principles of the "Social Market Economy1' are not veiy

explicit on this question.

Total emphasis lies on monetary policy.

The essence of the "Social Market" philosophy would probably imply an
adoption of a balanced budget.

If the government diverted from a balanc

ed budget over a period of years, it was by its own actions creating a
deflation or an inflation depending on whether the budget was surplus or
deficit.

The government had to support the market system of competition.

If in any year private industry was not investing enough here government
had to accept that fact.
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In practice, however, the government followed neither anticyclical fiscal policy nor balanced budget financing.

Consequently

the conclusion must prevail that Erhard did not follow Keynesian nor
"Social Market" economic policy.

He simply followed a wrong policy.

Part of the explanation can be related to "Social Market" theory.
principles are too vague to provide concrete guidelines.

The

Muller-Armack

himself realized the vagueness of the "Social Market" theory for the
practice of economic policy when he declaired that the "Social Market
Economy had to be regarded as a semi-automatic mechanism which assumes
economic policy direction but does not spell it out.

Without proper

direction the attempt to reach the social goals would have undesirable
social results.

Erhard could not escape the problem.

moves suggest indecision and reluctance to plan ahead.
the end of the market economy for Erhard.
would have resorted to.
successful.

His policy
Planning meant

It was the last measure he

His attempts at moral suasion were equally un

Demands for the removal of interferences to the competitive

mechanism and exhortations for correct economic behaviour had little mean
ing to labour or industry in view of the fact that the government led the
way each year with the greatest spending increases.

The combination of

the overemphasis on monetary policy, the unwillingness to accept anticyclical fiscal policy and Erhard's unsuccessful moral suasion thus gave
the German economic policy a uniqueness that the other major free enter
prise systems did not share.

(The responsibility for the first two can

be partly attributed to "Social Market" theory, and so the elements for
wrong applications in the economy were present).

It is astonishing that
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inflation was not more serious than it actually was.

The secret must

he in the rapid growth and technical progress of the economy that
effectively counter-balanced creeping inflation.
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CHAPTER 1V
INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL FORMATION

The third and final criterion of German's successful postwar
economic performance, capital formation, will "be examined in this chap
ter,

Investment as well as capital foimation are really implied.

Investment has a short run connotation as a major component in the pro
cess of income determination, while capital formation generally refers
to the long run, including also the creation of productive capacity.
Together, investment and capital formation, thus derive their principal
importance from their connection with growth.

If the German economy

grew successfully in the postwar era it must almost certainly have accu
mulated adequate investment and capital.

The rate of growth cannot,

of course, he explained solely in terms of capital formation.

Technolo

gical progress and qualified labour force are also important.

Growth

can occur even with zero capital formation if there are technological
changes and innovations that increase productivity.
will be rarely encountered.

Such a situation

In general, inventions and innovations

occur at the same time as capital is accumulated.

Because of the con

currence of progress and capital formation, because of the difficulties
in quantifying technological changes and because technological progress

109
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lias already been commented on, capital formation and investment will
'be analyzed in this chapter as the principal determinants of growth.
Knznets has shown in fact that in many countries factors other than
capital have been responsible for growth. 115

Capital formation must

be regarded as a partial explanation of growth.
The process of capital formation is in addition suitable
for the purpose of this thesis on account of its sensitivity to econo
mic policy.

Government monetary and fiscal policy are vital considera

tions when investment decisions are made in the economy.

Changes in

interest and tax rates directly affect the profitability of an invest
ment decision and hence the disposition of capital resources.

Finally,

the "Social Market" theozy could have applications in the realm of capi
tal formation oriented economic policy.

The theozy implies that the

process of income determination, of which investment is a part, should
be governed by the objective market laws and tempered only by
"Sozialpolitik?'.

The goals of "Sozialpolitik" , the reallocation of

some resources to the economically underprivileged can, likewise, only
be followed by selective monetary and fiscal policies.
Connections between investment and capital formation, the
balance of payments and price stability have already been touched on.
It was mentioned in the previous section that an excess of exports over
imports helps use existing capacity and this might stimulate further
investment, and a deficit will raise the available amount of capital
that can be used in the economy directly.
,

and Spread

Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate Structure
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 196^).
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Price stability and capital formation can also have a dual
relationship.

Investment in the income generating sense is a factor

of demand and once the full-employment ceiling is reached, prices must
rise.

On the other hand, investment creates new capital or capacity

in the long run and if this cannot be used, deflationary pressures
result.

Germany is considered to have profited through these series

of relationships in increasing its investment and capital formation.
Trade balance surpluses stimulated investment;

investment produced

capacity and kept production fairly reasonably within the limits of
its capacity.
The Growth of the German Economy
As has been the case in the previous chapters, the claim
of successful German capital formation and investment as regards
growth must first be verified statistically.

The success or failure

of economic policy, whether it was "Social Market" oriented or not,
will be evaluated thereafter.

Table 20 summarizes the growth of the

German economy from 1956 to 1966.

In nominal terms, the size of the

GNP increased by about 130,2 from 198.88 billion DM to 477.9 billion IM
in that period.

The increase in real 1954 terms amounted to approxi

mately one-half of that increase, 75/2 or an average of 7% per annum.
That performance has been surpassed only by Japan.116
The table also shows the exact annual increases, and from
these it can be seen that the decade can be divided into three cycles.

U.N. Yearbook of National Accounts and Statistics. 1966.
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The first years after 1955, when the growth rate reached a record 12fa,
were in the sign of a cooling off period not peculiar to Germany alone.
The growth rates were still quite substantial.

The German building

boom of 1959 created the next expansionary phase.

It reached its peak

in i960 and receded thereafter until the end of 1962, speeded up by the
1961 revaluation.

The third and last cycle began with the investment

boom in late 1963, reached a peak in 1SQ+, and the recession that follow
ed reached a trough in 1966.

The decrease of ifo in the real GNP esti

mated by Die Zeit for 1967 is indicative of the serious growth problems
the German economy is encountering.

The overall decline in growth is

discemable over the three cycles.

The high points reached each time

are successively lower, 12/o in 1955, 8.8% in i960 and finally only 6.6fo
in 196(4-.

And the boom years became less in number each time while the

recession years became more.

The first cycle had four boom years,

1952t- through 1957, the second three, and the last cycle witnessed merely
a one year boom.
Before a judgment be passed on the growth pattern of the
German economy and its continuation be predicted, it is worthwhile to
remember that North America went through a similar postwar experience,
only ten years earlier.

Pears of secular stagnation were widespread

in 1959 and were swept away by what became the longest period of growth
in the postwar period beginning with i960.

In the second half of 1967

there were similar signs of a new era of growth in Germany but it is
still too early to judge its permanence.

The government that took over

from Erhard certainly is staking its reputation on a new era of growth.
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Now that the aggregate growth statistics have been analyzed
the sectoral pattern needs to be examined.

For this purpose the indus

trial production index (Table 21) has been chosen, for output best reveals
real growth.

With the exception of the mining component the various in

dexes show surprisingly minor discrepancies.

The production and invest

ment goods industries, of course, have expanded most rapidly, 9Q£ and 8~3fa
respectively in the period 1956 to 1965.^"^ The consumption goods sector
follows with a ~JQ% increase in production.

The construction industry

ranks in fourth place with a 67/0 gain and mining is last with only a 3^
increase.

Thus, as far as these broad categories are concerned growth

has been well balanced, more so in the sixties than in the fifties.

If

the aggregate index rises the sub-aggregate indexes rise also, and if it
recedes the sub-aggregate indexes recede accordingly.

The similarity

of behaviour of the investment and consumer goods components is attribu
table to the preponderance of consumer durables in the latter category.
Durables often behave like investment goods in Germany, more so than in
North America.

Within these broad sub-aggregates the movements are

naturally quite diverse, ranging from increases of 248.2/j for professionlift

al and optical instruments to -47.7% for shipping

(Table 22).

Solely

in the construction sector is there little difference among the sub
components .

German national accounts statistics differentiate between
production goods and investment goods. Machinery is a production
good, while a plant is an investment good.
X13
D. Mertens and W. Kirner, Input-Output Rechnung:
Investitionsverflechtung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950-1970
(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 19^7), p. 37.
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Capital formation, it has been stated, will be the primary
focus as to the cause of the growth.

A first direct and important

relationship arises from the proportion of the GNP that is invested
annually.

The statistics show that Germany is investing a slowly

increasing proportion of its GNP.

In the period 1950 to 1955 Germany

invested an annual average of 20.4/0 of its GNP; from 1955 to I960 the
proportion rose to 22.8$, and during the first half of the sixties it
averaged 2$fa an can be calculated from Table 22.

Even in a recession

year such as 1966, the boom year figure was reached. Only Japan once
again has surpassed the German rate of capital formation.

According

to United Nations statistics, Japan has invested more than 3
GNP annually since 1953.

of its

During the complete period the three levels

of government have been responsible for about two-fifths of this invest
ment, direct and indirect, private industry for one-third and private
119.
households for one-quarter.
Direct government investment is, however, now declining,
120

its weight having been shifted to the indirect method. (Table 24)

A figure for the respective industry investment component can be taken
from Table 23.

It is difficult to estimate how much of gross invest

ment in turn can be considered net investment.

But is is certainly

119

Ernst Schneider, Investitionen und Kapitalbildung in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Diisseldorf: Mitteilungen der List
Gesellschaft, 19^3), p. 234.
120

(Care should be taken not to compare the figures in all
tables too exactly; discrepancies arise both because the different
research institutes use different calculating techniques and because
the newer estimates constantly revise the older estimates. For
example, the subcategory figures for industry in Table 24 always
exceed those in Table 25 somewhat).
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more than 5Q& of the gross figure, which according to Krengel is the
lower limit for replacement of capital to occur, anything lower
signifying obsolescence.

121

To have the correct awareness of the impact of investment
it is not enough to reveal its volume but also its productivity.

For

this purpose one must turn to Table 26, which shows the capital output
ratios up to 1963.

The aggregate coefficient for the six years pre

ceding that year increased somewhat, but really not significantly, and
it shows a tendency to move over the cycle, decreasing in boom years
such as I960 and then rising again.

In the last cyclical downturn,

the coefficient has most likely crossed the 1.50 mark.

This conclu

sion would agree with the comparison of the change in the total amount
invested per employee (Table 27), and the change in the index of produc
tion likewise.

Gross invested wealth increased by 38 % in the period

1958 to 1964-, which would have been between 20-23 % more without deprecia
tion, (the percentage is based on allowed legal tax amounts), while the
index of production increased by hOfo.

That yields an incremental capi122
tal output ratio of approximately I .36 .
As long as it is under 2

The average net investment I have calculated to be 6 O/0
or 71% depending on interpretation of gross investment in 1963.
Gross investment in that year was 9.1$ of capital stock.
(Table 22,
columns 1 and 2), while capacity increased by 7yi> (Table 21, column 2).
If capacity increase is interpreted to mean capital stock increase,
then net investment is 6 O/0 because the capital output ratio is 1.3 that
year, but if capacity increase means actual production power increase
then the proportion rises to llfo (7 * 9 .1).
The former is probably
more correct.

122

This follows simply on the basis of division, capital stock
increases divided by output increases.
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there is no question that the investment productivity is one of the
highest in the industrial world, and it is a rate that can usually
only be found in the early stages of development.
Returning once more to the sectoral analysis, Table 22
reveals the best details. Within the industry grouping, production
and investment goods were by far the strongest areas of investment in
absolute terms, with 50?o and b-7% increases in the period I960 to 1966,
respectively.

But in relative terms the increase in the consumption

goods industry was greater rising by 6Q?o in this time span.

However,

the trend definitely indicates the continuation of the predominance of
the production and investment goods sectors.

This conclusion follows

from the Mertens analysis which estimated the continuing investment
trend until 1970.

Apart from the construction industry these two

fields retain above average annual growth rates of 6.7^ and 7.2%,
These figures are rather conservative since they show the growth with
the housing construction industry excluded, and this will continue to
be a rapidly growing industry in the future, despite its rapid 15%>
increase in the 1960-1966 period.

Direct government investment is

still strongly on the rise in absolute terms and will no doubt continue
its trend, especially since the new government seems to be more planning
oriented than its predecessor.

The only surprising sector as far as

future growth is concerned is the consumption goods sector, for which
investments are even expected to drop.

All other sectors behaved more

or less as one would expect them in a mature industrial econony like
Germany.
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The sectoral breakdown in investment is approximately reflect
ed by the capital output ratios.

Differences result from different

cycles and thus different capacity utilization levels.

The rapid increas

es in the investments in the production, investment and consumption indus
tries were bound to lead to increased capital output ratios when the cycle
turned down after i960.

And since the consumption goods industry was

slightly less cyclical, the increase in its capital output ratio was less.
In mining, apparent sectoral stagnation and inefficiency have augmented
the capital output ratio.

The capital output ratio rose despite actual

decreases in the annual amount of investment.

The similarity of the

major expansionary categories is likewise quite evident from the statis
tics on capital intensification as demonstrated by the capital labour
ratios.

The production, investment and consumption industries were

subject to about 30-35% increases.

Consequently, given that the output

increases were not too different, the capital output ratios were also
similar in magnitude.

The only noticeable discrepancy among the three

is the greater size of the raw material and production goods component,
for which the raw material part is probably responsible, behaving as it
does more like the mining component.

Finally, the equal increases in

capital per employee in absolute terns of the investment goods and the
consumption goods industries under conditions of different absolute
amounts of investment must be explained by shifts in the labour supply
in the particular sectors.
The statistical synopsis on growth alone can be concluded in
a positive statement.

The German economy has grown more rapidly than
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most comparable economies and Germany has also invested a higher per
centage of its GNP than most of its competitors.
tetter in both circumstances.

Only Japan has done

At the same time the accumulation and

production processes have continued to display a high degree of techni
cal and economic efficiency as demonstrated by the low capital output
ratio, and finally growth has been of a very well balanced nature.
1966 was, however, a low point in the economic resurgence of the post
war era, but it is not being too optimistic to say that the growth and
accumulation pattern up to now have established a good basis for another
era of prosperous development.

It must only be properly made use of.

The underlying explanation rests on the analysis of the
economy's progress.

Neither the mere quantitative volume of capital

formation, nor its distribution among the sectors suffice in itself.
What is important is whether capital formation has been conducive to
growth and whether it will be conducive in the future.
economic policy will be excluded for the moment.

Government

In the most general

terms we can say that German economic growth during the fifties was
conditioned by the

ability of the econoany to combine successfully

increasing amounts

of capital with labour asthe source of increased

efficiency.

The continued success in the sixties was and is still

conditioned by the

increased substitution of certain reserves of un

trained labour by an increasingly complex productivestructure, the
123
source of which is capital accumulation.
Structural change has
become a basic necessity now and for the future.
Dieter Mertens, Die Wandlungen der industriellen
Branchenstruktur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950-19^0
(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 19&»-), p. 65.
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For the whole period, moreover, the changing interrelationstiip of aggregate supply and aggregate demand have made their impact
felt.

In regard to the supply-demand interrelationship one can divide

the period not into two but three.

Such division is more exact than

using only the fifties and the sixties as dividing lines, and they reveal
more clearly the actual driving forces in the process.

The first period

of postwar growth continued until 1955, the second from 1956 to 1962 and
the third one from 1963 to 1967, to continue, most likely, for another
five years at the least.

It will be noticed, in addition, that this

classification does not correspond with the cycles described earlier, but
that some turning points on the cycle are also turning points of the growth
segnents.
The first period was characterized by a surplus of labour.
The initiating force that determined growth was demand, primarily investment demand for heavy machinery.

12L

The problem of the structural im

balance resulting from the loss of East Germany was overcome by 1950 so
that the productive machinery was able to start a growth process with a
low average capital output ratio of .IkK in 1950 when the Korean boom
started.

The export sector, it will be remembered, also was a key in

this first real postwar expansion.

To put this growth pattern into a

theoretical framework, one can adopt the Harrodian model and say that
from 1950 to 1955 G was greater than Gw.

The actual growth rate exceeded

the warranted growth rate, an imbalance which created an upward trend.
In addition because the natural or possible rate was greater than the

Winfried Vogt, Makrookonomische Bestinmungsgrunde des
wirtschaftlichen Wachstums der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1950
bis 19^0 (Tubingen: Mohr. 19^-). P. 20.
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actual one, the upward trend was cumulative.

In the second period of growth the roles of supply and demand
were reversed.

Demand continued to be strong, but growth was deteimined

by the limitations on the supply side, i.e. by the changes in productivity
and labour supply.

On the demand side, foreign investment demand even

became stronger than the domestic demand and the demand for consumption
goods was just starting to boom.

Together, the three factors led to

complete capacity utilization in the economy.

In every industry the short

age of the labour supply led to full capacity operations.

Because of the

investment goods bias of exports, however, this sector was most hard press
ed. The fact that this component was able to grow strongly in the second
half of the fifties can be attributed to its initial head start, by virtue
ofwhich it was immediately able to gain a large labour supply to use as a
cushion later, an important factor since productivity gains were increasing
ly difficult to make.

The rising consumption goods industry was able to

continue faced with a shortage of labour mainly because it was much more
suitable for technological innovation and consequently productivity gains.
For this reason temporary equilibrium was reached during 1959.

Productiv

ity gains were able to overcome the excess of demand, only to be upset by
the ensuing building boom which made its effects felt as a general increase
in the level of demand above that of the level of supply until 1962.

To

put it into Harrodian terms once again, during this period the following
inequality held: Gn = G

Gw.

The natural rate of growth, determined by

1 OC

R.F. Harrod, Towards a Dynamic Economics (London: MacMillan
& Co.Ltd., 1963), p. 887
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capital accumulation, growth of the labour force and technological
progress, was reached but it exceeded the warranted rate, that which left
producers satisfied with their decisions.

Thus there was a deficiency

of investment persisting in most sectors, recreated from one period to
the next by new possibilities arising from productivity gains and capital
accumulation.

A big export demand for investment and production goods

plus a big domestic consumption goods boom went hand in hand in their
quest for resources.

Every year the importance of increased domestic

capital formation rose.

In the first years increases in productivity

could still be achieved by increasing the efficiency of the work force
through better organization for which the high discipline of the work
force was a great aid, but thereafter increases in efficiency meant ex126

clusively additional investment.

In the third period economic growth became a more complex
phenomenon.

Whereas in the first period growth could be referred to

as demand determined and in the second as supply determined, whether
demand or supply was the active force in the third period, depended on
the sector in question.

In 1962 the economy reached that point it had

reached in 1959> tut this time it remained there more or less permanently.
Prom a macroeconomic viewpoint supply and demand were in equilibrium.
Pull employment persisted and the average productivity gain was just
enough to balance the average increase in demand.

But within the

±26 Unfortunately most statistical analyses on this question
deal only with the period 1950-60, a reading of which gives the
impression that the labour factor was much more important than it
actually was, because averages are based on the whole period.
"
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•Individual sectors distortions arose; hence structural adjustment
'became a prerequisite for growth.

Investment and consumption demand

were no longer at astronomical heights;

the former was somewhat de

pressed after the initial reconstruction demand had been met, and the
latter was also slowly beginning to be saturated, especially with
regard to most household goods.

Specific sectors, however, were sub

ject to excess demand, while in others the supply immobilities counter
acted the removal of the demand-supply discrepancy.
The demand side continued as the influential factor in the
investment goods sector, and the influence pervaded the entire invest
ment goods sector.

Changes in the investment structure did not influ127

ence the level of demand until 1965.

The factors that did influence

the structure of investment were, in effect, discontinuous capacity
effects, but these were not strong enough to put a restraint on the ful
fillment of demand or they did so for only a short period of time.
Krengel has even expressed the fear that in the second half of the sixties
demand might not be sufficient to induce new investments when the capital
structure and its development must adjust to the new demands for a lower
123

growth rate.

Since he has expressed that fear, economic development

has proved the opposite.

Investments in investment and production goods

have risen at above average rates so that the total volume of investment

127

Rolf Krengel, "Ursachen und Y/irkungen der Strukturveranderunfren
des industriellen Anlagevermogens der Bundesrepublik?,’ Strukturwandlungen
ed. Neumark, p. 915.
128 £big., P. 913.
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has risen as a proportion of GNP also.

And secondly, the demand for

investment in general and in the production goods field in particular
is just "being touched by the electronic revolution in data processing
that will henceforth determine "reality" in the economy as Mertens so
129

aptly stated it.

The slackening of demand in sectors susceptible to such
scientific advances in 1965 and 1966 was thus in part a signal, not
that the investment goods industry was undergoing secular stagnation,
but that it has over-expanded in the wrong direction and with the
wrong means.

The structurally favoured sectors have become synono-

mous with the capital autonomous ones, with very little resort to the
labour factor.

Consequently the emphasis on the importance of capi

tal accumulation has been demonstrated once more as the key to success
ful growth, and it applies to the great majority of the investment goods
industry's branches.

The electronic revolution is one that can easily

change the rule that the nature of basic technological processes is fix
ed and that productivity gains are no longer possible.

All branches are

subject to its influence where the demand is absolutely rising, for then
it is worthwhile to replace labour by capital if capital is less expensive
or if it is left over from use in the more productive uses.

Whenever

supply and demand are close to equilibrium the profitability norm will
always act as a sieve.
In the consumption goods sector, on the other hand, the devel
opment since 1962 has been more problematic.
2.29

Total demand and total

Mertensj Wandlungen. p. 167.
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potential supply are in equilibrium, but the structural factor has been
nuch more significant, so that in one case, demand has been the engine
of growth and supply has been more than sufficient, and in the other
supply restrained a sector's growth potential.

In addition, due to

inflexibilities in the consumption goods producing capital goods indus
tries and immobilities in the labour supply the discrepancies could not
be easily overcome, particularly since the demand structure was also
constantly changing.

The more rapidly the structure of demand changes,

the less is the structural adjustment capacity and the lower are the
growth rates.

The process has gone so far already that even in the

same branches of the industry distortions in the supply-demand relation
ship have arisen.

In the automobile industry, for example, some models

made by the same firm are in excess demand straining available resources
while for others there is idle capacity.
this phenomenon was completely absent.

In the previous growth period
Increasing complexity of the

production process in turn accentuates the possible distortions further.
Although the conflict between the ever widening and changing
demand structure and the increasingly complex productive process is in
evitable in a mature and decentralized econouiy, it does not mean that the
distortions created cannot be reduced or avoided.

One way to do so is

to produce not for eternity and invest large sums of money only to find
the machine unwanted or obsolete shortly thereafter.

The

German indus

trialist is only slowly drifting away from that policy, but the slowness
of the adaptation no doubt contributed if not directly to the lower growth
rate of the consumption goods industry, at least to the long dragging out
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process of the reduction.

Demand has not yet changed so rapidly in

Germany to force the entrepreneurs to see the illogic of "durability
above all" motivated production.

130

(Part of the fault also lies with

the government's economic policy in this regard as it will be seen
shortly.)

Undoubtedly Mertens and K im e r forecast capital consumption

for the investments in the consumption goods industry until 1970 par
tially for this reason.

What that development tends to, however, is

a re-establishment of the conditions in the second "period" mentioned,
except that this time scarcity is artificially created.
quantly mean a reduction in total growth.

It will conse-

Maximum total growth in

Germaryr will be achieved through microeconomic structural adjustment.
Non-invested resources are wasted because in a non-centralized economy
with Germany's investment demands they will not be transferred to a more
productive use.
It is, furthermore, not the aim of industry or government to
sacrifice consumption purposefully for the sake of investment.

Never

theless, (German industrialists have found that it is easier to survive
in the field of investment goods, particularly where electronics has
already made big inroads.

The constant foreign demand for investment

goods in turn reinforced the domestic one, and so the risk of investments
in the capital goods sector was lower than in the consumption goods sector.

It is, of course, difficult to prove this argument with
the help of statistics.
There is, however, an undisputable durabilitymindedness present in Europe which is not so prevalent in American
business circles.
Wallich, for example, has observed that "many (German
businessmen find it difficult to accept the fact that obsolescence can
make equipment value less while it is still in working order" (p. 337).
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In Germany the investment goods sector consistently displayed a high
degree of activity and thus slight fluctuations.

The consumption goods

industry was not less susceptible to upturns and downturns.

The appar

ent paradox steins from the comparison of qualitatively different cate
gories.

The variety of consumption goods is greater than that of in

vestment goods.

Hence the consumption goods cycle, which is formed by

adding up many individual up-and-down movements, has a less abrupt cycli
cal pattern.

The investment goods cycle, on the other hand, does not

comprise so many components and so appears to be more cyclically pro
nounced.

The individual components of the investment goods sector have

fluctuated, but because of the great surge in demand for investment goods,
these fluctuations are movements around a rising trend.
turns have been rare.

Absolute down

The fluctuations of the consumption goods sector

have likewise been around a rising trend in the aggregate, but the demand
for many specific items has decreased significantly.
The problem can best be resolved by generalizing the makeup of
German industry into four categories as suggested by Mertens.131

These

four basic categories of industries are (l) growth industries, (2) cycli
cal industries, (3) shrinking industries ("Schrumpfungsindustrien"), and
(A-) secularly stagnating industries.

The chemical, oil refining and

automobile industries are typical of the growth category.
teristic is a steep upward growth rate.

Their charac

The second group is constituted

primarily by the iron and steel, rubber, non-electrical machinery and
paper and paperproducts industries.

These industries expand above

Mertens, p. 66.
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average in the expansionary phase and below average in the contrac
tionary phase.

Ore mining and the textile industry are representa

tive of the third class, whose peculiarity is that production increases
'but always at a lower rate of production.

And finally, coal mining is

the typical example of a secularly stagnating industiy.

Production

actually declined.
It is from this point of view that the question of structural
adjustment must be seen.

If the demand outlook for investment goods

seems more optimistic, it is because a large proportion of these goods
are found in the first two classes, and many consumption goods indus
tries are in the third grouping.

Prom -this classification it becomes,

likewise, obvious that decreased capital investments in the consumption
goods sector will accentuate the problems even further, for the dominant
characteristic of the growth industries is their high capital dependency.
There are, no doubt, exceptions, but their number is small.

Structural

change in the economy implies capital structure change, and expansion
implies intensification of the capital component in the investment or in
the consumption goods sector.

Nevertheless, there are capital inten

sive investments that do not fall under the first class, and so if the
German structure of investment since 1962 shows an all-round balance
among the major components, the structural effect need not have been
necessarily well-balanced in the positive direction, and indeed it has
not been.
Occasionally throughout the discussion the word factor mobi
lity has been mentioned.

There is no question that capital, mobility
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among the sectors is most essential to a flexible adjustment among the
sectors of the economy.

The direction of its movement is determined

by the varying degrees of productivity, i.e. profitability.

Labour

mobility has at sane time, however, been of some importance, and so it
deserves mention.

One estimate has it that 12$ of the productivity

gain between 1950 and 1963 is attributable to the change in the employ
ment structure, and predicts a reduction to only 6/0 in the period
132
between 1963 and 1970.
The latter figure shows the negligible impor
tance of labour mobility relative to that of capital.

The higher figure

for the 1950 to 19^3 period was, moreover, the result of the mass exist
from agriculture.

Immediately following the war the influx of refugees

into the agricultural sector had been unusually heavy because of the lack
of employment in industry and the necessity to have food.

Rationaliza

tion and mechanization of agricultural techniques as well as the indus
trial boom simply reversed the trend in the fifties and sixties.

Within

the industrialsector movements have in the last few years been very slight.
Distinctly noticeable has been only the exodus from the mining sector to
the investment and consumption goods producing sectors.
This analysis of the structural aspect of Germany's economic
growth can be summarized with mixed conceptions.

There is no question

that the productive power of German industry remains unbroken in the mid
sixties, but the extent of its efficient application requires continual
structural adaptation, in which the country has had only partial success.
1

Peter Schwanse, Beschaftigungsstruktur und Wirtschaftswachstum
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 1950-63 (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot,
1965), P. 77.
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There exist no fundamental structural problems at the present.

There

are, however, indications that the economy has overexpanded in some areas
such as iron and steel and underexpanded in others such as electronics
and computers.
later date.

These distortions could become serious problems at a
Thus, it is often less costly for an economy to suffer a

sudden drastic sectoral problem and shift rapidly than to experience the
readjustment through a long drawn out process.

As yet, the costs are

not veiy high, if a positive structural policy ("Strukturpolitik” )
should be implemented.
Before turning to government policy efforts in this direction,
the complementary aspect of the objective economic structure must be dis
cussed.

Attention was so far concentrated on the two main barriers,

namely, capacity and employment, the former of which has been seen to be
the principal important one.

It is in regard to this barrier that its

complement, the financial barrier, is important.
sectoral restructuring must be financed.

Capital intensifying

The German success requires

an analysis of how Germany has been collecting funds to finance the invest
ment and what are likely to be the prospects in the future.
The Financing of Investment and Capital Formation
From 1950 to 1962 the main concern had to be the procurement
of capital regardless of sectors concerned.

In the initial stage of

growth it was required to create employment, and once full employment was
reached it was required to rationalize production techniques once labour
had became a scarce factor.

In the third period of growth since 1962,

the structural changes in the industrial product mix also had an impact
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on the financing of investments.

It is no longer solely a problem to

obtain capital resources but also to secure a sound financial structure
133
for the investing enterprises.

Much of the risk of structural change

is accentuated by unsound financing techniques which will be mentioned
shortly, and unsound financing techniques in turn accentuate the problem
of capital acquisition later on.
The two principal sources of industry finance are the banking
and credit institutions and the stock market.

Tables 28 and 29 reveal

the quantitative importance of these sources.

Savings are, of course,

the ultimate source of finance, and so they will be mentioned first.
They rose from 2k.3 billion EM in 1956 to 110.7 billion EM in 1965, 311
increase of k6C£o.
that savings

Comparing figures for investment and saving shows

always increased faster, since I960 by 25/S for example.

Because Germany had a favourable balance on current account during this
period savings had to be greater than investment by this percentage.
Savings banks (Sparkassen and Girozentralen) always account for more than
5Q& of the savings followed by credit banks, credit co-ops and the postal
savings system.

Other minor capital collecting agencies include the

building funds and mortgage banks, but these limit their activity mainly
to the housing sector.

The enormous rise in the volume of savings is

attributable to private households.

The amount of the households' share

of current domestic savings rose both relatively and absolutely.

Prom

1950 to 1963, for instance, it rose from 21*0 to 377° and is still rising,

_ _ _

Wirtschaft

Ruprecht Melder, Die Geldkapitalnachfrage der -privaten
(Freiburg ilfe Dissertation (no publisher) 196k), p . 26.
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This development is the result of the steady increase in the ratio of
private savings to disposable income, which also had risen from 3/o in
1950 to 9.5% in 1963 . ^ ^

Particularly in 1966 the ratio increased to

12% of disposable income due to the pessimistic employment outlook.
All of the increase in the share of households came at the expense of
corporate savings, which were reduced from 47% to 21 % in the same time
;period.

The government's share also rose from 31$ to 43%
The stock and bond market increased its relative importance

as the actual supplier or mobilizing agent of these savings during the
sixties as evidenced by the lower corporate saving ratio.

Savings,

in general, increased by approximately 120% while the turnover of stocks
and bonds increased by 145/5 in actual value and by 160% in nominal value.
Of the two, the increase of 300% in bonds turnover has accounted for the
greatest part as compared with mere 45% in actual value stock turnover.
(in nominal terms, the increase comes to only 25/5.)
The decline in the self-financing of industry has been the
most important development in the investment process, a factor which has
had severe implications on the soundness of the financial structure.
Since fixed interest securities have also regained pre-eminence in the
sixties together with non-capital market loans, the credit worthiness
of investors must be even better to qualify for investment funds.
Schneider has observed accurately by stating that am enterprise in capable

Kindleberger, p. 53.
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of financing through retained earnings is not creditworthy.

136

The

old German rule states that the firms' own capital should always
account for about 60j of total invested capital.
centage was only y2.?o in 1961.

In Germany this per

Bven with an additional new stock turn-

over of 1.2 billion IM Germany was far from the 6Q% mark.

137

The prob

lem has unfortunately been fostered by government economic policy as a
reaction against the excessive self-financement that took place in the
early postwar years.

At that time, however, any other method was im

possible because no capital market existed, while the non-availability
of commodities and the inelasticity of demand allowed an ideal selffinancing through increased price.
in Germany were reinvested.

As late as 1956, 8j/o of sill profits

The rate of plough-back was especially

high in the larger enterprises.

Comparable figures for Britain and the
t

United States in that year were only 50/o and 41yo respectively.
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In

addition, it was still the stock market that provided additionally re
quired funds.

This course only shifted after 1961, when the stock

values fall, and fixed interest bonds became more important.

The trend

was initiated by the rising activity of the three levels of government
borrowing at high interest rates.

Since stock values fell, industry

likewise resorted to this market.

9.6 billion DM was acquired by

industiy in this way, 2.5 times the amount of new stock issues.

13%
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Schneider, p. 242.
quoted from table in Melder.
Melder, p. 95.
.ibid.

p. 95.
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Another 4.3 "billion CM was procured on the basis of promissory notes
outside of the organized capital market.
A further noticeable change occurring in the financing of
investments has been the changing character of bank credits.

Firstly,

the banks' proportion of all credit granted doubled within the fifties
from 3

to ICfo,

Since then the increase has only slightly continued.

Secondly, short term credits are slowly replaced by longer term ones.
Table 30 indicates the trend until 1962.

The problem remains that the

"banking system is never the best source of long term investment capital,
even though the German banking system has a long tradition of co
operation with industry.

For co-operation in the early industrial era

was based on the willingness of the banks to absorb large stock issues
from industiy and not to provide long term loans at fixed interest rates.
A concluding remark on this phase of Germany's growth and
capital formation is consequently similar to that made on the actual in
vestment in productive power itself.

Just as the capacity of the pro

ductive power to grow was affirmed, so the capacity of the economy to
finance the expansion can also be affirmed.
outcome of the latter)
of total investments.

(The former is really the

Household savings alone can now finance $0%
If government and corporate savings are added

there is a greater supply of liquidity than there is demand for.

Simi

larly, the success of the investment process depends on choosing the
right sectors in which to invest, a search that is in itself difficult
enough.

But if in addition, the financial mechanisms are not flexible

enough to transfer the resources to those sectors, growth will not be
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achieved.

The problem arises through the rising ratio of household

savings, the decline in corporate savings and thus the inevitable
decrease in financing through retained earnings.

Household savings

Ejre not directly invested by their owners, and the institutions hold
ing them do not necessarily direct them to their most useful occupa
tion.

When the degree of self-financeraent is great the mechanism

works automatically;

the most productive enterprises save the most

and immediately have investment funds at their disposal to undertake
the investments once more.

Growth is a two-step programme, first to

find out which sectors are most productive and second, to make sure
that investment occurs there.

Economic Folicy and Investment
The success of government economic policy in encouraging
the right reactions will now be analyzed.

The "Social Market Economy5'

stresses that the price mechanism is the best regulator of supply and
demand in the market, and that interventions in the market distort the
price mechanism's function, leading to inefficiencies.

Interferences

aimed at structural change would seem to be excluded.

The only excep

tion granted is that intervention could be justified on social grounds
as part of "Vitalpolitik".

Whether the philosophy underlying modern

structural interventions could, however, be classified as such is a
question demanding a very broad interpretation.

This philosophy states

that the aim of structural policy is to leave the risk of profit or loss
to the entrepreneur, but that it would be economically wrong not to
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intervene if the total economic utility of government interventions is
considerably greater than their financial cost.

140

Investments that

would qualify under such interpretation are elasticity promoting mea
sures, structural adjustment aids and complementary investments.

To

admit the possibility that they might be necessary is to deny the per
fect functioning of the price mechanism.

While no one would go so far

as to insist on its complete perfection, not even the "Social Market"
economists, the nature of the structural interventions implied would
no doubt go beyond what they regarded as permissible.

For direct

structural interventions could be objected to if they were called forth
merely to bridge sudden changes in demand.

Today, however, the economy

has become more interdependent, and this interdependency has become tech
nically conditioned.

The effort of a sudden innovation in one branch

immediately spreads to others, but the price mechanism will not follow
at once, or the magnitude of its change will not accurately reflect the
new environment.

Intervention is not justified in the modern version

to promote social goals but to promote growth.
In the German Federal Republic, structural interventions have
occurred for a variety of reasons.

Their successes have also differed

widely, sometimes very successful and at other times utter failures.
Generally the interventions were more successful in the fifties than in
the sixties.

One of the most accomplished structural interventions by

the government was the massive support for the public utilities, the

Heinz Kohn, "Sektorale Strukturpolitik ist notwendigy
V/irtschaftsdienst. (January, 1967), p. 87.
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railroads and the coal and steel industries set up by the "Investment
Aid Law" , which wan in effect from 1952 to 1954.

341

In this unique

venture of business cooperation with government 3 billion EM were
a.llocated for investment as a direct result of tax benefits given to
these industries, and the chain reaction that followed led to the first
boom of the postwar period.

The intervention definitely intended to

increase the elasticity of supply to put the country back on its feet,
as it were.

The price mechanism was not allowed to run its course

because it would have meant too high prices and that would have been
against the social interest, so even as a "Social Market Economy" device
the intervention could be justified.

But there is no doubt that the

underlying motive was the nationalistic sentiment for reconstruction and
industrialization beginning with basic industry regardless of how market
conforming the action was.

Fortunately, in this case it could be justi

fied on both grounds, but what is most important is that the intervention
was successful.

7/hen the end is prosperity the means are rarely question

ed later.
The typical example where no "Social Market Economy*' principle
could be used as justification is the shipbuilding industiy.

Subsidies

were given because the prestige of an industrial country required a fleet,
and because all other countries followed the same practice.

And again

in fev/ areas was the continuation of subsidies and tax privileges so

*1 I ■"I

Karl Hauser, "West Germany" , Foreign Tax Policies and
Economic Growth. National. Bureau of Economic Research (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 124.
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successful in the fifties.

Although shipbuilding is now a shrinking

industry, Germany became the second largest shipbuilding country in the
world.
Another area of reasonably successful structural intervention
that does not quite fit into the logic of the "Social Market Economy1' is
agriculture.

Beginning with the "Agriculture Law" in 1955, the govern-

ment sought to increase the productivity of agriculture through rational
ization of production of cultivable land and equipment.

Prom 1956 to

1961 , the principal era of the so-called "green plans" ("Gruner Plan"),

7.6 billion DM were spent for revenue increasing and cost decreasing
measures and another 12.3 billion DM were spent in the form of general
credits, subsidies and tax privileges.

143

/Also by I960 the number of

farmers was reduced by a third vis-a-vis 1955 und that of farm labour
ers by two-thirds.

Henceforth about a third of German agriculture was

internationally competitive.
This was a strong structural adjustment, an elasticity of
supply promoting measure and a complementary investment to increase the
labour supply for industry all rolled into one.
questionably beneficial.

The impact was un

Moreover the government was quite willing to

finance some of the cost via higher prices to the consumer, a move that
was non-market-conforming and against the social interest according to
"Social Market" theory.

In this case then its logic is lacking.

142

It

H.Busch, Steuerliche Entlastungen einzelner Wirtschaftsbereiche
- Ein Problem der sektoralen Pinanzpolitik. Dissertation (Cologne :
(no publisher), 19&5), p. 107.
Lilge.
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is not surprising for its is well known that the government's interven
tion in this sector was encouraged in part by the well-organized farmers'
pressure group under Erhard's personal friend

Rehwinkel, and that some

of the subsidies coincided with national elections.

The programme has

never been completed to bring 10Q-j of the units up to international stan
dards of efficiency, requiring the exit of 2 million more farmers from
their occupations.
The outstanding success in the housing programme has been
the most positive "Social. Market" inspired structural intervention.

In

the period up until 1966 there have been more than half a million units
built annually, for Germany is the record holder internationally.

The

basis for this interference was clearly phrased in terms of "Social
Market Economy5' doctrine:

the market economy after the war was too weak

to produce social equilibrium, and so public regulation of production
became necessary.

Rents were kept below what they would have been,

given the free interplay of supply and demand, and construction was kept
at a rate above what it would have been, given the natural market forces.
The structural intervention has been carried out in four
phases according to the legislation introduced.
the last regulation was instituted in 1963.
1950 created three categories of housing;

It began in 1950 and

The first housing law in
namely, the publicly financed,

the tax privileged and the privately financed type according to the
degree of restrictions on rents and the origin of the support.
p,J,

144

A. Hampe, "Strukturwandlungen in der Wohungswirtschaft"
Strukturwandlungen. ed, Neumark, p. 969 .
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this period which lasted until 1955* 50/^ of the investments in housing
were financed by government funds and only 39/0 by private capital., mort
gages constituting the rest.

The second set of laws implemented in 1955

and 1956 moderated the restrictions on rents somewhat and encouraged more
building of private homes.

During this period the proportion of public

funds was consistently reduced to 30-4-Qo of the total and privately finan
ced mortgages attained more importance.

Quasi-cooperative building funds,

("Bausparkassen") were also slowly entering the investment business.
The last two housing laws significantly cut the amount of public money
engaged and the restrictions on rents.

The first one in 196l eased the

restrictions on rents in tax-privileged and old houses, while the subsidi
zation through public funds continued by means of low interest rates on
loans.

The principle of the "white county"vas also introduced, which

meant that where the excess housing demand was less than 3% the rent res
trictions were cancelled on all old privately financed housing.

This law

was complemented in 1963 by a further law redefining the relationship be
tween owner and tenant and revising the remaining rent restrictions which
took the form of ceilings, upward to correspond approximately to the actual
maintenance costs.

Prom Table 31 it can be seen that although public in

vestments always increased absolutely, they constitute only 20/o of the
total invested now.

Much of the continuing success of encouraging the

private capital to invest in housing stems from the cooperative nature of
the investment process.

Public funds were contributed conditional on

sizeable concurrent private contributions.

These contributions came

about by virtue of the fact that consumptive expenditures were replaced
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by investive ones.
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After seventeen years of government direction the

housing need has been met.
The other successful interventions are more or less of minor
individual importance.

The German tax system is filled with special

provisions for privileges under certain conditions, such as those allowing
higher depreciation allowances for sewerage investments and for water
pollution control, etc.

Since the eariy sixties, however, the Federation

of German Industiy has generally no longer demanded subsidies or special
tax privileges.

Its emphasis has shifted much more to demands for equal

izing the starting conditions of industry in international competition
than to structural aids.
An important field in which the intervention of the government
has been very unsuccessful is the coal mining industiy.

Ever since the

late fifties this industiy has been plagued with overcapacity, partly attri
butable to the excessive expansion encouraged several years earlier.

The

mine owners, nevertheless, came up with "metaeconomic" arguments like the

Ili-S

farmers and secured support for rationalization and consolidation programmes.
But in contrast to the agricultural sector a concrete programme was not set
up until five years later.
production process.

The structural aid funds did not improve the

Finally, in 1963 a structural plan came into existence,

fostering the combination and shutting down of unprofitable mines, reducing
the tax rates on undistributed profits to encourage modernization, and

'^+'> J. Hoffner, Jahrbuch des Instituts fur Christliche
Sozialwissenchaften. (Munster: Verlag Regensburg, 19 6d), p.100.

Mertens, p. 169.
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promoting the use of coal in industry through accelerated depreciation
147
rates for the construction costs of the factory using it.

At the

same time different methods were used to retrain workers for other jobs
cr pension the older workers if they so desired.

Still, productivity

changes to this day cannot be witnessed and the workers resist moving to
other industries.

Erhard was never able to solve the problem while in

office.
The example shows that a structural intervention designed to
shrink an industry is always more difficult than an intervention with
an expansionary purpose.

The case of the coal mining industry in the

two instances, 1952 and 190, shows this contrast poignantly.

And only

a resolute government can succeed especially since contraction brings
sociological and political complications with it.

But worst of all,

and this is the ultimate critique of the coal mine intervention, were
the indecision and contradictions accompanying it.

Subsidies were paid

to economize on the one hand, and on the other the use of the product was
encouraged.

The opinion has often been voiced that the intervention did

not aim for a positive restructuring but for the preservation of an in
efficient overexpanded industry, and that is under any conditions irreconciliable with the premises of a "Social Market Economy” .

An almost

similar condition prevails at this time in the shipping industry, except
that it does not catch the eye as much as the traditional Rhr coal indus
try.

One must, nevertheless, see the problems of an industry such as

coal mining in international perspective.

Most countries in the world

Mesenberg, p. 678.
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are presently facing a situation of high operating costs and excess
supply of coal.

Inexpensive hydroelectric power and oil and gas have

placed the industry at a severe disadvantage that makes its ultimate
contraction inevitable,

What the

German government can be reproached

for are the endless delays that prevented any decisions from being final
ized after intervention had been decided upon and the extent that Erhard
was influenced by the mine owners to decide in their favour.

Even agri

culture, another "enfant terrible" of most developed countries proved to
be less of a problem in Germany.
Whether contractive interventions will be successful in the
future cannot be determined a priori, for much of the coal industry dilemma
rested on Erhard1s shoulders, and he is no longer in any executive decision
making position.

’What is certain is that more similar problems will arise

as more traditional primary industries will lose their competitiveness to
newer ones.

The steel industry has,fortunately, already taken the first

step to consolidation itself after the High Commission of the EEC in
Luxembourg allowed it to set up an all-embracing counting-house system,
("Stahlkontore" ) ,
to such industries.
there.

The free competitive process is no longer of much help
The price mechanism has long lost its advantages

There is much that the government can and must do in the future,

if positive economic growth is to be maintained.
spared many a task;

So far it has been

industry has been able to adapt fairly well on its own.

Now it is necessary once more to turn to the second step of the
analysis of the growth process, the financial aspect.
government influence here is taken for granted.

By its very nature

Monetary and fiscal
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policy automatically have a certain effect on growth.

Prcrn what could

he seen from the statistics, government monetary and fiscal policy seem
to have succeeded to a considerable degree in both creating the ability
cjid the will to save in the postwar era, and both continue undiminished
in the present.

However, it was seen that the disposition of the savings

was not always satisfactory.

Of most importance for the financing of

German growth have been the taxation system, in general, and the laws
governing the capital market within it, in particular.
The characteristic of the German tax system is that it has gone
very far in creating specific encouragements and discouragements in great
detail to further a certain economic behaviour.

It is a remnant in some

respects of the allied occupation after the war.

Taxes in that period

were very high;

for example, there was a 5Qo tax rate on an annual income

*
118
of 25,000 EM, and the marginal 50,3 rate began at 9,000 EM.

7/hen the

allies refused the German government to undertake a general tax cut, it
simply punctured the system,

providing tax privileges for funds invested

in certain areas, such an exports and public utilities.

Hence business

men were virtually compelled by the tax saving opportunities to invest at
very high rates, for the tax savings rose cumulatively with the income
bracket.

Because the investments were at the same time financed by means

of raising prices the amount of savings was further augmented.
higher the income the higher wan the saving.

And the

Naturally the large savings

were achieved at the cost of a grossly unequal distribution of wealth,
which still continues today.

The unequal wealth distribution is new
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encouraged, however, not “by tax privileges for selective investment but
by the degree of the progression of the income tax rate.

The maximum

rate which anyone must pay is 53/a today, compared with Q8/o for the
United States, for example, while at low incomes the rate increases much
more steeply.
Fortunately, the social, security system has taken much of the
edge off the otherwise ruthless methods of taxation designed to finance
the promote investment.

At low levels of income the problem of in

security as to sickness or accident is non-existent.

As Reuss stated

it, the system works through incentives at the top and through paterna
lism at the bottom.

Moreover, if one compares the absorption by pay

roll taxes including social security taxes of income otherwise used for
consumption with the savings of the public insurance funds, it is clear
that the German social security system is an additional channel of sa
vings that can be injected into investment, the fruits of which the
middle and lower classes certainly partially reap.

149

The same held

true throughout the fifties for the LAG funds, the equalization of
burdens tax, which Hauser has estimated were saved and invested up to

150

50^o.

* Finally, not only did collective savings contribute poten

tially to investment by virtue of the customary discrepancy between
absorption and savings, but the very collectivity gave an additional
impetus, for it increased the lending capacity of the banking system.
In the sixties the procurement of savings was no longer
strictly dependent on the existence of such an institutional, system
^

Reuss, p. 182.
Hauser, p. 135.
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that created forced savings.

Savings other than those generated by

the social security system were possible on the part of the middle
classes.

However, to organize them, higher interest rates for savings

by the less privileged were paid if they kept them there for specific
periods.

The success can be shown in Table 28 and is considerable.

Premium saving ("Pramiensparen"), as it was called, increased from
nothing in 1959 to over a billion EM in 1965.

The reason the govern

ment resorted to this .means is attributable to the low popularity of
securities among the less privileged.

In order not to let the funds

leak into consumption, a saving incentive had to be provided.

Among

the higher classes, the higher rates of saving and investment still
continue.
While the government has thus had remarkable success in
organizing household savings in latter years, it has not been equally
successful in seeing that they are productively applied.

As has been

mentioned already, the problem lies in the fact that a 5Qu proportion
of household savings is too great to carry for the still not fully de
veloped capital market and the imperfect transfer system between the
suppliers and demanders of credit.

Corporate savings have been neglect

ed in recent years, as can be seen in the rapid shrinkage of their pro
portion.

The tax system has discriminated against this form of saving

ever since the latter part of the fifties.

It is in the discrimination

toward corporate savings that a burden of the tax system is found.

The

discouragement of this form of saving is a misallocation of resources in
an e conomy that must rejuvenate its economic structure at an accelerated
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rate to remain internationally competitive.

The decline in the propor

tion of corporate savings can he attributed first of all to the different
and changing method of taxation of distributed and undistributed profits,
and secondly to the lower depreciation allowances progressively instituted.
During the early fifties the latter were high and constituted the princi
pal weapon for encouraging corporate investment.

They were especially

effective as part of the "Investment Aid Law" of 1952.

The high depre

ciation allowances were actually still higher as a result of rule that
firms were able to use the "Teilwert" (partial value) appraisal method;
that, a specific capital good was evaluated not on the basis of purchase
price but on the basis of its value as part of the total production comlex, a method leaving room for much administrative discretion.

In 1958,

however, the system was replaced by a more rigid scheme of regressive
depreciation allowances limiting the minimum deductible amount in the
first year to 25% and permitting a maximum value of 67.2/1 to be written
off in five years.

A new lav/ in i960 lowered the first year's allowable

write-off to 20,1, placing Germany internationally in the worst competitive
position.

(Table 32).

In fact, German firms are not even taking advan-

151
tage of the maximum permissible depreciation rates as Melder has shown.
Hence they cannot be really suffering under the low rates, and it is a
tribute to the firms ability to provide adequate finance at low cost.
There are bound to be some firms to whom the low limit does, however, pro
vide a restraint to their ability to expand,

Hor the larger enterprises

the value of higher depreciation allowances will certainly become clearer
151
Melder, p. 135.
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the greater the replacement requirements will become.
The negative influence on corporate savings resulting from
the altering taxation of distributed and undistributed profits has been
generally of more importance.

The first German instituted tax reform

sifter the occupation era, known as the "small" tax reform, set the tax
rate on distributed profits at 3Q/o, and that on undistributed profits
at 6ofo.

Such obvious discouragement of financing through retained

earnings was ended under the influence of the drastic need for invest
ment funds beginning with the boom a year later in 1953.

The tax re

form of 1954, known as the "big" reform, changed the relationship to
3Qe and 45yo for distributed and undistributed profits respectively.
However, in 1958 the roles were drastically reversed to a
for undistributed and distributed profits.

a-nd 15%

7/hen in 1959 the stock

market reform allowed the corporations the tax free change of undistri
buted profits into stock capital, the decline in self-financing was well
under way.

This law meant simply that the undistributed profits could

be distributed tax free as shares, which limited the use of the funds
for reinvestment.

No change has since been made in the tax rates appli

cable to the effect that German companies are again in the worst position
internationally with respect to taxation of undistributed profits.
Erhard always believed that because of the fear of inflation and the un
equal distribution of income it would be good to reduce financing through
retained earnings further,

regardless of the adverse effects on the

industry's position.
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And this occurred at a time when the transfer of private
capital to investment was hampered.

As the statistics show, since

1961 the volume of government fixed interest securities have increased
enormously, funds which are not productively invested except in housing,
where the government has been taking over mortgages.

Because of the

great volume the public sector demands the interest rates have likewise
risen, and that naturally constitutes another block to the greater par
ticipation of industry in the capital market.
the supply and the demand remains.

The discrepancy between

One cannot be certain whether those

sectors which require the most investment funds will actually obtain
them, and even if they can the price will be too high.

This failure of

the government to create a capital market must be regarded as one of its
major faults.

Even if the proportion of self-financing ever rises again

to international averages, industry cannot do without a well functioning
capital market to turn to if it needs funds to retain its high growth
rate.

The performance of the economy under these conditions is remark

able, but, and in this manner one can conclude every section in this
analysis, it does not insure permanent continuation.

Certainly the

principle of the establishment of a good capital market should be regard
ed as market conforming in philosophic harmony with the "Social Market
Econony” .
Conclusion
In conclusion, the findings of this chapter should once again
be summarized.

Investment and capital formation were analyzed as growth

influences from the point of view of objective factors and economic policy
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influences.

It was seen that West Germany has had a most successful

growth record in the postwar period hut that this record is being pro
gressively jeopardized.

Both objective and subjective influences are

discernable as causes, and they are closely connected with investment
end capital formation.

The existence of a capital goods oriented eco

nomic structure was seen to have contributed greatly to growth.

It

meant large exports, economies of scale and great productivity gains
that brought prosperity to the economy.

In the consumption goods

sector growth was achieved through technical progress and innovation
■under the pressure of a shortage of labour.

Structural interferences

on the part of the government were helpful in sectors that required
expansion.

Shipbuilding, housing, agriculture and primary industries

owe their growth to government economic policy.

Housing is noteworthy

because the structural interference was an overwhelming success of
"Social Market" theory.

In the other sectors nationalism, the desire

for reconstruction and lobbying were more important considerations,
but these interventions must be regarded as secondary explanations re
lative to the objective factors as causes of Germany's growth.
Economic policy was more influential as far as the "financ
ing" of investment and growth is concerned.

The government successfully

exploited the already present savings mentality of Germans, particularly
at higher income levels.

The action exemplified the essence of the

"Social Market Economy" , incentive at the top and paternalism at the
bottom.

Both factors were seen to have contributed to the savings

effort, the regressive tax at the top, and the social security system
at the bottom.
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The progressive jeopardization of the growth of the German
economy in the sixties could be explained similarly by the structural
factors and the system of financing that underlies them.

Whereas

structure and financing did not require coordination in the fifties,
when aggregate demand was always greater than supply, since 1962 it
lias become essential.

The savings that result from incentive at the

top must be applied productively.

Economic policy has not been acccm-

'nodated to fit the new requirements.

It is, however, questionable

whether the lack of accommodation was attributable alone to the handsoff attitude of "Social Market" theory on this point.

At a time when

growth industries are in great need of investment funds to finance their
expansion, the government's tax laws are progressively discriminating
against self-financement and the government's borrowing volume limits
industries use of the capital market.

In the immediate postwar era

self-financing via prices had been the only possibility to get capital
and it was permitted because reconstruction was necessary.

Later Erhard

feared inflation and income inequalities, and so he counteracted the
practice.

Thus taxes on retained earnings were raised and depreciation

allowances lowered.

Ibis would indicate that the "Social Market" prin

ciple of countering inflation was the causal consideration.

If discri

mination against self-financement is to persist, only a better utiliza
tion of the rising household savings will secure the continuation of
growth.

Parodoxically this would require a more elaborate structural

interference policy than the automatic device that self-financing pro
vided.

There are, in fact, signs that economic policy does tend in
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this direction.

The reorganization of steel industry in 1967 was an

indication that henceforth competition was no longer required in the
primary industries.

German economic policy with respect to investment

and capital formation has become on the whole less competition oriented
than it might have had to be if considerations of inflation and income
distribution had not become such vital questions.
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CONCLUSION

In the introduction the object of this thesis was defined
to be the evaluation of the effect of economic policy on Germany's
economic development in the postwar period in general and in particular
the extent to which that policy was motivated by thetheory of a "Social
Market Economy".

In conclusion, some general comments should be made

as to what was revealed in this purpose.

The "Social Market Economy"

itself was found to be not a system of concrete economic policy but an
economic philosophy, idealistic and individualistic in its outlook.
The pillars of the "Social Market" theory, competition and social better
ment, primarily evolve through the philosophical attitudes of those res
ponsible for the execution of the whole gammut of day-to-day economic
policies.

Exceptions certainly exist and they have been mentioned in

the text.
Consequently, the successful development that the German
economy has displayed in the postwar period was revealed rarely to rely
on the tenets of "Social Market" doctrine.

The positive and beneficial

balance of payments position was above all accounted for by the favourable
composition of German industry, its technical ability and the non-colonial
ambitions of the country.

Economic policy contributed little of positive

152
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value;

it was not necessary that it did.

But the emphasis on trade

liberalization and comparative advantage by the German government was
inspired by "Social Market" theory.

The European Economic Cammunity

tiiat was thus helped into existence certainly stimulated the develop
ment of the German economy.

It is, nevertheless, difficult to show

it as a direct outcome of "Social. Market" theory.
Similar logic holds for investment and capital, formation.
Their successful record of growth was the outcome of a fast growing
capital goods oriented economy, German nationalism, the desire for
reconstruction and the German saving mentality.

The less successful

record of the sixties can, likewise, be explained by these factors to
a great extent.

Economic policy played a somewhat more important

role, however, than it did in the case of the balance of payments
question.

The industrial structure was favourable to rapid growth,

but the government had to exploit and support this positive inclina
tion by enabling the financing.

Erhard's policy of "incentive at

the top and paternalism at the bottom" was

the propeller in the fif

ties, and it was directly inspired by "Social Market " theory.

As

long as all sectors of the economy required expansion and there was no
problem of inflation this strategy worked quite well.

When the six

ties came along the danger of inflation and overexpanded industries,
however, complicated the problem.

Structural policies were required

which necessitated intervention in many sectors that were contracting
and special incentives to those needing to expand.

'With the exception

of the contrived success in the provision of housing, the government's
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economic policy has been unable to cope with this more complex problem.
"Social Market" theory provided no guidelines in this regard and so
could not be of help nor hindrance.

It has had an influence only in

directly in the sense that "Social Market" motivated anti-inflation
policy has discriminated against growth industries through progressively
heavy taxation of retained earnings.
The problem of inflation has indeed provided the government
with most of its problems of economic policy although not so much its
economic development problems.

The degree of inflation that Germany

experienced since the war, particularly since the sixties, has not been
excessive in comparison with other countries, but it has shown that
economic policy has not been able to cope with the problem.

The govern

ment's counter-inflation oriented economic policy has suffered from the
overemphasis on monetary policy, the unwillingness to use anti-cyclical
fiscal policy, the unsuccessful moral suasion attempts on the part of
the economics minister and the division of levels of government.
defects are almost exclusively related to "Social Market" theory.

These
After

disastrous experiences with inflation in the past, monetary discipline
became the watchword of the "Social Market Economy .

Fiscal policy was

not suitable for the competitive mechanism nor was much attention paid
to it, for only a balanced budget was constitutionally legalized.

The

"Lander", moreover, did not have any sense of financial responsibility
as they consistently went into debt regardless of the cyclical period.
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Counter-inflation policy was consequently the most negative aspect
of "Social Market" motivated economic policy and thus contributed
strongly to the slowdown of the economic development of Germany in
the sixties.
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TABLE I
INTERNATIONAL TRADE:GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC I950-I965(mill.DM)

1950

II374

8362

232

170

25

23

18

1951

14726

14577

297

294

26

32

29

I

36

10

1952

16203

16909

325

399

31

36

35

6

40

4

1953

I60I0

18526

318

368

35

40

38

3

44

4

1954

19337

22035

380

433

43

49

47

9

53

9

1955

24472

25717

467

500

54

56

58

II

61

8

1956

27964

30961

538

593

60

65

64

6

70

9

1957

31697

35698

602

683

67

74

70

6

78

8

1958

3II33

36998

584

694

72

78

75

5

81

3

1959

35823

4II84

659

785

85

87

87

12

89

8

I960

42723

47946

771

865

100

100

100

13

100

II

1961

44363

50975

790

907

Io7

106

106

16

105

5

1962

49498

52975

869

930

123

110

119

13

107

2

1963

52277

58310

908

1013

131

122

126

7

117

10

1964

58839

64920

IOIO

III4

146

134

138

12

138

II

1965

70448

7I65I

1193

1214

169

145

159

21

136

8

Source:

26

Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik
Nftnt-Cinhl and ;TQFin-TQ66 .

COLUMN I: TOTAL IMPORTS
2: TOTAL EXPORTS
3: PER CAPITA IMPORTS
4; PER CAPITA EXPORTS
5; IMPORT VOLUME INDEX 1960=100
6: EXPORT VOLUME INDEX 1960=100
7&8: PER CAPITA VODUME INDEX OF IMPORTS
AND ANNUAL CHANGE
9&I0; PER CAPITA VOLUME INDEX OF EXPORTS
AND ANNUAL CHANGE
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TABLE 2
MERCHANDISE TRADE AND THE BALANCE OP PAYMENTS
GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC 1958-1965(mill.DM)

1958

58134

50629

75.05

48528

40490

7838

5598

4240

1959

4 2911

55159

6752

55549

46559

6990

5814.

5176

I960

50385

41805

8580

62262

54820

7442

5960

5482

1961

53525

45558

9767

65241

56760

6481

5824

265.7

1962

55464

49256

6228

68707

65677

3030

4556

-1 5 0 6

1963

6II05

51957

9166

750II

69080

5951

4289

1642

1964

68216

58562

9654

85549

78123

5426

4220

1206

1965

75455

70560

5095

91950

92345

-595

415,2

4547

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die HundaarepuhUk
Deutachl and^QHS-TQfifi.

COLUMN Is MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
2: MERCHANDISE IMPORTS
3* BALANCE X-M
4» BALANCE OP PAYMENTS CREDITS
5: BALANCE OP PAYMENTS DEBITS
6 ; BALANCE X-M

7: PAYMENTS BY FOREIGN MILITARY
8 ? BALANCE OP PAYMENTS BALANCE - MILITARY COMPONENT
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TABLE 5
INDEXES OF MAIN IMPORTS' AND EXPORTS' PRICES
(1958=100)
GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC 1958-1965 (mill.DM)

IMPORTS
PRODUCTS

1958

1959

I960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

Textiles

100

9 8 .6

105.6

104.6

IOI.O

107.7

1 1 2 .0

108.9

Oil

100

91.1

87.6

78.8

76.7

75.7

72.4

69.1

Chemical
Products
Mach'y

100

9 6 .2

96.0

91.1

86.4

84.0

8 4 .6

8 5 .8

100

99.8

1 0 0 .2

98.5

99.5

1 0 0 .2

Io2. 2

103.1

Refined
& Prec.
Metals

100

Io9.I

113.4

1 0 6 .6

105.6

1 0 6 .6

118.5

103.0

Ores

100

82.2

82.0

81.3

75.4

69.5

70.7

71.4

TOTAL

100

97.5

9 0 .2

94.5

93.6

95.8

97.8

1 0 0 .2

M acH'y

100

100.3

103.2

107.0

I0 8 .8

1 1 2 .9

1 1 6 .1

1 2 1 .1

Vehicles

100

9 8 .8

9 8 .2

9 8 .6

99.5

99.5

99.8

I0I.3

Chemical
Products
Elect'1
Mach'y
Textiles

100

97.7

9 6 .0

92.9

89.7

88.9

89.5

90.3

100

100.4

I0I.3

102.9

103.5

103.7

105.2

107.5

100

95.0

99.9

98.3

97.6

9 8 .8

99.4

100.4

Coal&Coke

100

9 6 .2

95.5

94.8

95.6

97.4

100.4

100.5

EXPORTS
PRODUCTS

TOTAL

1 0 0 .6
104.2
100.5
100.5
100.3
106.7
Source: SftaUsiUisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrenublik Deutsche
1958-1966,
100

99.2
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TABLE 4
MOST IMPORTANT EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC I958-I965(mill.DM)
1962
11 7 7 8 ’

1963
1253'2

13779

6529

7098

8551

9742

10806

5604

5887

6161

7033

8052

8895

5807

4074

7555

4724

5132

5774

6455

3183

3717

7386

4493

7349

7063

7742

883.5

Textiles

1810

2072

2375

2427

2680

3179

3688

4057

Coal&Coke

1997

2036

2310

2253

2258

2424

2 246

2079

Prof. Instrumts

1015

1125

1218

1299

1364

1699

1749

1815

TOTAL

6998

4II84

47978

50978

52975

58310

64920

7I65I

IMPORTS
Textile

3597

3981

4970

4790

5428

5823

6449

7494

Oil

1965

2299

2885

3113

3829

4405

4951

5045

Iron&Ir onProds.

II9I

2388

3030

2903

3209

3208

4118

4322

Fruit&Veg's

2270

2457

2650

2996

3502

3324

3624

4579

Refined. Metals

1558

2076

2970

2766

2378

2413

3448

4409

Non-elt.Mach'y

I2II

1516

2151

2740

3064

2981

3408

4357

Chem.Products

1579

1891

2448

2341

2506

2825

3457

4256

Ores

1709

1628

2344

2205

1830

1713

2226

2380

3II33

36823

42723

44363

49498

52277

58839

70448

1958
'"7560

1959
Yb92

I960
9065

Vehicles

4838

5579

6327

Chem.Products

4199

4936

Iron&IronProds.

5206

Elect'l Mach'y

EXPORTS
Machinery

TOTAL

1961
1098b"”

1964
"

"

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrenublik Deutschland

laaa-riasg.
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1965
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TABLE 5
ORIGIN OP MAIN IMPORTS,DESTINATION OP MAIN EXPORTS
GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC 1958-1965(mill.DM)
1958

1959

I960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

U.S.A.

4193

4576

5974

6097

7033

7941

8066

9196

Prance

1595

2761

3998

4618

5270

5495

6270

7843

Netherlands

2500

3500

3638

3762

4196

4788

5350

6826

Italy

1698

2182

2631

3043

3745

3700

4468

6562

Belgium&
Luxemburg
EEC

1410

1776

2441

2355

2765

3359

4305

5416

7193

9843

12708

13778

15966

17343

20393

26647

U.K.

1351

1630

1956

1965

2351

2472

2782

3141

Sweden

I4II

1533

1804

1930

2000

2014

2304

2472

Switzerland

1167

1432

1627

1612

1707

1722

1839

2226

Prance

2154

2970

4202

4777

5440

6432

7424

7792

Netherlands

2995

3465

4210

4755

4883

5718

6735

7391

Switzerland

2062

2408

2991

3620

3583

4142

4879

5741

U.S.A..

2642

3776

3723

3454

3858

4195

4785

5558

Italy

1853

2202

2847

3385

4106

5462

4592

4651

Belgium&
Luxemburg
Austria

2453

2489

2890

3262

3997

4285

4561

4499

1847

I960

2444

2686

2757

2938

3295

3798

EEC

9465

III26

I4I49

I6I29

18426

21897

23312

24333

COUNTRY
IMPORTS

EXPORTS

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrenublik
Deutschland,1958-1966.
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TABLE 6

CAPITAL ACCOUNT:GERMAN FEDERALREPUBLIC 1958-1965

4

“

INDICATES NET INCREASE IN FOREIGN ASSETS

1958

5580

1959

4044

I960

6309

1961

3232

1962

-1317

1963

355

1964

2049

1965

4003

(mill.DM)

Source: Stacistisches Jahrbuch fur die
Bundesreoublik Deutschland
1965-1966.
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TABLE 7
INDEXES OP WHOLESALE PRICES (I958*Ioo)

USA

Prodn
Goods

Consn Bldg
Goods Mats
Germany-

Basic
Mats

Year

Fr.

Ger.

Jap.

1955

81

97

99

93

96

99

96

97

99

1956

85

99

104

96

98

100

98

100

100

1957

90

100

107

99

100

100

100

101

105

1958

100

100

100

100

1000

100

100

100

100

1959

105

99

101

100

100

100

100

101

95

I960

107

100

102

100

100

100

101

101

100

1961

110

102

103

100

Iol

102

104

102

102

1962

113

103

101

100

102

104

107

101

Io2

1963

117

104

103

100

102

106

108

101

104

1964

119

104

103

100

104

106

III

103

106

1965

121

107

104

102

106

108

IL2

106

107

1966

123

109

108

Io5

108

III

113

108

108

Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook. 1965.1966,
U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. October.1967.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Texs

TABLE 8
INDEX OP GERMANY'S CONSUMER PRICES
(1958=100)

Year

Index

1955

94

1956

95

1957

98

1958

100

1959

101

I960

102

1961

105

1962

108

1963

III

1964

114

1965

118

1966

122

Source: United Nations, Statlstic
Yearbook. 196*5.1966.
U.N. Monthly Bulletin of
Statistics.October, 1967.
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TABLE 9
INDEX OF AVERAGE WEEKLY GROSS PAY(1962*100)
OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORK FORCE BY SECTORS
Year

Indy

Mining

RawMats&
ProdnGds

I Gds

C Gds

Constn

1958

70.6

79.9

70.4

6 9 .6

67.9

70.9

1959

74.4

81.2

74.5,

70.3

72.1

15.1

I960

81.3

84.7

81.6

80.7

80.1

81.8

1961

89.7

9 2 .0

90.6

88.4

89.9

88.9

1962

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

1963

107.5

106.9

107.0

1 0 6 .0

1 0 9 .0

109.5

1964

116 .5

1 1 2 .8

115.8

1 1 6 .2

1 1 6 .9

1 2 0 .1

1965

127.9

126.3

126.4

127.2

128.3

131.5

TABLE 10
INDEX OF AVERAGE MONTHLY GROSS PAY(I958rIOO)
OF SALARIED WORKERS IN INDUSTRY AND TRADE
1958

100.0

100.0

1 0 0 .o

100.0

100.0

100.0

1959

103.7

99.8

104.3

103.0

104.2

106.1

I960

III.3

104.1

1 1 2 .9

119.6

1 1 2 .5

113.9

1961

I2o .8

III.7

122.9

119.5

1 2 3 .2

122.9

1962

130.9

120.7

1 3 2 .1

129.3

134.0

140.1

1963

138.4

126.9

139.4

135.8

1 4 2 .8

150.7

1964

146.6

133.5

147.7

143.3

151.7

164.1

1965

1 5 8 .8

144.8

1 6 0 .0

154.9

163.5

177.4

Source:

Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland^ I958-I966T
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TABLE II

CHANGE IN LABOUR COSTS PER UNIT OP OUTPUT
OP SELECTED COUNTRIES

USA

0

Ger.

3%

J ap.

\1o

Can.

fyfo

Pr.

4 of

Italy

Mo

GB

2$
1958-64

0
5 &

51o
IM
Ifo

1964-66

Source: Geachaftsberichte der Deutschen
Bundesbank 1965-66. Monatsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank
1965-66 .
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TABLE 12
SELECTED INDICATORS
(BY COLUMNS)
INDEX OP CONTRACTUAL WAGES OP MALE AND FEMALE EMPLOYEES IN
MANUFACTURING AND GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY(1962*100)
EMPLOYMENT(IN MILLIONS)
CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN
CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN
CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN
CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN

INVESTMENT GOODS INDUSTRY
USER GOODS INDUSTRY
CONSUMPTION GOODS INDUSTRY
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

1958

75.7

18.2

1959

78.5

18.5

I960

84.1

20.3

90

90

91

89

1961

90.9

20.7

89

86

89

87/

1962

100.0

21.1

88

89

89

88

1963

106.7

21.3

87

88

89

87

1964

III.3

21.6

88

91

90

89

1965

122.6

21.8

88

91

91

89

1966

131.5

21.9

83

88

87

84

Source: IFO-Institut fur Wiri:schaftsforschung, Die Wirtschaftsentwicklung der Bundesrepublikj1964-65*
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TABLE 13

PROPORTIONS OF SPENDING

Y ear

Govt
Consumption

Investment

private
Consumption

1954^100
Index PC

1950

14.8

22.8

63.6

90.0

19 51

14.8

23.0

60.3

98.0

1952

15.7

22.8

59.0

IOI.O

1953

14.9

21.4

59.9

99.0

1954

14.5

22.0

60.0

100.0

1955

13.6

26.3

58.3

102.0

1956

12.9

25.1

59.2

104.0

1957

12.8

24.3

58.7

107.0

1958

13.4

23.7

59.0

108.0

1959

13.6

24.9

58.2

IIO.O

I960

13.6

26.7

56.8

III.5

1961

14.7

26.6

56.9

114.6

1962

15.0

26.4

57.6

118.7

1963

15.7

25.8

57.2.

121.4

1964

15.0

27.5

56.3

124.2

1965

15.6

27.7

56.9

128.1

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik Peut3chland]
1955-66.
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TABLE 14

INDEBTEDNESS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR(mill.DM)

Year

Federal
Govt

Lander
Govts

Local
Govts

1962

7285

5411

7440

1963

I025I

5422

16800

1964

I09I0

4521

20510

1965

12069

7557

24900

Source: Geachaftsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank.1965.
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TABLE 15

SELECTED INDICATORS

Year

Industrial
Price Index
I96a-IOO

Retail
Price Index
1958=100

Labour
Share oJ
Income

I960

97.6

101

60.8

1961

99.9

103

62.5

1962

100.0

107

63.9

1963

100.5

109

64.5

1964

I0I.6

112

64.6

1965

104.0

115

66.0

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland^1958-66.
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TABLE 16

INDEXES OP PRODUCTIVITY
PRODUCTION PER HOUR OP EMPLOYMENT
(1958=100)

Year

Mining

Raw Mats&
Prodn Gds

I Gds

C Gds

Pood

TOTAL

I960

119.0

122.3

114.7

118.0

107.1

116.6

1961

127.9

126.1

119.8

125.3

112.8

122.0

1962

138.5

135.6

124.1

135.1

118.5

129.3

1963

149.9

145.6

128.5

142.6

124.7

135.5

1964

159.3

162.2

137.2

153.5

132.6

147*8

1965

166.0

170.7

142.8

164.7

139.7

155.0

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
1958-66.
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TABLE 17

INDEX OP ACTUAL AND CONTRACTUAL EARNINGS
IN THE ECONOMY
(1960=100)

Year

CE

AE

Change in CE

Change in AE

-

-

III

8.5$

11.0$

116.9

121

7.7$

9.0$

1963

122.9

128

5.2$

6.1$

1964

120.0

139

4.9$

8.9$

1965

137.7

152

6.7$

9.c$

I960

100. 0

100.0

1961

108.5

1962

Source: Geschaftsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank^963-66.
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TABLE 18

HOUSING DEFICIT INDEX
(IOOO represents no deficit)

I960

681.9

1961

744.1

1962

809.9

1963

806.9

1964

775.4

1965

795.4

Source: Geschaftsberichte der Deutschen
Bundesbank.1965-66. Monatsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank
1965-66.
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TABLE 19

DISCOUNT RATES OP THE GERMAN CENTRAL BANK
Date

Rate($)

4.8.55

3l

8.3.56

41

19.5.56

51

6.9.56

5

II.I.57

41

19.9.57

4

17.I.58

31

27.6.58

3

10.I.59

CM

4.9.59

3

23.10.59

4

3.6.60

5

II.11.60

4

20.I.61

31

5.5.61

3

22.1.65

31

13.8.65

4

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bun'
desrepublik Deutschland^1959-66.
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TABLE 20
DEVELOPMENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
CURRENT AND REAL
(bill.DM)

Year

GNP
current

GNP
constant
1954

£
change
12.0

1955
1956

198.8

189.3

7.0

1957

216.3

200.2

5.8

1958

231.5

206.8

3.3

1959

250.9

221.0

6.9

I960

296.8

254.9

8.8

1961

326.2

268.6

5.4

1962

554.5

279.6

4.1

1963

377.6

289.3

3.5

1964

313.8

305.5

6.6

1965

449.6

323.2

4.8

1966

477.9

331.5

2.7

1967

-1.0

Source: IFO-Institut fur Virtschaftsforschung.
Die Zeit.
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TABLE 21

INDEX OP INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION BY SECTORS
(1958*100)

Year

Mining

RawMat.s&
ProdnGds

I Gds

C Gds

Constn

1956

99.2

94.4

91.5

95.1

96.6

1957

100.5

98.9

94.4

99.5

95.4

1958

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

1959

97.0

112.9

107.4

108.0

114.5

I960

99.6

129.5

125.0

118.9

117.4

1961

I0I.2

135.4

135.1

124.9

128.0

1962

103.7

148.1

141.3

136.0

141.3

1963

I0I.9

141.4

138.6

132.7

137.7

1964

105.3

168.4

153.9

156.1

158.9

1965

103.1

178.7

165.1

156.8

162.0

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die Bundesrenublik Deutschland.
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TABLE 22

RELATIVE GROWTH EFFECTS 1954-1962
(In; percent)

Nominal
Growth

Sector

Real
Growth

Price
Factor

Mining &
Raw Mats
Steel Industry

77.5

55.1

74.5

149.9

91.6

50.4

Machinery

167.1

112.6

25.6

Road & Aircraft
Construction
Shipping

108.6

105.6

1.4

-51.9

-47.7

50.4

Electronics

161.6

148.8

5.2

Consumers
G^oods
Small Industry

99.1

66.0

19.9

125.4

44.1

55.0

Housing

186.8

88.5

52.5

Trade

172.1

115.9

27.2

TOTAL

158,8

92.2

54.5

Source:

Input-Output Rechnung
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TABLE 23

INVESTMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OP
THE CURRENT GNP

Year

Percentages

I960

24.1

1961

28.0

1962

25.6

1963

25.4

1964

26.5

1965

26.7

1966

26.4

Source: Die Zeit.
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TABLE 24
GROSS INVESTMENT BY SECTORS
(bill.DM)

Sector

I960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1970

Agric. &
Forestry

4.91

5.58

5.68

5.61

6.62

7.80

8.20

7.20

7.80

Energy

3.25

3.68

4.34

4.75

5.36

6.00

6.40

5.80

5.80

Mining

1.76

1.70

1.62

1.59

1.29

1.30

1.20

1.10

0.60

Raw Mats &
Prodn Gds

6.53

7.29

7.83

7.88

8.12

9.50

9.80

8.90 11.50

I Goods

5.63

6.72

8.18

5.92

6.55

7.80

8.20

7.30

9.20

C Goods

2.49

2.62

2.82

2.69

2.99

3.80

4.00

3.60

3.40

Foodstuffs

1.57

1.77

1.95

2.07

2.26

2.30

2.40

2.10

2.00

Small Indy

2.21

2.64

3.10

3.00

4.90

5.70

6.10

5.40

6.40

Construction

2.46

2.95

3.61

3.83

4.44

4.50

4.30

3.88

5.90

Trade

5.30

5.49

6.53

6.40

7.40

8.20

8.90

7.90 10.30

Railroads

2.17

2.66

2.94

3.00

3.19

2.40

2.10

1.90

2.50

Shipping

0.88

0.99

0.83

1.03

0.98

1.10

1.20

1.10

0.90

Government

9.42 Io.83 13.41 15.73 18.31 19.30 20.30

-

-

Housing

75.74 17.81 19.77 21.18 24.40 25.90 27.50

-

-

TOTAL

71.42 81.45 90.92 96.03 Io982 I2Q20 126.20 70.00 83.10

INDUSTRY

* estimated values
Source: D.Mertens, W.Kirner, Input-Output Rechnung: Investitionsverflechtung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1950-70.
DIW, Berlin.
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TABLE 24A
INVESTMENT GROWTH
EXCLUSIVE OP HOUSING INFLUENCE
Sector

Growth Rate
196 6-:

Average

Agriculture &
Forestry

8.5

2.1

Energy

8.2

2.0

INDUSTRY
Mining

-45.4

-1 4 .0

Raw Mats &
Prodn Gds

29.8

6.7

I Goods

52.2

7.2

C Goods

-5.7

-0.9

Foodstuffs

-8.5

-

Small Industry

19.2

4.5

Construction

55.5

II.4

Trade

50.1

6.8

Railroads

20.8

4.8

Government

-

Housing

-

TOTAL

18.8

2.2

4.4

Source: Input-Output Rechnung
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TABLE 25
SELECTED INDICATORS
(BY COLUMNS)
GROSS CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IN INDUSTRY
CAPACITY INCREASES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (in percent)
INDEX
INDEX
INDEX
INDEX

OF
OF
OF
OF

ORDERS RECEIVED IN INDUSTRY (1954*100)
TURNOVER IN INDUSTRY (1954*100)
ORDERS IN INVESTMENT GOODS INDUSTRY (1954=100)
ORDERS IN CONSUMPTION GOODS INDUSTRY (1954=100)

1955

9.3

10

137.2

133.6

149.5

124.0

1957

9.3

9

144.5

144.7

154.5

130.0

1958

II.9

10

145.8

147.6

155.4

129.9

1959

13.1

8

188.4

168.6

220.4

151.9

I960

16.4

II

204.3

189.1

264.5

150.7

1961

18.9

7

199.0

199.6

250.5

163.3

1962

19.8

8

208.7

215.4

250.9

172.4

1963

18.5

7

227.8

224.5

283.1

192.1

1964

19.9

9

247.6

246.2

311.3

195.5

1965

23.3

9

264.4

262.4 .

338.2

213.8

1966

23.3

7

253.3

264.1

322.8

193.8

Source: IFO-Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung.
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TABLE 26
INVESTMENT AND THE CAPITAL COEFFICIENT

Investment

1958

1959

I960

1961

1962

1963

Gross Invt.
in Industry

13526

14488

17974

20731

21397

19950

157225

166493

176660

189990

204160

217490

Mining

2.79

2.95

2.92

2.92

2.95

2.95

Raw Mats &
Prodn Gds

1.78

1.87

1.52

1.56

1.60

1.65

I Goods

1.00

1.01

0.96

0.99

1.07

1 . 16

G Goods

1.13

1.13

I.II

1.15

1.16

1.21

TOTAL

1.38

1.36

1.29

1.31

1.36

1.41

Gross Wealth
in Industry
Capital
Coefficients
(K/0 Ratios)

Source: Viertel.jahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, 1965*
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TABLE 27

GROSS INVESTED WEALTH OP GERMAN INDUSTRY
PER EMPLOYEE BY SECTORS
(mill.1958 DM)

Raw Mats&
Year

Mining

Prodn Gds

I Goods

C Goods

TOTAL

1958

35955

34410

13029

II648

20329

1959

39406

35557

13837

12543

21442

I960

43559

35451

I4I86

I30I8

2I86I

1961

46541

36565

15049

13826

22847

1962

50388

39551

16403

14762

24482

1963

54202

42881

17782

15852

26317

1964

57565

45768

18679

17028

27931

Source: Viertel.jahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, 1969*
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TABLE 28
SAVINGS
(mill.DM)

Year

TOTAL

Tax
Privd

Prem
Privd

Savgs
Banks

Cred
Coops

Cred
Banks

Postal
System

1956

24276

2917

-

15606

3418

3782

145.7

1957

29388

3785

-

18655

4140

4615;

1822

1958

36102

4157

-

22882

5081

5698

2786

1959

44268

4045

558

27958

6267

7142

2783

1959*

45039

4051

565

28516

6306

7204

2793

I960

53H4

3216

1408

33724

7554

8402

3274

1961

60424

15,8

2554

38525

8551

9313

3754

1962

69705

57

3972

44407

9843

10896

4204

1962*#

69874

56

3977

44407

I00I2

10896

4204

1963

81522

36

6026

5I7I3

II925

12668

4701

1964

94212

-

7269

59713

I4I60

14681

5196

1965

II0678

10396

69369

17080

17992

5709

_

* Saar added
*# Berlin added
Source: Geschaftsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank.1965<
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TABLE 29
GROSS NEW TURNOVER OF STOCKS AND BONDS
DIVIDENDS AND RETURN
(mill.DM)

Total
NV
5836.2

Diiv$

Ret$

1631.7

AV
1676.2

7.43

4.15

7976.3

1339.5

1214.5

9266.6

8.64

4.64

10048.I

9903.7

1383.0

I85I.3

II43I.I

9.28

3.29

I960

5372.3

5195.4

1904.5

2792.5

7276.8

10.63

2.91

1961

9620.8

9491.4

2192.4

3295.7

II8I3.2

11.79

1.96

1962

II944.5

II84I.I

1506.7

2195.9

I345I.2

13.17

2.49

1963

16584.5

16498.6

IOI5.7

I3I8.8

17600.2

13.65

3.44

1964

17802.4

17596.8

1608.4

2243.0

I94I0.8

13.44

3.16

1965

I622I.9

15761.4

2445.9

3958.7

18867.8

13.24

3.08

Bonds

«
AVy

Year

NV

1957

4204.5

4058.9

1958

8127.I

1959

Stocks
NV

■* Nominal Value
# Actual Value

Source: Wirtschaft und Statistik.1958-1966.
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TABLE 30

BANK CREDIT TO INDUSTRY
(mill.DM)

Year

Industry
Short Term

Industry
Long Term

Housing
Long Term

1956

13706

9246

19557

42866

1957

13694

10222

22661

48805

1958

13781

II535

26276

58806

1959

13882

13672

31650

682II

I960

16354

14320

37076

77910

1961

19769

17202

43219

91737

1962

21065

20897

50554

108961

Source: Monatsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank, 1963.
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TOTAL
Long Term

TABLE 31

INVESTMENT IN HOUSING
(mill.DM)

Year

TOTAL

Public

Capital
Collectors*

1956

10300

3600

4408

1957

10860

3800

4290

1958

115-50

3900

4766

1959

13950

4200

6640

I960

13740

4600

2923

1961

I78I0

4110

9226

1962

19770

4890

10706

1963

21400

4810

II939

1964

24500

4900

13670

1965

26000

5000

14950

* Comprises mainly savings banks, mortgage banks and building
funds.
Source: Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, "Die Finanzierung des Wohnungsbaus in der Bundesrepublik durch
Kapitalsammelstellen im Jahre 1965." Viertel1ahreshe£te
zur Wirtschaftsforschung. 1965.
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TABLE 32

TAX PRIVILEGED DEPRECIATION RATES IN
VARIOUS COUNTRIES
(in percent)

Country

Write Off
First Year

Write Off.
Pive Years

Belgium

22.5

92.5

Canada

30

71.4

Prance

25

76.3

Germany

20

67.2

Italy

25

Japan

45.5

68.2

Netherlands

26.2

85.6

Sweden

30

100

UK

55

91

100

Source: R.Melder, Die Kapitalnachfrage der Privaten Wirtschaft.
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